

Chapter 8

The Primacy of the Ingroup: The Interplay of Entitativity and Identification

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ABSTRACT

In the present chapter, we move away from the traditional focus on the outgroup encountered in the literature on intergroup relations and argue that the ingroup is psychologically primary. We build upon the notion of entitativity first proposed by Campbell (1958) and suggest that entitative ingroups meet basic needs related to group membership better than less coherent ingroups. We provide initial support for the privileged status of entitative ingroups by reviewing contemporary research on group homogeneity. Next, we report on a research program showing that social identification and ingroup entitativity go hand in hand. First, we address the influence of ingroup identification on group entitativity in such phenomena as the "black sheep" effect and ingroup overexclusion. Second, we examine the impact of ingroup entitativity on social identification. We conclude by proposing that ingroup entitativity may also be related to a feeling of efficacy which need not produce conflict and discrimination toward outgroups. Globally, the accumulated evidence strongly suggests that the perception of ingroup entitativity plays a key role in intra- and intergroup relations.

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One's own family is an ingroup; and by definition all other families on the street are outgroups; but seldom do they clash . . . One knows that one's lodge has distinctive characteristics that mark it off from all others, but one does not necessarily despise the others. The situation it seems can best be stated as follows: although we could not perceive our own ingroups excepting as they contrast to outgroups, still the ingroups are psychologically primary. We live in them, by them, and sometimes, for them. Hostility toward outgroups helps strengthen our sense of belonging, but it is not required (Allport, 1954, pp. 40–41).

Social psychologists have long known that the way we categorize ourselves and others influences all aspects of our life (Allport, 1954; Sherif, 1967; Tajfel, 1981). Whether we divide up the world into those sharing our ethnic background as opposed to the others, or into those who opted for the same profession rather than for another, any categorization is likely to have a profound impact on our relations with the social environment (for reviews, see Hogg & Abrams, 1988; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Messick & Mackie, 1989; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Spears, Oakes, Ellemers, & Haslam, 1997; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Social identity and self-categorization theorists suggested that dichotomizing the environment in terms of any momentarily meaningful social categories affects a host of social phenomena (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner *et al.*, 1987). For instance, people's group membership has a powerful impact on their willingness to adopt or reject certain viewpoints in social influence situations (Turner, 1991). Two of the most celebrated findings are that group membership influences people's evaluation of group members and group products as well as their perception of group homogeneity (for a review, see Brewer & Brown, 1998).

Interestingly, even a cursory look at the literature shows that the work on intergroup relations has mostly been motivated by a concern with the outgroup. Whether working in the social cognition or in the social identity traditions, researchers tried their best to uncover various factors that would promote or attenuate stereotyping, prejudice, discrimination, and conflict. Without minimizing the role of the outgroup in a wide range of social situations, we think that a focus on the ingroup may also give us some valuable insights about group behavior. Ever since Brewer's (1979) classic review of ethnocentrism and ingroup bias, we are aware that ingroup bias is better understood as a tendency to favor one's own group and not so much as a behavior that is detrimental for the outgroup. In the present chapter, we report on a research program that led us to consider the merits of an ingroup-centered perspective on social behavior. Specifically, we examine how the way people relate to their group influences a series of intragroup and intergroup phenomena. Also, we explore the consequences of modifications of ingroup features on people's attachment to their group.

In the first section, we provide an overview of current conceptions of the notion of entitativity (Campbell, 1958). Building upon the dominant perspec-

tives regarding people's need to become or remain a member of a group, we explore the possibility that entitative ingroups meet these needs better than less entitative ones. In the second section, we concentrate on perceived group homogeneity as one expression of group entitativity and review the relevant literature. We conclude that people's attachment to their group is very much related to the perception of ingroup homogeneity. In the third and fourth sections, we present data showing that identification may influence the perception of group entitativity. In particular, we reinterpret earlier work on the "black sheep" effect (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988) and ingroup overexclusion (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992; Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Bellour, 1995) within the present theoretical framework. We also present new data from our laboratory indicating that people's identification with a group has a direct influence on the emergence of these phenomena, thereby reinforcing the perceived entitativity of the ingroup. A fifth section is devoted to the impact of group entitativity on identification. We show that an increase in the entitativity of the ingroup may have important consequences for the level of identification of group members. In a sixth section, we comment on another important dividend of ingroup entitativity, i.e., perceived efficacy. Although this feature is likely to be seen as undesirable when it concerns outgroups, we suggest that it constitutes a desirable outcome in the case of ingroups. As a set, our various empirical and theoretical arguments suggest that researchers may be well advised to pay closer attention to the ingroup if they want to better understand the dynamics of intergroup relations.

THE CONCEPT OF ENTITATIVITY

The history of science tells us that some insights may come too soon. The scientific community often needs time before it becomes aware of the full potential of new ideas, concepts, or theories. Well-known examples are Semmelweis's suspicion regarding the role of microbes in post-childbirth fatalities, or Poincaré's groundbreaking work on fractal figures. Within social psychology, Campbell's (1958) concept of entitativity seems to have undergone a similar fate. Although the concept was proposed some 40 years ago, it is only recently that researchers have come to appreciate its full potential. A quick look at major journals in our field, as well as at recent book chapters, suffices to underscore the newly-acquired popularity of this concept (Brewer & Harasty, 1996; Brewer, Weber, & Carini, 1995; Eberhardt & Randall, 1997; Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, 1998; McConnell, Sherman, & Hamilton, 1997; McGarty, Haslam, Hutchinson, & Grace, 1995; Yzerbyt, Rogier, & Fiske, 1998; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997).

Campbell (1958) defined entitativity as the degree to which a group has the nature of an entity, of a real thing. We fully embrace this definition. In the present context, an entitative group is thus a group that somehow forms a coherent whole, as opposed to a simple aggregate, and seems to exist more than a non-entitative group. According to Campbell (1958), several perceptual features contribute to the perception of a group as being an entity. These factors form two distinctive clusters (Lickel *et al.*, 1998). The first "similarity" cluster includes aspects such as proximity, boundedness, and, of course, similarity. Interestingly, these features are typically used or implied in the research on intergroup relations (Brewer & Brown, 1998). A second "organization" cluster comprises aspects such as organization, structure, common fate, etc. These different features are generally the focus of small group research (Levine & Moreland, 1995). The notion of entitativity thus seems to encompass two popular views of social groups (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; Wilder & Simon, 1998). As such, it provides a rich and flexible way to approach group perception.

Recent work on the notion of entitativity suggests that the extent to which a group is perceived as entitative, *i.e.*, perceived to be real and coherent, has an impact on information processing and thus on impression formation (Hamilton & Sherman, 1996; Hamilton, Sherman, & Lickel, 1998). According to Hamilton, Sherman, and Maddox (1998), entitative groups, just as (entitative) individuals, induce integrative information processing characterized by on-line judgments, organization of information during encoding, and resolution of inconsistencies upon encountering the information. In contrast, non-entitative groups trigger retrospective information processing characterized by memory-based judgments, organization of information during retrieval and little concern for inconsistency resolution. Clearly, the crucial parameter is not the nature of the target (individual or group) but the perception of entitativity (see also Covert & Reeder, 1990). Importantly, the perception of entitativity or groupness has been found to influence phenomena other than impression formation. For instance, the degree of competition (Insko & Schopler, 1998) or the level of ingroup bias (Brewer, Weber, & Carini, 1995; Wilder, 1986; Vanbeselaere, 1991) also seem highly sensitive to the entitativity of the group (see also Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998). Finally, Yzerbyt, Rogier, and Fiske (1998) linked the notion of group entitativity to social attribution (Deschamps, 1973–1974; Oakes, Turner, & Haslam, 1991). These authors showed that the perception of people as forming an entitative group fosters the interpretation of their behavior in terms of enduring dispositions of the group members (see also Rogier & Yzerbyt, 1999; Yzerbyt & Rogier, *in press*).

Not surprisingly, the vast majority of the above researchers have investigated the notion of group entitativity in terms of the coherence of outgroups. An exception can be found in the recent work of Yzerbyt *et al.* (1998c), who

showed that entitativity affects the perception of ingroup members and outgroup members alike. In a more direct investigation of the entitativity of the ingroup, Gaertner and Schopler (1998) had their participants distributed in one of two small groups to work on a group project. The experimental setting either did or did not stress intergroup competition. Also, the level of intragroup interaction was controlled to be low, medium, or high. The data reveal that the level of intragroup interaction influenced the perception of ingroup entitativity, and that the two groups came across more in terms of two distinct entities when the level of intragroup interaction was high or medium than when the level of intragroup interaction was low. Also, the level of intragroup interaction had a strong impact on intergroup bias and ingroup favoritism. Finally, the perception of ingroup entitativity was found to mediate the influence of intragroup interaction on intergroup bias. In sum, the nature of interaction among the members of the group affected the perception of ingroup entitativity, which in turn had an impact on intergroup perceptions.

Given the nature of the different group features that are conducive to the perception of entitativity and the small group research data reported by Gaertner and Schopler (1998), we would like to argue that entitativity stands as a most desirable feature of the ingroup. This is, we suggest, the case because an entitative ingroup serves the group members better than a non-entitative ingroup. Of course, such a claim ought to be evaluated in the light of current viewpoints regarding people's motivations to claim membership of a group. Indeed, why do people want to be member of a group? The answer to that question depends on the theoretical perspective one adopts.

For social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), the search for positive distinctiveness and a resulting secure image of the self are at the heart of group affiliation. Because people's self-esteem derives in part from their group membership, they are motivated to belong to groups that can be compared positively with other groups. In short, the possibility of affirming one's sense of worth is posited to be at the origin of intergroup behavior and, more specifically, of the ingroup bias (Brewer, 1979; Cialdini *et al.*, 1976; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In comparison, the idea that the context of judgment orients people towards clarifying the differences between groups and the similarities within groups sits well within self-categorization theory (SCT) (Oakes *et al.*, 1994; Turner *et al.*, 1987). Specifically, the process of depersonalization leads people to endorse whatever social identity best fits the current social context. So, in addition to providing an account of the way people categorize themselves and others, SCT also suggests that social identification is crucial because it allows people to better understand who they are. Closely related to the knowledge function proposed by SCT, Hogg and Abrams (1993) suggested that social categorization and group membership are essentially motivated by the individuals' need to reduce uncertainty in social settings (see Hogg & Mullin, 1998). They argue that although the search for positive self-

esteem may well be a key factor in the emergence of group discrimination and ethnocentrism, its role is not so clear when it comes to explaining group affiliation. In other words, self-esteem may well account for some aspects of group members' behavior but it does not tell us much with respect to the motives that make unique individuals turn into members of social groups. According to the uncertainty reduction perspective, people's identification with groups is to be expected because they want to be confident about how to behave and what to expect from the physical and social environment within which they find themselves (see also Festinger, 1950, 1954, Schachter, 1959). In that context, self-categorization and depersonalization processes associated with social identification offer an ideal means of reducing uncertainty, because they allow group members to replace individuality and concomitant unshared beliefs, feelings, and behaviors by an ingroup prototype that prescribes shared beliefs, feelings, and behavior (see chapter by Hogg, this volume).

Brewer (1991) suggested another motive that could explain why people may or may not want to identify with a group. According to her optimal distinctiveness theory (Brewer, 1991), membership in social groups would be the consequence of a subtle compromise between two basic needs, the need to belong to a community and the need to show some degree of uniqueness. Whereas the need for inclusion is in itself sufficient to explain why people want to be members of social groups (Baumeister & Leary, 1995), Brewer (1991) argues that it is the interplay with the opposing need for differentiation that accounts for the individual membership in any specific group. The groups that lead to the best balance between the two basic individual needs are most likely to be chosen as ingroups.

To be sure, each of the above-mentioned needs sheds some light on the benefits that may derive from one's membership in a given social group (see also Stevens & Fiske, 1995). People may strengthen their ties with a group because of their concern for self-esteem, because they want to know who they are and map the social world, or because they want to satisfy their need to belong. We argue that these needs are likely to be better served by membership of an entitative rather than a less entitative ingroup. To put this another way, an entitative ingroup would, more easily than a less entitative ingroup, contribute to people's self-esteem, provide them with a clear understanding of who they are and how they relate to others, and satisfy their need for inclusion and differentiation. Indeed, we defined group entitativity as the degree to which a group is perceived to be an entity, to really exist. This means that, by relying upon various indicators revolving around issues of similarity and organization, people may acquire the conviction that their group is real. Support for our hypothesis should come from the existence of a strong association between ingroup entitativity and social identification. In other words, members who strongly identify with a group should be more concerned with keeping their group entitative than people who are less identified with that

same group. A first way to evaluate the viability of this hypothesis is by looking at the literature on group homogeneity. As a matter of fact, Campbell (1958) argued that perceived group homogeneity contributes to the perception of entitativity. The next section examines the link between social identification and the perception of ingroup homogeneity.

FROM OUTGROUP TO INGROUP HOMOGENEITY

Social psychologists have long been aware of the prevalent belief that outgroup members resemble one another. In contrast, ingroup members are generally thought to be very different from each other. In other words, whereas heterogeneity stands out as a proud feature of ingroups, outgroups are plagued by the perception of sameness among their members (for reviews, see Brewer & Brown, 1998; Devos, Comby, & Deschamps, 1996; Lorenzi-Cioldi, 1998; Yzerbyt & Schadron, 1996).

According to the social cognition literature, two factors are responsible for the outgroup homogeneity effect. The information acquisition perspective claims that outgroups come across as being more homogeneous than ingroups because we know fewer members of the outgroup than of the ingroup (Linville *et al.*, 1986, 1989). This relative absence of familiarity limits our knowledge of the true variability of the outgroup. In contrast, the information-processing perspective asserts that the differential familiarity with outgroup and ingroup members may not be the crucial factor (Judd & Park, 1990; Krauss *et al.*, 1993; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). Rather, the way we deal with information about the ingroup and the outgroup is what really matters. Supposedly, whereas we encode outgroup members only at the group level, we process information regarding ingroup members at both the group and the "intragroup" level. As a consequence, group variability is taken into account better for the ingroup than for the outgroup (see also Mullen, 1991).

In line with the argument that the viewpoint of the perceiver plays a crucial role in the emergence of the outgroup homogeneity effect, self-categorization researchers stressed the role of temporary shifts in the comparative context (Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994). Whenever perceivers think about the outgroup, self-categorization theorists argue, they spontaneously make an intergroup comparison. As a result, the outgroup is approached as a bounded category. In contrast, when appraising the ingroup, the comparative context stresses the diversity within the group in general and the differences between the self and the other ingroup members in particular. To express this another way, whereas outgroup members are more likely to be perceived in terms of their overarching membership, ingroup members tend to come across as unique individuals. According to self-categorization theory, this differential focus offers a straightforward cognitive account of the emergence of the

outgroup homogeneity effect. Provided that ingroup members are evaluated in an intergroup rather than in the more habitual intragroup context of judgment, one would not expect to find less homogeneity in the ingroup than in the outgroup. Indeed, when the ingroup is compared to the outgroup, the group identity of the perceivers, as well as that of the other ingroup members, comes to the fore through a process of depersonalization. The net result of this process is that perceivers focus on similarities instead of differences within their ingroup and end up with a homogeneous representation of the ingroup. A number of studies (Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998, expt. 1; Haslam *et al.*, 1995) confirm that the SCT perspective indeed provides interesting insights into the mechanisms leading to the perception of group homogeneity (see Voci, this volume).

Despite the ties between the SCT and the motivationally oriented Social Identity Theory (Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), it is quite apparent that the SCT account of the perception of group homogeneity is mainly cognitive in tone. A different explanation of group homogeneity was provided by Simon and his colleagues (for a review, see Simon, 1992). These authors stressed the role of motivational factors in the perception of group homogeneity. They also took issue with the viewpoint that group homogeneity ought to be a negative feature of groups. Simon and Brown (1987) noticed that members of specific groups have sometimes been found to see the ingroup as a homogeneous whole (Stephan, 1977). Reasoning that membership in a minority is likely to reflect negatively on people's self-esteem, Simon and Brown (1987) argued that people belonging to a minority group will try to strengthen their positive social identity by perceiving more intragroup similarity within the ingroup than within the outgroup. In other words, minority members should enhance the perceived entitativity or groupness of the ingroup compared to that of the outgroup. This would in turn provide the members of a minority group with the social support and solidarity that can be furnished exclusively by a coherent group. Although a number of researchers have proposed a cognitive interpretation of Simon and Brown's results (Bartsch & Judd, 1995; see also Mullen, 1991; Brewer *et al.*, 1995), the accumulated evidence supports the idea that social and motivational concerns play a role in the perception of group homogeneity.

For instance, in a study conducted by Kelly (1989), participants were asked to judge the degree of homogeneity of the British Labour and Conservative political parties on a variety of dimensions. Kelly (1989) observed that, as far as specific political issues were concerned, the official members of the Labour Party perceived a greater degree of homogeneity within their own party than simple supporters did. Moreover, the official members also perceived the Labour Party (the ingroup) to be more homogeneous than the Conservative Party (the outgroup). To the extent that official party members can be thought of as more highly identified than simple supporters, this result points to the

importance of the initial level of identification. More recently, Castano and Yzerbyt (1998, expt. 2) directly examined the impact of group identification on the perception of group variability. They divided their participants, all students in psychology, in two groups according to their degree of identification with the larger group of psychologists. They then presented participants with attributes typical of the group of psychologists or typical of the group of social workers in an intergroup context, i.e., a situation in which the perception of ingroup homogeneity should be maximized. As expected, high identifiers, but not low identifiers, perceived the ingroup as being more homogeneous than the outgroup.

A study by Lee and Ottati (1995) offers another illustration of the potential role of motivational factors in the emergence of ingroup homogeneity. These authors asked students of Chinese background to evaluate a series of targets, one of which allegedly possessed traits that were either not stereotypically associated with the stereotype of Chinese (control condition) or stereotypically associated and seen to be threatening (sly, cruel, etc.) vs. non-threatening (shy, timid, etc.). Compared to the control condition, the threatening (vs. non-threatening) information led to the emergence of a more homogeneous (vs. heterogeneous) perception of the Chinese. Along the same lines, Rothgerber (1997) found that students perceived more homogeneity within their group when they thought that students from a rival university had judged them unfairly, compared to a control condition or to a condition in which they had been judged leniently.

Neither Lee and Ottati (1995) nor Rothgerber (1997) took into account their participants' level of identification with their group. It thus remains impossible to know whether ingroup identification interacted with the presence or absence of threat. Fortunately, a study by Doosje, Ellemers, and Spears (1995) provides a direct answer to such a question. These authors first measured the level of identification of their participants, all psychology students, with the group of psychology students. Next, they manipulated status by having participants believe that they were more vs. less intelligent than students in economics. Participants were then asked to rate the degree of ingroup and outgroup homogeneity. Whether they identified strongly or weakly with their ingroup, high-status students did not differ in their perception of ingroup homogeneity. Quite a different picture emerged for the low-status students. Whereas high identifiers stressed ingroup homogeneity, low identifiers showed the opposite tendency.

If the presence of threat increases the members' need to see their group as being homogeneous, a lack of definition of the group's boundaries seems to have a similar impact. In a study by Simon and Pettigrew (1990), participants were divided into two groups: whereas membership in one group was derived from the participants' appreciation of a particular painter (well-defined group), the other group was formed by all remaining individuals (ill-defined

group). Participants were then asked to fill out a questionnaire examining, among other things, the perception of group homogeneity. In line with predictions, members of a well-defined group reported greater ingroup homogeneity on group-defining dimensions. In contrast, members of an ill-defined group perceived their group to be more homogeneous than the outgroup on alternative dimensions. In our view, these results suggest that individuals belonging to groups lacking in distinctiveness, i.e., ill-defined groups, try to define themselves by ascribing ingroup homogeneity on new dimensions. This pattern is reminiscent of the strategy of social creativity (Lemaine, 1974), which corresponds to the tendency to display an ingroup bias on alternative dimensions whenever the status of the ingroup is inferior on the dimension of comparison (Capozza & Volpato, 1990; Doosje *et al.*, 1999; Tajfel, 1981; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). The search for positive discrimination can thus be served by increasing the clarity of the definition of the group and perceiving the group as being homogeneous on selected attributes.

In sum, the picture emerging from the literature on group homogeneity is all but homogeneous! On the one hand, there is a wide consensus that outgroups are generally perceived to be homogeneous and that heterogeneity is an inescapable feature of the ingroup. On the other hand, recent work reveals that ingroups can also be seen as coherent and homogeneous wholes. Indeed, the take-home message of recent ingroup homogeneity research is that an intergroup or otherwise threatening context can encourage people, especially high identifiers, to perceive their group to be homogeneous. To the extent that highly identified members are, if anything, more familiar with the ingroup than their low identified counterparts, such a pattern of findings constitutes a genuine puzzle for a strict cognitive approach to group variability. Also, because high identifiers are by definition more attached to their group than low identifiers, it becomes very difficult to envisage group homogeneity as a negative feature of groups.

In our view, the apparent paradox in the literature points to the possibility that homogeneity is more complex than is generally thought. Indeed, some theorists stressed the importance of a distinction between several possible meanings of homogeneity (Park & Judd, 1990; Quattrone, 1986). For instance, Park and Judd (1990) evaluated the available measures of variability and identified two different conceptions of homogeneity: the perceived distribution of group members around the group central tendency, i.e., dispersion, and the extent to which the group is seen as fitting the stereotype, i.e., stereotypicality. Our understanding of the literature suggests that more work is needed on this front. How, for instance, are we to reconcile the perception of ingroup homogeneity with the frequent observation that variability characterizes the ingroup? In our opinion, it could very well be that some degree of coherence at a fundamental level can sometimes go hand in hand with heterogeneity at the surface level (Haslam, Rothschild, & Erust, 2000; Rothbart & Taylor, 1992;

Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997; see also Medin & Ortony, 1989). Apparently, when people switch from an interpersonal to an intergroup level of perception (Tajfel, 1981; Turner *et al.*, 1987), the critical feature may be the more basic similarity of group members in terms of origin, goals, purpose, etc., rather than correspondence of surface features. In other words, a fundamental coherence would not preclude the existence of a fair amount of heterogeneity at the surface level. To take an example, although US citizens are quite ready to claim diversity within the ingroup, it is also true that few Americans feel unconcerned when one of them is taken hostage by a foreign terrorist group. Every member of the group has a clear idea of what is being targeted in the context of an intergroup conflict. Homogeneity at a deep level, for instance, in the form of shared ideology, may be the key dimension in such a context (Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). Instantly, the group is seen as one acting body with ambitions and hopes of its own (for a distant ancestor of similar ideas, see Hobbes, 1651/1904).

We suspect that individual (e.g., Levy, Stroessner, & Dweck, 1998) and cultural differences (see Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1998) play a major role in the prevalence of such an autonomous vision of groups, as well as its potential impact on the emergence of stereotypes, and researchers are beginning to address these important issues (Yzerbyt & Rogier, 2000). As we proposed in the previous section, homogeneity is but one aspect of the more encompassing notion of entitativity proposed by Campbell (1958). This means that people's attempts at fostering the entitativity of the ingroup could take many other forms. In other words, when group members have the impression that the coherence of their group could be questioned, they can rely on a variety of strategies in order to restore the entitativity of the group. In the following section, we will document the link between ingroup identification and harsher judgments of deviant ingroup members compared to similarly deviant outgroup members, i.e., the "black sheep" effect. As we will see in the fourth section, cautiousness in the acceptance of new members, i.e., the ingroup overexclusion effect, can be seen as yet another strategy at the service of group entitativity.

THE "BLACK SHEEP" EFFECT: LET'S GET RID OF THE BAD ONES!

The "black sheep" effect, as it has been identified by Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens (1988; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; for a review, see Marques & Paez, 1994), offers a first illustration of the link between the subjective value of the ingroup and the emergence of a strategy favoring the entitativity of the ingroup. In several studies, people expressed more negative judgments about a negative member of their own group than about a negative member of the

outgroup. This pattern was first seen to contradict the more general ingroup bias. However, a more uncompromising treatment of a negative ingroup member, Marques and his colleagues (1988) argued, stands as a subtle yet effective way of reaffirming the value of the group as a whole. The "black sheep" pattern emerges whenever the ingroup member fails to hold up to the assumed standards of the group. Presumably, it is because people are strongly attached to their group and claim its value that they derogate deviant ingroup members (see also the work on social attraction, Hogg, 1992; Hogg, Hardie, & Reynolds, 1995).

In an attempt to shed light on the role of motivational factors in the derogation of deviant ingroup members, Branscombe, Wann, Noel, & Coleman (1993) conducted a study that examined the level of identification of group members in a more direct way. Participants were undergraduate students with varying levels of identification with their university basketball team. They were presented with a newspaper article allegedly written by a student in journalism who was either a fan of the "Jayhawks" (the participants' university basketball team) or a fan of the "Sooners" (a rival university basketball team). The article concerned a specific game between the Jayhawks and the Sooners, and the outcome of the match, as well as the loyalty of the author towards "his" team, were manipulated. The main dependent variable was the evaluation of the author. As predicted by Branscombe *et al.* (1993), the most negative evaluations of the author were those from the high identifiers who read that the author was disloyal to the university under threatening conditions, i.e., when the Jayhawks, the ingroup, lost the game.

The fact that the derogation of the ingroup member was most pronounced when the group members strongly identified with their group is totally in line with Marques *et al.*'s (1988) interpretation. Along with other recent confirmations of the effect (Biernat *et al.*, 1999; De Cremer & Vanbeselaere, 1999), data such as these are fully compatible with the idea that the "black sheep" effect contributes to the maintenance of a positive and entitative image of the ingroup. Of course, it would be most desirable to examine the actual consequences of the encounter with a negative ingroup member in terms of both the representation and the composition of the group. In short, do harsh judgments of negative ingroup members indeed go hand in hand with the maintenance of the image of the ingroup? Moreover, does the "black sheep" effect in fact constitute a symbolic or psychological step towards the exclusion of the undesirable exemplars from the ingroup? A positive answer to the above questions would mean that the image of the group found among high identifiers should either be unaffected by the confrontation with deviant ingroup members or become even more entitative. That is, the derogation of an ingroup member should go hand in hand with the perpetuation (or even accentuation) of the stereotype of the ingroup. Were these predictions supported, this would indicate that the "black sheep" effect clearly corresponds to a *mors tua vita*

mea (your death means my life) rationale, at least in the eyes of the highly identified group members.

To address these issues, we conducted a series of studies (Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 1999). Our goals were quite straightforward. First, we wanted to replicate earlier findings that the level of identification with the ingroup influences the judgment of a deviant ingroup member. Second, we wanted to obtain evidence that highly identified group members would not let the deviant member affect the image of their ingroup. In contrast, weakly identified members would likely generalize the negative information to the rest of the ingroup and modify the image of the ingroup. Finally, we hoped to demonstrate that, compared to low identifiers, high identifiers banish the deviant ingroup member more readily when they are given the opportunity to do so.

In a first study (Castano *et al.*, 1999, expt. 1), psychology students were initially evaluated with regard to their level of identification with the larger group of psychologists. All participants were then presented with a series of seven profiles. These profiles contained several pieces of biographical information about a specific psychologist along with evidence regarding his or her level of empathy. Six profiles described a rather empathic psychologist. The critical manipulation concerned the seventh profile, which was always presented in the sixth position. For half of the participants, the psychologist was described in quite negative terms (the negative target condition). The remaining participants read about a psychologist who was above average in terms of empathy (the positive target condition). After the presentation of all seven targets, participants rated them on an evaluative scale (bad vs. good) and a typicality scale (atypical vs. typical). They were then given a series of stereotypical and counter-stereotypical traits and asked to estimate the percentage of psychologists having each of these traits, the average level of these traits among psychologists, and the stereotypicality of these traits for the group of psychologists as a whole.

In line with predictions, the negative target was judged as being significantly less typical by high than by low identifiers. Also, there was a moderately significant difference on the evaluation scale in the expected direction. More interestingly, the data revealed the predicted interaction pattern for the group ratings. As can be seen in Figure 8.1, low identifiers confronted with a negative target thought that the stereotypical traits characterized a lower percentage of psychologists than did high identifiers confronted with a negative target, or low identifiers confronted with a positive target. The same pattern emerges for the stereotypicality ratings, that is, low identifiers confronted with a negative target thought that the traits were less stereotypical of psychologists than high identifiers confronted with a negative target, or low identifiers confronted with a positive target. Finally, the negative target also led low identifiers to have a less positive image of the group as a whole than high identifiers




Figure 8.1 Percentage of psychologists having stereotypical traits as a function of the negativity of the target and the level of identification of participants

confronted with a negative target. Because an account in terms of different *a priori* representations among high and low identifiers does not readily account for the observed data, these results strongly suggest that the presentation of the negative target indeed affected participants' representation of the group differently, depending on their initial level of identification.

A follow-up study (Castano *et al.*, 1999, expt. 2) allowed us to investigate further the direction of causality between the perceived negativity of the target and the representation of the group. Participants first indicated their level of identification with the group of psychologists and rated the group as a whole on a series of stereotypical traits. They then read a vignette of an interview conducted by a psychologist who was depicted as non-empathic. Finally, they rated the group of psychologists anew on the same set of stereotypical traits. Replicating earlier findings, high identifiers judged the target to be less typical than low identifiers. Our data also reveal that high and low identifiers did not have different representations of the group at the outset of the study. Moreover, whereas the representation of high identifiers was not affected by the presentation of a negative ingroup member, low identifiers perceived the group to be less positive after than before reading the vignette. In line with our analysis, the group representation of low but not high identifiers thus proved to be sensitive to the encounter with improper conduct on the part of an ingroup member.

The similarity among the group representations of high and low identifiers observed in the early portion of the above study essentially concerned the

mean evaluation of the group on a series of stereotypical traits. Another important aspect of group representation is the variability within the group. As reviewed earlier, a number of experiments have found that the ingroup may be perceived as more homogeneous by high than by low identifiers (Castano & Yzerbyt, 1998; Doosje *et al.*, 1995; Kelly, 1989). All these studies, however, relied on an intergroup context. In a third study (Castano *et al.*, 1999), we decided to examine the potential role of the variability of the group representation in the emergence of the "black sheep" effect in an intragroup context. Indeed, the harsher judgment of a negative ingroup member among highly identified members is thought to correspond to a psychological exclusion of the deviant (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988). To test this hypothesis, we checked high identifiers' derogation of the bad ingroup member and asked our participants what they wanted to do with the negative target. We also wanted our study to be more realistic by using members and supporters of an environmentalist group as participants.

We contacted an approximately equal number of active members and supporters of an environmentalist group in Padua, Italy. Under the pretence of learning how to use the rating scales, all participants filled in a questionnaire dealing with their identification with the group of environmentalists. Participants also rated the variability of the group on two stereotypical dimensions suggested by the leader of the group, i.e., superficial and coherent. They then read the description of an environmentalist person living in another city who found himself in a dilemma. The person owned a store in the center of the city and had to decide about the prohibition of car traffic in the center of the city. At the end of the description, participants were informed that the person decided to disregard various environmental concerns and favored business interests instead. Participants then evaluated the person on a series of evaluative traits, rated his typicality, and indicated what needed to be done with regard to this group member. Finally, they rated the variability of the group anew on the two critical traits.

The results were in line with the predictions. Activists felt more identified than supporters. Compared to the supporters, activists also judged the target as less positive and less typical. More interestingly, activists were much more in favor of banishing the target from the ingroup than were supporters. Our data also revealed the presence of a positive correlation between the judgments of typicality and the selection of banishment as a suitable strategy for dealing with the deviant ingroup member. Finally, supporters but not activists tended to see the group as being more heterogeneous and less positive after reading the description of the deviant ingroup member, although this pattern was significant only for the trait "superficial".

Globally, this series of studies provides useful information about the way people deal with improper conduct of an ingroup member. Clearly, high identifiers strive for the maintenance of the image of their group. They seem to be

able to achieve that goal by derogating and eventually excluding the negative ingroup member. In contrast, low identifiers take stock and alter their representation of the group in the direction of the evidence. As a set, these studies confirm and extend earlier "Black Sheep" effect findings (Biernat *et al.*, 1999; Branscombe *et al.*, 1993; De Cremer & Vanbeselaere, 1999; Marques & Paez, 1994; Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques *et al.*, 1988).

Although the work on the "black sheep" effect has been carried out in the context of social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), it is highly reminiscent of earlier small group research on the impact of opinion differences on communication and rejection (Festinger & Thibaut, 1951; Gerard, 1953; Schachter, 1951). In a classic study, Schachter (1951) wanted to know whether the cohesiveness of the group and the relevance of the discussion for the group influenced the rejection of deviant members. He showed that deviants were more likely to be rejected by other group members when the discussion topic was directly relevant for the group and when the group was highly attractive for the members. In terms of the present framework, we would probably say that members with a high level of identification (because of the attractiveness of the group and the relevance of the discussion topic for the group) were likely to aim for entitativity by resorting to harsher treatment of the "black sheep". We see at least two reasons to take these efforts into consideration. First, it is clear that early research on the issue of group cohesiveness was performed at a time when the ingroup was the main focus of interest. It is thus reassuring to see the communalities between these old findings and the more recent "black sheep" data. As it appears, a stronger concern for the ingroup, be it in the context of classic small group research or modern work on intergroup relations, points in one obvious direction. Second, the theoretical perspectives of the time dealt with somewhat different needs for affiliation and membership than the motives we have been discussing in the first section. It may thus be profitable to re-examine the exhaustiveness of contemporary approaches. We will come back to this issue in our final section.

In our opinion, the consistent finding that high identifiers hardly change their views about the ingroup and derogate the deviant member is also important because it underscores a series of commonalities with the issues examined in the stereotype change literature (for a review, see Hewstone, 1994). The main message emerging from the most recent two decades of research echoes earlier conclusions by Allport (1954): people do not easily change their stereotypes about other groups. Interestingly, judging a counter-stereotypical exemplar as an exception to the rule seems to be a key condition for keeping one's stereotype intact. For instance, Johnston and Hewstone (1992) relied on Weber and Crocker's (1983) classic stereotype change paradigm and showed that participants who consider the disconfirming outgroup member as an atypical exemplar also change their stereotype less than participants who perceive the deviant member to be a typical member of the group. Using a very dif-

ferent procedure, Maurer, Park, and Rothbart (1995, expt. 1) found that participants asked to put together those members not fitting the group stereotype also perceived the group as a whole in more stereotypical ways. Other data reveal the link between the extremity of the judgment of a counterstereotypic group member and its (psychological) exclusion from the group. Indeed, Kunda and Oleson (1997) recently found that a more extreme deviant is not only judged to be more atypical but also causes less stereotype change.

Kunda and Oleson (1995) made a number of suggestions regarding the way people engage in stereotype maintenance processes when faced with a counter-stereotypical target. According to these authors, when perceivers encounter individuals who violate their expectations, they are motivated not to change their stereotype. As a result, they try to find subjectively satisfactory reasons not to take deviants into account (Kunda, 1990). Judging the target as being atypical is one way to maintain the stereotype because it provides a justification for fencing off the disconfirming members. Any piece of information, even neutral, that could facilitate the isolation of the deviant individuals can be used as valid evidence for leaving the group stereotype unaffected. Kunda and Oleson's (1995) participants listened to an interview with a successful yet shy lawyer. As expected, people changed their view of lawyers as being extroverted when they were confronted with a deviant, introverted, lawyer. In contrast, the provision of either one of two neutral attributes ("works in a small firm" vs. "works in a large firm") failed to produce a generalization from the deviant introverted lawyer to the category of lawyers. Additional data revealed that the experimental participants actually perceived both pieces of neutral information to be atypical of lawyers in general and, therefore, likely to be associated with the deviance. Such reinterpretation of the neutral information, Kunda and Oleson (1995) concluded, allowed participants to escape generalization. In other words, stereotypes remained intact when participants thought that they could explain away the inconsistency of the target.

Building upon Kunda and Oleson's (1995) findings, Yzerbyt, Coull, and Rocher (1999; Coull & Yzerbyt, 1999) reasoned that perceivers need cognitive resources to fence off the deviant, i.e., to see the deviant as being an atypical member of the group, and to keep their stereotypes intact (Allport, 1954). In one of their studies, Yzerbyt *et al.* (1999, expt. 1) had distracted and non-distracted participants read a description of an extroverted archivist. Whereas half the participants also received neutral information in addition to the inconsistent information, the remaining participants confronted only the counterstereotypical evidence. As predicted, the stereotype remained unchanged only for those participants who were given neutral information and were not distracted when reading the description. These findings strongly suggest that neutral attributes can indeed be used to dismiss deviant group members, as suggested by Kunda and Oleson (1995), but they also emphasize the fact that

perceivers need a sizable amount of cognitive energy to explain away the inconsistency and maintain the stereotype intact. Aside from cognitive resources, motivational factors may also play a role. As a matter of fact, Kunda (1990) argued that stereotypes may also be difficult to change because individuals are highly motivated to save their *a priori* views of the world. In other words, perceivers are much more likely to invest the necessary mental energy to perpetuate their beliefs when they have a vested interest in the specific stereotype under attack.

Clearly, thus, the question in both the stereotype change and the "black sheep" literature is to understand the way people react when they are confronted with unexpected information about one or several group members. Admittedly, whereas stereotype change research focuses on the potential modification of the image of outgroup, the "black sheep" studies concentrate on the alteration of the representation of the ingroup. Also, in the typical stereotype change study, perceivers are presented with positive information about outgroup members. In contrast, the "black sheep" literature is concerned with the impact of negative anomalous members of the ingroup. These differences notwithstanding, we claim that there is much to be learned by bringing these two strands of research together. As a case in point, we think that high identifiers are much more likely than low identifiers to invest the necessary cognitive resources in fencing off the ingroup deviant.

Coull, Yzerbyt, Castano, Paladino, and Leemans (1999) recently tested this idea. High and low identifiers among psychology students were presented with a series of four descriptions of psychologists in the context of a dual task paradigm. During the presentation of the descriptions on a computer screen, participants were also requested to monitor a tape-recorded text on the ancient city of Carthage. One of the four descriptions was rather negative. The critical measure was participants' performance on a multiple choice questionnaire about Carthage given afterwards. The predictions were that high identifiers would be particularly motivated to explain away the negative ingroup member. Therefore, they would have to use a sizable portion of their cognitive resources in order to deal with the deviant, leading to a deterioration of their performance on the subsequent multiple choice test. Importantly, such a deterioration was found both compared to the performance of low identifiers for the same negative target and compared to the performance of the high identifiers for an otherwise stereotypic group member. These results provide supportive evidence that high identifiers are tempted to devote a substantial amount of their intellectual energy to construe the negative member as atypical. Being psychologically excluded, the deviant may soon become victim of actual exclusion from the group.

This study offers a clear illustration of the benefits of bringing together the stereotype change research and the work on the "black sheep". We are convinced that a convergence of both social cognition and social identity tradi-

tions will prove most beneficial for the understanding of the perpetuation of social stereotypes, be it of the ingroup or of the outgroup. As for the issue of entitativity, our findings emphasize that group identification plays a key role in the extent to which people perpetuate the subjective image of their group as being a positive and rather homogeneous whole. When identification is high, negative exemplars hardly affect the image of the whole group. That is to say, the entitative image of the group is not modified by the encounter with negative ingroupers. In contrast, low identifiers are much more vulnerable to negative information and stereotype modification ensues. Thus, more generally, the tendency to derogate bad ingroup members among high identifiers is an efficient strategy for preserving a coherent vision of the ingroup.

THE INGROUP OVEREXCLUSION EFFECT: NOT ANYBODY CAN JOIN!

Another situation in which the subjective value of a group is linked to entitativity can be found when people must make a decision about another person's group membership. Indeed, even when people possess the most unequivocal defining characteristic of a given social category, they may not necessarily be considered full members. One case in point is nationality. Strictly speaking, citizenship is the obvious criterion for being a member of one nation as opposed to another. As we all know, some people make additional distinctions. They use more stringent criteria in order to define their group and rely on more restrictive boundaries. We would like to suggest that whereas the "black sheep" effect can be seen as a way to *cure* the group from a perceived lack of entitativity, the caution taken to include members in the ingroup stands as the *prevention* strategy in order to ensure a sufficient level of perceived entitativity.

Shocked by the atrocities of the Second World War, social psychologists wanted to contribute to a better understanding of prejudice. A standard way was to show prejudiced and non-prejudiced participants a series of photos of Jewish and non-Jewish people and to ask them to categorize the pictures in two groups—Jewish and non-Jewish (Quarty, Keats, & Harlow, 1975). A recurrent finding was that highly prejudiced individuals outperformed non-prejudiced people. Incidentally, they also identified more targets as being Jews. Additional work on these issues led to the formulation of two rival accounts. A first interpretation came to be known as the vigilance hypothesis (Lindzey & Rogolsky, 1950). Because prejudiced people are alert to outgroup members and are thus likely to pay careful attention to anything related to the disliked outgroup, they acquire a good knowledge of the outgroup characteristics (Blascovich, Wyer, Swart, & Kibler, 1997). The competing explanation rested on the idea of a response bias (Elliot & Wittenberg, 1955). Prejudiced people

make a better job of identifying the outgroup members simply because they consider more targets to be outgroup than non-prejudiced individuals.

In the larger context of the social judgeability model (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1992, 1994; Yzerbyt, Schadron, Leyens, & Rocher, 1994; Yzerbyt, Dardenne, & Leyens, 1998), we proposed a reinterpretation of this older work on prejudice. Building upon social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), Leyens and Yzerbyt (1992) suggested that one could explain the phenomenon by concentrating on the ingroup rather than on the outgroup (Capozza, Dazzi, & Minto, 1996; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Bellour, 1993; Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Bellour, 1995). In short, people's social identity is what matters. Because people's identity in part rests upon the group they are connected with, they want to protect their ingroup from undesirable outsiders. When a decision must be made about another person's group membership, people are likely to be especially watchful. Instead of taking a perspective in which the level of prejudice towards the outgroup plays a central role (Allport & Kramer, 1946), the present framework proposes that the value attached to the ingroup is the key issue. When there is doubt, the inclination to categorize people in the outgroup may thus correspond less to an artifact or to an acute knowledge of the outgroup than to a simple exclusion from the ingroup. We use the term "ingroup overexclusion" to refer to the general tendency to define stricter criteria to accept a person in the ingroup than to reject the person as an outgroup member.

The ingroup-focus interpretation is compatible with an earlier study by Pettigrew, Allport, and Barnett (1958). These authors worked in South Africa with five samples of participants: Afrikaners, English-speaking Europeans, Indians, Mulattos, and Black Africans. Each participant was exposed to a 2 second stereoscopic presentation of two ethnic photographs, with all possible combinations for each eye, and asked to state which race they had seen. We will restrict our summary to the data pertaining to the Whites (Afrikaners and English-speakers) and the Indians, because their misidentifications of the pictures are less likely to be due to social mobility strategies. Whites and Indians were equally accurate when the two faces belonged to the same ethnic group. The results were quite different when one face was representative of Whites and the other of Indians. In this case, 54% of the Afrikaners and 46% of the English-speaking Whites saw a European face, whereas 74% of the Indians saw someone of their own ethnicity. If one assumes that racial identity is more important for Whites than for Indians, the data show that, given ambiguous information, Whites are especially reluctant to accept someone as their own. One is reminded of radical (e.g., political or scientific) groups that require probes of loyalty and competence before accepting a new member.

To test the ingroup overexclusion effect, we took advantage of the linguistic situation in Belgium, where there has long been a conflict between Dutch speakers (called Flemings) and French speakers (called Walloons). In a series

of studies, participants were asked to decide whether a target belonged to an ingroup or to a threatening outgroup. In a first study (Leyens & Yzerbyt, 1992), French-speaking students received stereotypes that corresponded either to Flemish or to Walloon targets and had to decide whether these targets were Walloon. As expected, students reported less often that the targets were Walloon than Flemish. Also, they needed more information for the Walloon targets than for the Flemish ones. In the second study (Yzerbyt, Leyens, & Bellour, 1995), participants, either Walloon or Flemish, were asked to decide whether the target was an ingroup member or an outgroup member on the basis of sentences pronounced in either French or Dutch by Walloon or Flemish persons. Origin of participants and type of question did not lead to interesting results that would qualify the main findings. In agreement with an ingroup-focus interpretation of earlier categorization effects, more errors were produced for ingroup targets, especially for short sentences pronounced in the outgroup language, that is when the available information was ambiguous. Decision time was longer for ingroup members, who read sentences in the outgroup language. This ingroup overexclusion effect has since been replicated with North Italians judging North or South Italian stereotypes (Capozza, Dazzi, & Minto, 1996).

Although the ingroup overexclusion effect is now well documented, it is also clear that there has been no direct test of an identity management explanation of the phenomenon. In particular, if the effect stems from the special status of the ingroup as opposed to the outgroup, it is important to show that those people who are strongly committed to their group display the tendency to overexclude more than people for whom the ingroup is less important. We conducted a series of studies to address this issue (Castano, Yzerbyt, Bourguignon, & Seron, 2000; Yzerbyt, Castano, & Seron, 1998).

In one of these studies (Castano *et al.*, 2000), we measured the level of identification of students of the University of Padua with their region of Northern Italy. Both low and high identifiers were then confronted with a categorization task. They saw a series of 49 pictures of faces on a computer and were asked to decide whether the picture showed the face of a Northern or a Southern Italian. Each face was a combination (a morph) that included 0, 20, 40, 50, 60, 80 or 100% of the picture of a Northern European student and the complementary proportion of the picture of a North African student. Pictures of Northern European and Northern African students were selected because they represented extreme versions of the Northern Italian and the Southern Italian faces, respectively. There were seven replications of each morphing combination. We expected that, compared to less identified members, highly identified individuals would be more choosy in accepting people in their group. Specifically, we expected high identifiers to be quicker at excluding targets as the proportion of outgroup facial features increased.

As expected, more Northern Italian answers were given as the morph

included a larger proportion of a Northern European face and a smaller proportion of a Northern African face. More importantly, the data supported our specific ingroup overexclusion hypothesis. Indeed, strongly identified participants included fewer targets in their group than weakly identified respondents. We also measured the time that participants took to make a decision. Again, we found a significant main effect of combination, confirming that participants generally took less time when the presented face included more outgroup characteristics. More interestingly, we also observed a significant interaction between the level of identification of the respondents and the combination. This interaction was mainly due to the presence of a significant linear trend for high but not for low identifiers. In line with our hypothesis, high identifiers took less time to make a decision when the face included fewer ingroup features. Clearly, thus, attachment to one's ingroup stands as a proximal cause of the tendency to be cautious in accepting new members.

An obvious benefit of framing the explanation for categorization effects in terms of the ingroup is that it leads to a number of unique predictions regarding the simultaneous presence of perceived group homogeneity and the ingroup overexclusion effect. Indeed, the alternative, outgroup-focus interpretation of the effect perpetuates the earlier viewpoints on the categorization effects in that the role of the outgroup is emphasized. Specifically, the greater caution displayed among high-identified as opposed to low-identified members of the group would be related to their perception of the outgroup as being more homogeneous. Although such a relation seems plausible, we would like to propose that the greater overexclusion observed among high identifiers is linked to their tendency to perceive the ingroup as being more entitative.

Our ingroup-centered interpretation received support in a recent study showing the impact of participants' level of identification with the ingroup on both the perception of ingroup entitativity and the ingroup overexclusion effect. Yzerbyt *et al.* (1998a) asked Walloon participants to select from a list of traits those that they considered necessary to make a decision with respect to the eligibility of a given person for ingroup membership, i.e., Walloons. The same exercise was also performed with respect to outgroup membership, i.e., Flemings.

Not surprisingly, participants tended to pick out traits that were typical of the target group. That is, participants preferred typical Walloon traits when the decision concerned a Walloon and typical Flemish traits when the decision concerned a Fleming. The Walloon participants also requested more traits for their ingroup than for the outgroup. Because the design did not involve Flemish participants, the relevance of this main effect as a demonstration of the existence of an ingroup overexclusion pattern admittedly remains questionable. After all, it may well be the case that fewer traits are necessary to spot a Fleming than a Walloon. One reason to doubt the latter consideration

comes from earlier work using the same targets and a full design which led to clear findings of overexclusion in both groups. More importantly, however, the joint tendency to rely on typical traits and to be more restrictive for the ingroup candidate was much stronger among high identifiers than among low identifiers (see Figure 8.2). This means that the Walloon participants, who were more strongly committed to the Walloon group, indicated that a larger number

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


Figure 8.2 Number of traits requested by low identifiers (left) and high identifiers (right) as a function of the group membership of the target and the typicality of the trait

of traits were indispensable for the Walloon candidate than for the Flemish candidate. This pattern of interaction provides strong evidence in favor of the hypothesized relations between identification and overexclusion.

Another critical feature of the study concerns group entitativity. Participants completed measures of perceived homogeneity of ingroup and outgroup as a means to tap relative group entitativity. Contrary to the outgroup-focus interpretation, we found that the tendency to use more stringent criteria for Walloons was unrelated to the perception of homogeneity among Flemings. In contrast, and in line with the present interpretation of the overexclusion effect, there was a significant positive relationship between the tendency to use more restrictive criteria for Walloons and the tendency to perceive Walloons as forming a homogeneous group.

Clearly, thus, the present perspective has led us to produce a set of data that cannot be explained in terms of an outgroup-centered interpretation. Moreover, our focus on the primacy of the ingroup also allows us to re-examine older sets of data fruitfully. For instance, in one classic demonstration of the impact of response bias in categorization studies, Carter (1948) showed that the categorization pattern obtained when using two groups, Jews and non-Jews, disappeared when participants were given the same pictures but told that there were three groups, Jewish, Southern European, and Northern European. Interestingly, additional data reported by Carter (1948) suggest that, compared to less prejudiced participants, her prejudiced White Anglo-Saxon participants were especially likely to assign fewer targets to the Northern European category. In other words, although Carter (1948) did not find any evidence for a response bias in favor of the Jewish category, she very clearly found that prejudiced people chose to assign a minimum of people to a category that they could see as their own. The fact that ethnic or racial categorization studies were made in an outgroup-centered paradigm is probably responsible for the subsequent neglect of Carter's (1948) result, a finding which becomes clearly interpretable once the primary role of the ingroup is acknowledged.

The idea underlying the ingroup overexclusion research is that the subjective value of the ingroup goes hand in hand with the willingness to include others in the group. The more people are identified with their group, the more they will close ranks and exclude potential ingroup members. Of course, members do not always overexclude people from their categories. Everyone knows of groups that want to include the largest possible number of people. We think that people involved in intergroup conflict (and this conflict was always made salient in our own studies) may overexclude in order to protect the entitativity of their group. Even groups involved in a conflict may not always rely on overexclusion. For instance, Capozza, Voci, and Toaldo (1998) did not obtain the overexclusion effect when their Italian participants were from the South. We also found that low identifiers failed to display an over-

exclusion effect (Castano *et al.*, 2000; Yzerbyt *et al.*, 1998a). It may thus be that the overexclusion effect is obtained only for highly identified people or for members of high-status groups. Such a pattern is reminiscent of the classical finding that high-status groups often tend to display more ingroup bias than low-status groups (for a review, see Brewer & Brown, 1998). Future research should not only examine whether (subjective) status inferiority translates into ingroup overinclusion and (subjective) status superiority leads to ingroup overexclusion, but also how identification affects these reactions.

To sum up, the research presented in this section questions the traditional view about the role of the outgroup in categorization effects. From all we know, the ingroup overexclusion effect is best interpreted as a strategy aimed at protecting the image of the ingroup. This is because erroneously considering a person as an ingroup member may indeed have critical consequences for the ingroup. The message to be derived from the research on group homogeneity, the “black sheep” effect, and the ingroup overexclusion effect is quite straightforward. The stronger the ties between the person and the group, the more the group is supposed to meet the criteria set forth by Campbell (1958). Because high identifiers like to see their ingroup as a more coherent whole than low identifiers, they rely on diverse strategies to secure the entitativity of the ingroup. But do things work the other way around? Is it the case that the entitativity of the ingroup has a direct impact on the level of identification of its current members and on the attractiveness of the group for prospective members? We think the answer to this question is positive and conducted a series of studies to collect evidence regarding this important question. This is the issue to which we turn in the next section.

FROM ENTITATIVITY TO IDENTIFICATION: WE ARE ONE AND I LIKE IT!

Ingroup entitativity may not only be a consequence of the influence of various factors such as group identification, intergroup conflict, and so on. It may also have a direct influence on the extent to which people identify with the group. Again, this is a somewhat counter-intuitive proposition if we consider that the stereotyping and intergroup literature has long been, and still is, conceiving of homogeneity and, more generally, entitativity as one of the main (negative) characteristics of the outgroup. That is, the lack of variability of the outgroup is thought to be central to the stereotyping process as well as to the justification of discriminatory behavior. In contrast, we claim that the ingroup rather than the outgroup is at the heart of people’s concerns. In line with that assumption, we argue that ingroup entitativity is instrumental in increasing the desirability of the ingroup. Seeing the ingroup as a coherent whole may in fact help perceivers to attribute certain valued qualities to their group. We carried out

a series of four studies to test this idea (Castano, Yzerbyt, & Bourguignon, 1998).

Our main hypothesis was that the perception of entitativity of the ingroup would influence the degree of identification with the group. In order to examine the viability of this hypothesis in a challenging context, we decided to work with a large-scale social category of the kind encountered in intergroup relations research. We thus explicitly avoided a close-knit group, as is typically used in small group research (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998; see also Lickel *et al.*, 1998). We also wanted to rely on a social category that would be of some significance for people's everyday life and that would be part of the public debate. Finally, and in contrast with what can be observed for racial or ethnic categories, we wanted people's views about the specific social category to be dissociated as much as possible from any specific political stand. For all these reasons, the European Union (EU) seemed a most appropriate social category.

In line with the above rationale, we predicted that identification with the EU would be strengthened under circumstances in which the entitativity of the EU was stressed. In contrast, we predicted that the identification with the EU would be weakened when group members were led to think about the EU as being low in entitativity. Of course, we did not expect the manipulation of the perceived entitativity of the ingroup to affect those members who felt very positively or very negatively about the group. However, the impact of group entitativity should show for those who have moderate feeling about the EU. This hypothesis was based on Sherif and Hovland's (1961) theory regarding attitude change and the role of the latitude of acceptance and of rejection. According to these authors, the size of the latitude of acceptance is quite small for those individuals holding polarized attitudes with respect to the issue at hand. Because we wanted to take into account the initial polarization of our participants, we decided not to discard individuals holding polarized attitudes toward the EU, but to categorize participants in three different groups according to their attitudes towards the EU.

A major interest of the present series of studies is that we did not want to rely on one specific antecedent of entitativity. Rather, we wanted to activate representations of entitativity using a variety of factors. Based on Campbell's (1958) work, we decided to concentrate on common fate, similarity, salience, and boundedness. To investigate the impact of common fate, we confronted participants with a propaganda video produced by the European Commission and expected to be circulated outside the laboratory among European citizens (for details, see Castano *et al.*, 1998, expt. 1). Because the video stressed the existence of a history and a future shared by the countries composing the EU, thereby operationalizing the common fate dimension of entitativity, we expected that it would increase the level of identification with the EU. The results from Study 1 confirmed our hypothesis. People expressed a stronger

attachment to the EU after they had been confronted with an entitative image of the group. Interestingly, the impact of the video on identification level was not the same for all participants. Group members holding moderate attitudes toward the group were much more sensitive to the manipulation of the entitativity of the ingroup than the remaining participants. Although the video also had an impact on individuals holding positive attitudes, the effect was lower than for those holding moderate attitudes. Moreover, participants holding negative attitudes toward the EU remained totally unaffected.

In a second study (Castano *et al.*, 1998, expt. 2), we manipulated another aspect of entitativity, namely intragroup similarity. Our specific goal was to shed light on both versions of our hypothesis, namely that an increase vs. a decrease of entitativity leads to an increase vs. a decrease of ingroup identification. We presented participants with the same information about the EU member states but gave them one of two sets of instructions. Concretely, we asked participants to concentrate on either the similarities or the differences between the EU member states. This strategy allowed us to ensure that perceived group entitativity was the result of the specific steps taken by the participants to process the information presented to them, rather than a consequence of some unwanted characteristics of the material. Because we expected similarities and differences instructions to increase and decrease, respectively, the perception of entitativity of the EU, we hoped to find a corresponding strengthening and weakening of the identification with the EU.

The data fully confirmed our hypothesis. First, manipulation checks confirmed that similarities and differences instructions influenced the degree to which people saw the EU as a coherent and entitative whole. Second, and more importantly, participants' attitudes towards the EU played an important role in moderating the impact of the entitativity manipulation. Specifically, the perception of ingroup entitativity influenced the level of identification of those individuals holding moderate attitudes but not of those individuals holding negative or positive attitudes. Our data thus provide unambiguous support for the idea that participants' level of identification with the ingroup can be strengthened or weakened depending on the level of perceived entitativity of the group. Asking people to concentrate upon similarities between the different countries tended to increase the perceived entitativity of the EU and, by way of consequence, exacerbated their level of identification. In contrast, asking participants to concentrate on differences among the several countries comprising the EU produced a less entitative view of the EU and engendered a dramatic decrease in the participants' level of identification.

In two additional studies, we also tested the hypothesis relative to the increase of entitativity by manipulating the contextual salience of the ingroup (Castano *et al.*, 1998, expt. 3) and to the decrease of entitativity by manipulating the EU's apparent boundedness (Castano *et al.*, 1998, expt. 4). As a

means of varying the context of judgment, participants learned that the study was carried out either by a European or a non-European university before they reported their level of identification with the EU. Our hypothesis was that, compared with an intragroup context of judgment, an intergroup context of judgment would increase the salience of the ingroup, leading to an increase of participants' level of identification with the ingroup. As can be seen in Figure 8.3, our data supported this prediction. In order to manipulate the boundedness of the EU, we informed participants that the final number of countries to be included in the EU was either known or still under discussion among the current members of EU. We predicted that, compared to a condition in which the boundaries of the group were well-defined, ill-defined boundaries would decrease the degree of identification with the ingroup.

These experiments are innovative in two important respects. They not only reverse the causal link between entitativity and identification but they also aim at demonstrating that ingroup entitativity may be an important determinant of ingroup identification. They show that the entitative nature of the ingroup stands as an attractive feature for its members. Indeed, people facing an entitative ingroup feel more attracted to it. In contrast, a lack of entitativity




Figure 8.3 Level of identification as a function of the initial attitude toward the EU and the comparative context

seems to lead people away from the group. This pattern complements the one reported above, showing that people who care about their ingroup were tempted to see it as being more entitative. As a set, these findings can be taken as convincing evidence that people value entitative ingroups.

THE THREATENING OUTGROUP AND THE REASSURING INGROUP

In the first section, we argued that entitativity would be linked to identification because entitativity buys the ingroup something that makes it more desirable and attractive to its members. That is, we relied on contemporary views about intergroup relations to identify the needs governing group membership and identification, and suggested that such benefits of group membership may be easier to acquire when the ingroup is perceived to be entitative, as opposed to an aggregate. But is it possible that other aspects make entitative ingroup particularly attractive? One way to gain additional knowledge about the dividends of ingroup entitativity is to look at the repercussions of entitativity for the outgroup. Clearly, the literature on intergroup relations supports the idea that outgroups are often seen to be rather threatening (Brewer & Brown, 1998). When the outgroup is not simply unfamiliar, it competes with the ingroup for limited resources and presumes incompatible and even hostile goals. Recent research suggests that threat is especially present when the outgroup comes across as a strong entity (Abelson, Dasgupta, Park, & Banaji, 1998).

The work of Insko, Schopler, and their colleagues on the interindividual–intergroup discontinuity effect is probably the best-known line of research regarding the issue of outgroups as potential threats (for recent reviews, see Schopler & Insko, 1992; Insko & Schopler, 1998). These authors found that relations among groups are more competitive than among individuals and presented a wide array of arguments in favor of the idea that distrust (Leyens & Schadron, 1980) and competition will prevail when people are confronted with an outgroup that they perceive as entitative (see also Horwitz & Rabbie, 1982). Insko and Schopler (1998) note that they started investigating the discontinuity effect because of their colleague Thibaut's interest in Le Bon's (1895/1983) book *La psychologie des foules* (The psychology of crowds). Crowds were described by Le Bon as behaving like one soul, sharing the same (intense) feelings and the same (few) ideas, that is, as prototypically entitative. It is well known that Le Bon held in contempt crowds which he saw as threatening outgroups.

Other evidence confirms the fact that entitative, as opposed to less entitative, outgroups can exacerbate the impression of threat among observers (Dépret & Fiske, 1999; Vanbeselare, 1991; Wilder, 1978). For instance, Dépret

and Fiske (1999) examined the repercussions of group cohesiveness on the way people form an impression about outgroup members. In line with the idea that people may be at a loss when confronted with a powerful entitative outgroup, Dépret and Fiske (1999) found that an encounter with a powerful entitative outgroup increased the attachment to the ingroup. Emotional responses also confirmed the devastating impact of a cohesive outgroup.

As a set, these various lines of research indicate that outgroup entitativity is linked to the perception that the group has the capacity to do things, to be impactful. But what about an amplification of entitativity in the case of the ingroup? We see both a similarity and a difference between the perception of entitative outgroups and ingroups (Sherman, Hamilton, & Lewis, 1999). The similarity resides in the fact that entitativity provides a sense of efficacy. The difference is that the valence of the efficacy resulting from entitativity is positive rather than negative in the case of the ingroup. Entitative outgroups are not passive repositories of stereotypical traits but are active agents ready to engage in actual behaviors. Likewise, we propose that group members experience an entitative ingroup as being in a better position to act upon its agenda than a less entitative ingroup. As we see it, this idea is reminiscent of the classic work on group cohesiveness alluded to in the third section (Festinger, 1950, 1954; Schachter, 1959; for a recent review, see Hogg, 1992). In other words, an entitative ingroup may also be attractive because it gives its members the feeling that whatever goal is pursued is more likely to be attained. In our opinion, this aspect nicely complements the message emanating from contemporary perspectives on group membership and social identification. Whereas modern approaches seem to focus on the idea that people use the dynamics of similarity and differences in order to achieve some sense of worth and to know who they are, we think that people also join other people and feel attached to their groups because this meets with their need for effectiveness (for a recent discussion, see Stevens & Fiske, 1995). Using classic jargon, one would say that entitative ingroups are attractive because they offer more guarantees in terms of group locomotion (Schachter, 1951). Although this efficacy dimension is largely neglected in current perspectives on intergroup relations, we suspect that it may play an important role in intra- and intergroup phenomena.

The fact that people may enjoy being members of an entitative group is fully compatible with our data that group members identify more with such groups. Clearly, entitativity cements the members to their group. It adds something to the individuals. This original group product is probably what bothered F. Allport (1924) even in the case of an ingroup, as when he wrote about the "fallacy of patriotism". In our opinion, though, ingroup entitativity need not go hand in hand with aggressive behaviors. As Brewer's (1979) review of ethnocentrism and ingroup bias long revealed, we know that the ingroup favoritism is better understood as a strong tendency to favor one's own group

and not so much as a behavior intended against the outgroup. The same conclusion can be drawn from recent research within the social cognition tradition, showing that subliminal presentation of terms such as “we” or “us” is associated with more positive evaluation, whereas terms like “them” and “they” are not conducive to more negative reactions (Perdue *et al.*, 1990; see also Mummendey, 1995). Unfortunately, researchers often forget the crucial difference between ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. Attraction to ingroups precedes distrust towards outgroups and people may favor an entitative ingroup without feeling the need to derogate the outgroup (Gaertner & Schopler, 1998). In fact, members of an entitative ingroup are likely to be reassured as to the standing of their group and may, as a result, feel less of a need to derogate other groups. In contrast, members of a less cohesive group may experience the need to establish a firm distinction between their group and other, competing, groups. This would result in harsher judgments about outgroups. In short, because ingroup entitativity may contribute to a secure sense of identity, it may alleviate the need for intergroup competition and aggression. More research is needed to address these fascinating issues.

CONCLUDING COMMENTS

The recent literature on intergroup relations reveals a preoccupation with the outgroup. In other words, researchers often stress the impact of the outgroup in a variety of group phenomena, leaving the role of the ingroup largely unexplored. In an attempt to provide a more complete picture of intergroup perception and behavior, we think that social psychologists should also turn their attention to the way people relate to their own group. The ambition of the present chapter was to provide evidence that the ingroup indeed constitutes a crucial aspect of the intergroup situation.

The starting point of our analysis was the renewed interest in the notion of entitativity. In line with Campbell (1958), we defined entitativity as the perception that a group is forming an entity and really exists. We noticed that the antecedents of entitativity are typically examined in two different yet complementary traditions of research (Wilder & Simon, 1998). Reasoning that membership in an entitative group may entail more benefits than membership in a less entitative group (Brewer, 1991; Hogg & Abrams, 1993; Tajfel & Turner, 1979; Turner *et al.*, 1987), we hypothesized that group members would want to see their group as being entitative. We collected preliminary support for our conjecture by reviewing the work on group homogeneity, one of the features contributing to the perception of entitativity. Contrary to the traditional view that outgroups are necessarily more homogenous than ingroups, research indicates that the ingroup can also come across as a homogeneous set of people.

In addition to showing that group homogeneity need not always be a negative characteristic, we saw that the available literature indeed stresses the link between social identification and ingroup homogeneity. Our own research, presented above, confirms that people prefer to see their ingroup as an entity rather than as a loose collection of people. Specifically, group members strive to achieve some sense of entitativity by excluding bad members and by protecting their ingroup from questionable candidates. Moreover, they also seem to be sensitive to the entitativity of the ingroup, and identify more with an ingroup perceived to be entitative than with a less entitative ingroup. Our data showing the positive impact of ingroup entitativity on social identification also led us to speculate about the factors that would explain the attractiveness of entitative ingroups. We proposed that an entitative ingroup may not only satisfy a variety of social comparison needs, but may also be associated with greater perceived effectiveness. In our opinion, the present work on ingroup homogeneity, on the derogation of deviant ingroup members, on ingroup overexclusion, and on group identification not only stresses the importance of the notion of entitativity for the study of intra- and intergroup relations, but also confirms that the ingroup really is at the heart of people's social behavior.

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