Counterfactuals seminar 2015-2016
Program
Session 1. 22/09/2015.
Place and time:
Salle Jean Ladrière, 14:00-16:00.
Plan:
- general introduction to the counterfactual seminar by Peter Verdée
- reading "The problem of counterfactual conditionals" by Nelson Goodman
Texts:
Nelson Goodman. “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals." The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 44, No. 5, 1947, pp. 113-128. Pdf.
Slides:
Slides "general" introduction (pdf format)
Session 2. 20/10/2015.
Place and time:
Salle du conseil FIAL. 11:00-13:00.
Plan:
- finishing reading "The problem of counterfactual conditionals" by Nelson Goodman.
- reading chapter 1 "An Analysis of Counterfactuals" from "Counterfactuals" by David Lewis.
Texts:
- Nelson Goodman. “The Problem of Counterfactual Conditionals." The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 44, No. 5, 1947, pp. 113-128. Pdf.
- Lewis, D. K. Counterfactuals. 1973, Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Pdf.
Session 3. 17/11/2015.
Place and time:
Salle Jean Ladrière, 14:00-16:00.
Plan:
- Guided by Rodrigo Cid: reading chapter 1 "Laws Form Counterfactually Stable Sets" from "Laws and Lawmakers" by Marc Lange.
Texts:
- Lange, M. Laws and Lawmakers. 2009, Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press. Pdf.
Slides:
Slides Lange's counterfactualism (pdf format)
Session 4. 15/12/2015.
Place and time:
Salle Jean Ladrière, 14:00-16:00.
Plan:
- reading "Causation" by David Lewis.
- reading "Causation as Influence" by David Lewis.
Texts:
- David Lewis. “Causation." The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 70, No. 17, 1973, pp. 556-567. Pdf.
- David Lewis. “Causation as Influence." The Journal of Philosophy. Vol. 97, No. 4, 2000, pp. 182-197. Pdf.
Session 5. 13/01/2016.
Place and time:
Salle du conseil FIAL (batiment ERAS) 10:30-12:30.
Plan:
Lecture on "Why Is There Something Rather Than Nothing?" by Jan Heylen (HIW, KULeuven).
Abstract:
From Leibniz to Krauss philosophers and scientists have raised the question as to why there is something rather than nothing (henceforth, the Question). Why-questions request a type of explanation and this is often thought to include a deductive component. With classical logic in the background only trivial answers are forthcoming. With free logics in the background, be they of the negative, positive or neutral variety, only question-begging answers are to be expected. The same conclusion is reached for the modal version of the Question, namely 'Why is there something contingent rather than nothing contingent?'. I also look skeptically at the prospects of giving causal-counterfactual or probabilistic answers to the Question. The meta-question, viz. the question as to whether or not we should continue to ask the Question, is tentatively answered in the negative.
Session 6. 01/03/2016.
Place and time:
Salle Jean Ladrière, 14:00-16:00.
Plan:
- Peter Verdée gives an introduction and summary of Woordward's interventianist theory of causation and causal explanation as developed in his book "Making things happen".
- reading "Mechanisms revisited" by James Woodward.
Texts:
- James Woodward. "Mechanisms revisited." Synthese. Vol. 183, No. 3, 2011, pp. 409-427. Pdf.
Session 7. 12/04/2016.
Place and time:
Salle Jean Ladrière, 14:00-16:00.
Plan:
- reading "A simple argument for downward causation" by Thomas Kroedel
Texts:
- Thomas Kroedel. "A simple argument for downward causation." Synthese. Vol. 192, No. 3, 2015, pp. 841-858. Pdf.
Session 8. 24/05/2016.
[The schedule for the rest of the year is not yet fixed.]