Analysis of a Boardroom Voting Protocol. Mathilde Arnaud, Véronique Cortier and Cyrille Wiedling. In Proceedings of the 4th International Conference (Vote-ID 2013), pp. 109-126, Guildford, UK, July 17-19, 2013.
We study a simple electronic boardroom voting system. While most existing systems
rely on opaque electronic devices, a scientific committee of a research institute (the CNRS Section 07)
has recently proposed an alternative system. Despite its simplicity (in particular, no use of cryptography),
each voter can check that the outcome of the election corresponds to the votes, without having to trust
the devices.
In this paper, we present three versions of this system, exhibiting potential attacks. We then formally
model the system in the applied pi-calculus, and prove that two versions ensure both vote correctness
(even if the devices are corrupted) and ballot secrecy (assuming the devices are honest).
@inproceedings{DBLP:conf/voteid/ArnaudCW13,
author = {Mathilde Arnaud and
V{\'e}ronique Cortier and
Cyrille Wiedling},
title = {Analysis of an Electronic Boardroom Voting System},
booktitle = {VOTE-ID},
year = {2013},
pages = {109-126},
ee = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39185-9_7},
crossref = {DBLP:conf/voteid/2013},
bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de}
}
@proceedings{DBLP:conf/voteid/2013,
editor = {James Heather and
Steve A. Schneider and
Vanessa Teague},
title = {E-Voting and Identify - 4th International Conference, Vote-ID
2013, Guildford, UK, July 17-19, 2013. Proceedings},
booktitle = {VOTE-ID},
publisher = {Springer},
series = {Lecture Notes in Computer Science},
volume = {7985},
year = {2013},
isbn = {978-3-642-39184-2},
ee = {http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-39185-9},
bibsource = {DBLP, http://dblp.uni-trier.de}
}