

Did Longer Lives Buy Economic Growth? From Malthus to Lucas and Ben-Porath*

David de la Croix[†]

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Abstract

The chapter provides a summary of the possible impact of increases in adult longevity on economic growth with a focus on two particular channels: the contact time effect and the incentive effect. After documenting empirical evidence concerning the rise of longevity, two methods to measure longevity are presented, namely the Gompertz Law and the BCL Law of Mortality. These methods are then applied qualitatively and quantitatively to various models to show the effect of longevity on growth. Overall, the note concludes that increases in longevity are quantitatively significant for the increases in growth observed over the last two centuries and calls for the consideration of demographic factors when examining determinants of growth.

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[†]IRES - Université catholique de Louvain, Place Montesquieu 3, B-1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium.
email: david.delacroix@uclouvain.be

1 Introduction

To what extent long lives matter for growth is a topic that has been investigated both theoretically and empirically, in history and in contemporary data. In this note, I shall first provide some empirical evidence that improvements in life expectancy occurred before the take-off to modern growth. Establishing the precedence of longevity over growth is one argument in favor of causality. After a short section on measurement, I shall discuss two mechanisms through which longevity may impact growth, both in the past and today, and their quantitative significance: the contact time effect and the incentive effect.

2 Early Longevity Increases

Today, I would claim that the precedence of longevity improvements for the elite over the Industrial Revolution is firmly established. That longevity increased in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was already known by historian demographers on the basis of local evidence, and for specific social groups. For example, Hollingsworth (1977) builds mortality tables for British peers sampled from genealogical data. Vandenbroucke (1985) provides vital statistics for the Knights of the Golden Fleece, an order started in 1430 with the Dukes of Burgundy and continued with the Habsburg rulers, the kings of Spain and the Austrian emperors. In both samples, mortality reduction for nobility took place as early as in the 17th century, showing that improvements in the longevity of the upper social class anticipated the overall rise in standard of living by at least one hundred years.

Two recent studies provide a more general picture. The paper by Cummins (2014) proposes an analysis of the longevity of European nobility over a long period of time, encompassing several critical events such as the Black Death and the Industrial Revolution. It therefore extends the existing demographic studies of Europe's aristocracy considerably. Such an analysis is now possible thanks to the data collection performed by the church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints and exploited by several independent genealogists. The empirical challenge is to extract the major time and spatial trends in nobles' lifespans from the noisy data while controlling for the changing selectivity and composition of the sample. The main result of the paper is that the rise in longevity started as early as 1400, with improvements over 1400-1500. Then, this phase was followed by a second phase of improvements after 1650. The first phase is only observed in Ireland and the UK. The fact that only England, Scotland, Ireland and Wales benefitted from an increase in longevity over 1400-1500 is probably subject

to a broad confidence region because of the low number of observations. The second tipping point, in the middle of the 17th century, is however hardly disputable.

The paper by de la Croix and Licandro (2015) pursues the same aim but builds a different database from the *Index Bio-bibliographicus Notorum Hominum* (IBN), which contains entries on famous people from about 3,000 dictionaries and encyclopedias. It also contains information on multiple individual characteristics, including place of birth and death, occupation, nationality, as well as religion and gender, among others. de la Croix and Licandro (2015) document that there was no trend in adult longevity until the second half of the 17th century, with the longevity of famous people being at about 60 years during this period. This finding is important as it provides a reliable confirmation to conjectures that life expectancy was rather stable for most of human history and establishes the existence of a Malthusian epoch. They also show that permanent improvements in longevity preceded the Industrial Revolution by at least one century. The longevity of famous people started to steadily increase for generations born during the 1640-9 decade, reaching a total gain of around nine years in the following two centuries. The rise in longevity among the educated segment of society hence preceded industrialization, lending credence to the hypothesis that human capital may have played a significant role in the process of industrialization and the take-off to modern growth. Finally, using information about locations and occupations available in the database, they also find that the increase in longevity did not occur only in the leading countries of the 17th-18th century, but almost everywhere in Europe, and was not dominated by mortality reduction in any particular occupation. Compared to Cummins (2014), this study has the advantage of covering a broader population than just the nobility, including all the professions that could be suspected of having played a role in the transition to modern growth: scientists, professors, writers, merchants, etc.

3 Measuring Adult Longevity

The evidence presented in the previous section leads us to wonder what the mechanism(s) linking longevity improvements to growth could be. I will explore two of them. Before being able to measure the quantitative effect of longevity improvements on income growth, these improvements first need to be evaluated in a formal framework that can later be embedded into an economic model. Let us start with the Gompertz approach to mortality.

GOMPERTZ MORTALITY LAW: Let death rates be denoted by $\delta_g(a)$, an age-dependent function, where a denotes an individual's age. The Gompertz law of mortality, as suggested

by Gompertz (1825), asserts that the logarithm of the death rate is linear in age:

$$\delta_g(a) = \exp\{\rho + \mu a\}. \quad (1)$$

In the Gompertz function, the parameter ρ measures the mortality of young generations while the parameter μ , $\mu > 0$ represents the rate at which mortality increases with age. The corresponding survival law is

$$S_g(a) = \exp\left\{-\int_0^a \delta_g(a) da\right\} = \exp\left\{\frac{(1 - \exp\{\mu a\}) \exp \rho}{\mu}\right\}. \quad (2)$$

The Gompertz law of mortality is extensively used in demographics to study adult survival, but it is often untractable to use within structural economic models because of the double exponential.

BCL MORTALITY LAW: Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002) suggest using the following mortality law:

$$\delta_b(a) = \frac{\beta}{1 - \alpha \exp\{\beta a\}},$$

with $\alpha \in \mathbb{R}_+$ and $\beta \in \mathbb{R}$, and

$$\alpha < 1 \Leftrightarrow \beta > 0.$$

The corresponding survival function is:

$$S_b(a) = \frac{\exp\{-\beta a\} - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}.$$

As soon as α is positive, the survival function displays a maximum age \bar{a} , solving $S_b(a) = 0$:

$$\bar{a} = -\frac{1}{\beta} \ln \alpha.$$

As stressed by Bruce and Turnovsky (2013), this survival function (referred to as BCL) is in fact a first-order approximation of the Gompertz law of mortality. Indeed, starting from the Gompertz survival (2), using the first-order expansion of the exponential function $\exp(x) \approx 1 + x$, we obtain

$$S_g(a) \approx 1 + \frac{(1 - \exp\{\mu a\}) \exp \rho}{\mu},$$

which after some rearrangement leads to

$$S_g(a) \approx \frac{\exp\{\mu a\} - \mu / \exp\{\rho\} - 1}{-\mu / \exp\{\rho\}} = S_b(a),$$

with

$$\rho = \ln \frac{\beta}{1 - \alpha}, \text{ and } \mu = -\beta. \quad (3)$$

Three remarks on the BCL survival law are in order. First, life expectancy at $a = 0$ can be computed as:

$$\int_0^{\bar{a}} S_b(a) da = \frac{1}{\beta} + \frac{\alpha \ln \alpha}{(1 - \alpha)\beta} = P.$$

When the cohort of newborns is of size 1, life expectancy is also equal to the size of the population P . Second, this two-parameter curve fits the data very well (Mierau and Turnovsky 2014), except for the inflexion point which is observed for very old ages. Third, depending on the value of α and β , the survival function can reproduce several special cases, as shown in Figure 1. The top left panel shows a survival function with a probability of death independent of age ($\beta = 0.05$, $\alpha = 0$). This is the perpetual youth model popularized by Blanchard (1985). In this set-up, there is a positive probability of reaching any age $a \in \mathbb{R}$. When $\beta, \alpha > 0$, the survival function is convex, as illustrated in the top right panel of Figure 1 for $\alpha = 0.1$, $\beta = 0.03$. When α approaches 1 and β approaches 0, the survival function becomes close to linear (see bottom left panel, with $\alpha = 0.999$ and $\beta = 0.000013$), which is, for example, a characteristic of the Roman Empire.¹ Finally, when $\alpha > 1$ and $\beta < 0$, the survival function is concave, like the current survival curves of modern societies. Letting α increase and β decrease leads to a rectangularization of the function. For α very large, survival until the maximum age is almost certain, which is the case assumed for example by Hazan (2009). The bottom right panel illustrates the case for $\alpha = 5000000$ and $\beta = -0.2$.

ESTIMATION OF PARAMETERS: The parameters of the BCL survival function have been estimated on different populations. As this function is only valid for adult survival, the empirical survival function is normalized by setting it to one for an initial age $a_0 > 0$. Table 1 provides a summary of the various estimates. The estimates of Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Peeters (2007) and de la Croix, Lindh, and Malmberg (2008) are not reported; they estimate β and α as polynomial functions of time, for England and Sweden, respectively. The estimates of Córdoba and Ripoll (2013) are not reported either; they calibrate the BCL survival function for 74 countries but do not publish individual country results.

¹From <http://www.richardcarrier.info/lifetbl.html>, consulted on January 12, 2015, adapted from “Frier’s Life Table for the Roman Empire,” p.144 of T.G. Parkin, *Demography and Roman Society* (1992).




Figure 1: Four examples of survival functions $S(a) = \frac{\exp\{-\beta a\} - \alpha}{1 - \alpha}$.

COMPENSATION EFFECT: In the literature using the Gompertz law of mortality, there is a relationship called the Compensation Effect of Mortality. The Compensation Effect of Mortality states that any observed reduction in the mortality of the young, ρ , has to be compensated for by an increase in the mortality of the old, μ , following the relation

$$\rho = C_0 - C_1 \mu$$

where C_0 and $C_1 > 0$ are constant parameters, the same for all human populations. Under the Compensation Effect, survival laws tend to rectangularize when α goes to infinity; in this case, the maximum lifespan of humanity tends to C_1 (to which the initial age a_0 should be added to get the lifespan in terms of biological age). According to Strulik and Vollmer (2013), the Compensation Law indeed holds until about 1950, consistent with a biological maximum to aging. Beyond, they find some evidence that C_1 itself increased, testifying to the effect of medical advances on the maximum lifespan (they call it manufactured lifespan.)

Place	cohort or period	a_0	$-\beta$	α	Source
Roman Empire	c. 100	15	-0.001	0.93	own computation
Geneva	1625-1674	10	0.005	1.45	Boucekkine, de la Croix,
Geneva	1675-1724	10	0.010	2.18	and Licandro (2003)
Geneva	1725-1825	10	0.018	3.86	
France	1875-1899	10	0.019	4.92	Boucekkine, de la Croix,
France	1900-1924	10	0.032	15.11	and Licandro (2004)
France	1925-1949	10	0.052	94.83	
Netherlands	1960 (p)	18	0.068	122.64	Heijdra and Mierau (2010)
USA	1840	20	0.018	5.37	Cervellati and Sunde (2013)
USA	1850	20	0.019	5.66	
USA	1860	20	0.020	6.39	
USA	1870	20	0.022	7.49	
USA	1880	20	0.023	8.64	
USA	1890	20	0.025	10.28	
USA	1900	20	0.028	13.46	
USA	1910	20	0.031	18.05	
USA	1920	20	0.032	20.94	
USA	1930	20	0.037	33.42	
USA	1960 (p)	18	0.054	43.98	Mierau and Turnovsky (2014) ²
USA	2006 (p)	18	0.057	78.36	

Table 1: Estimates of $S(a)$

In the case of the BCL law of mortality, using (3) the Compensation Effect implies:

$$\ln \frac{-\beta}{\alpha - 1} = C_0 + C_1\beta$$

This relation on the US data from Cervellati and Sunde (2013), which is provided in Table 1, can be checked. The regression is:

$$\ln \frac{-\beta}{\alpha - 1} = -4.21 + 68.6\beta,$$

with an $R^2 = 99.6$, and a maximum lifespan $C_1 + a_0$ of $68.6+20=88.6$. The very good fit indicates that the Compensation Law holds to a large degree, and that most of the changes in survival are related to a rectangularization process. Let us finally remark that rectangularization has a particular economic importance. It means that the early increase

in longevity benefits adults in their working age, therefore affecting economic incentives to invest. At later stages, increasing longevity benefits old workers and retired people more, and is probably of less importance as far as incentives are concerned.

Oxborrow and Turnovsky (2015) study the properties of a dynamic general equilibrium model for an open economy where survival is modelled using various functions. They find that assuming a fully rectangular survival curve or a BCL survival curve delivers similar economic responses to macroeconomic shocks, while assuming a constant mortality rate à la Blanchard yields very different outcomes in response to changes in foreign interest rates, less so in response to productivity shocks. The fact that, using current data, the BCL and the rectangular curves have similar properties in terms of economic incentives is not surprising as the rectangularization process of actual survival functions is well advanced. Their conclusion would probably be different if they looked at pre-industrial data where the survival function was close to linear. Then, the constant mortality function and the BCL would yield similar results, which are very different from the rectangular curve. As a conclusion, in order to study both periods, pre-industrial and contemporaneous, the BCL survival function offers the required flexibility.

4 Contact Time Effect

For a long time, knowledge was not written in books or encoded in computer systems but was embodied in people. Face-to-face communication was key for knowledge transmission and enhancement. Today, even if books and computers have become key, person-to-person interactions remain essential for learning. That is why, after all, we economists organize and attend conferences and workshops.

When face-to-face communication does matter to accumulate knowledge, longer lives increase the contact time between people. This is particularly important as far as apprenticeship and teaching is concerned. The longer masters live, the more likely they are to accumulate knowledge and to transmit it to a large number of apprentices. If Robert Lucas had died in 1992 at the age of 55, a pre-modern value for longevity, he would have directed 17 Ph.D. dissertations instead of 34.³ Moreover he would not have had the opportunity to further improve by exchanging ideas beyond the age of 55.

APPRENTICESHIP: I view a model of person-to-person exchange of ideas as crucial for mod-

³Computations made using the genealogy module of RePec

eling technological progress in the pre-industrial era. Most productive knowledge was tacit, and was passed on directly from a “teacher” to a “student.” Across societies, much of this knowledge transmission took place within families, i.e. children entered the same occupations as their parents and acquired knowledge from working with them. However, the transmission of knowledge across family lines was also important, and here (at least in some areas) institutions such as apprenticeship and journeymanhood played an important role. By adopting a formal model of person-to-person transmission of knowledge, de la Croix, Doepke, and Mokyr (2015) help our understanding of the role of such institutional arrangements for the transmission of knowledge and, ultimately, the overall rate of productivity growth. ⁴

LUCAS’S MODEL: A formal link between productivity growth and longevity is implicitly provided by Lucas (2009) who builds on earlier contributions by Jovanovic and Rob (1989) and Kortum (1997). In his model, the productivity of any individual evolves as follows. Suppose individuals have the productivity z at date t , viewed as a draw from the date- t technology frontier, represented by a cumulative distribution function G . Over the time interval $(t, t + h)$, individuals get ηh independent draws from another distribution, with a cumulative distribution function H , representing the source of new ideas. Assuming that the origin of everyone’s ideas is other people in the same economy, $G = H$. Let y denote the best of these draws. Then at $t + h$, their productivity will be either their original productivity z or the best of their new ideas y , whichever is higher: $\max(z, y)$.

MINIMUM STABILITY POSTULATE: Each idea y gives the possibility of producing one unit of output with cost $x = y^{-1/\theta}$. The distribution of ideas is assumed to be a Fréchet distribution with shape parameter $1/\theta$ and scale parameter λ_t^θ :

$$Pr(Y < y) = \exp\{-(y/\lambda_t^\theta)^{-1/\theta}\} = \exp\{-\lambda_t y^{-1/\theta}\}$$

This distribution has the advantage of being preserved by the max operator of the matching process. If ideas are drawn from a Fréchet distribution, the corresponding costs are distributed following an exponential distribution with rate parameter λ_t :

$$Pr(X < x) = Pr(Y > x^{-\theta}) = 1 - Pr(Y < x^{-\theta}) = 1 - \exp\{-\lambda_t x\}.$$

⁴In their model, knowledge is represented as the efficiency with which workers can perform tasks. While there is some scope for new innovation, the main engine of technological progress is the transmission of productive knowledge from old to young workers. Young workers learn from elders through a form of apprenticeship. There is a distribution of knowledge (or productivity) across workers, and when young workers learn from multiple old workers, they can adopt the best technique that they have been exposed to. Through this process, average productivity in the economy increases over time.

The exponential distribution satisfies the minimum stability postulate according to which if x_1 and x_2 are mutually independent random variables, exponentially distributed with parameter λ , then $\min(x_1, x_2)$ is exponentially distributed with parameter 2λ . As a consequence of this property of the exponential distribution, the maximum of two independent random variables, Fréchet distributed with parameters $(1/\theta, \lambda^\theta)$ will be itself Fréchet distributed with parameters $(1/\theta, 2^\theta \lambda^\theta)$. The Fréchet distribution is said to satisfy the maximum stability postulate.

The consequence of this nice property is that it is not necessary to track the entire distribution of knowledge over time, but only the rate parameter of the underlying exponential distribution of cost. The only state variable of the model is λ_t , which is equal to the inverse of the mean cost. Being inversely related to the cost, λ_t is an indicator which is positively associated with aggregate knowledge. Along a balanced growth path, λ_t grows at a constant rate γ , while GDP per capita grows at rate $\gamma\theta$.

INTRODUCING A COHORT STRUCTURE: In addition to these assumptions on knowledge diffusion, Lucas introduces a cohort structure with a stationary population characterized by the density $p(a)$ giving the density of population aged a in the economy. This implies age-specific distributions of ideas. Assuming that everyone is met with equal probability, Lucas relates the parameter λ_t of the aggregate distribution of knowledge to the age-specific distributions. It is through this structure that longevity affects knowledge diffusion. Indeed, if the survival curve is more rectangular, there are more old people in the economy and the probability of meeting them is higher. As these old people are those with the best ideas – as they had more opportunities to improve their knowledge through the operator \max –, having more old people around accelerates the rate of knowledge diffusion.

In the end, the growth rate of knowledge along a balanced growth path is given by Equation (8) in Lucas (2009):

$$\gamma = \eta \int_0^{\bar{a}} p(a)(1 - e^{-\gamma a}) da, \quad (4)$$

where, as explained above, γ is the growth rate of knowledge, η is a parameter measuring the frequency of contacts and the ability to learn from others, and $p(a)$ is the density of population aged a . $p(a)$ can be computed with the BCL survival function as:

$$p(a) = \frac{S(a)}{\int_0^{\bar{a}} S(x) dx} = \frac{\beta (e^{-\beta a} - \alpha)}{1 - \alpha + \alpha \ln \alpha}. \quad (5)$$

Only in the case where $\alpha = 0$, one can solve Equation (4) for γ . It yields two solutions, $\gamma = 0$, and $\gamma = \eta - \beta$. Growth depends negatively on the constant death rate β . In the more

general case, numerical solutions must be used.

QUANTIFICATION: From the model above, what can be concluded is that the idea-processing rate η and the demographic parameters α and β combine to determine the rate γ of technological change. Together with the Fréchet scale parameter $1/\theta$, they determine the growth rate of GDP per capita $\gamma\theta$. This set-up can now be used to quantify the effect of longer lives on GDP growth.

To fix ideas, let us take from Bolt and van Zanden (2014) the GDP per capita for the USA and estimate its growth rate. Growth in the nineteenth century was 1.16% per year. In the twentieth century, it was 1.97% per year. We assume that growth was zero in the Malthusian epoch, i.e. before 1700. I now proceed in four steps.

1. Following Lucas (2009), θ is a parameter which can be estimated from the variance of earnings across workers. I take the value estimated by Lucas which is equal to 0.5.
2. η is now calibrated to give a realistic growth rate with a recent estimate of the survival function. I consider the growth rate of the last century to be 1.97% per year. Given the value of θ , it requires a growth of knowledge λ_t of 4%. I take the α and β estimated on the cohort born in 1930 in the USA ($\beta = -0.037$, $\alpha = 33.42$). Equations (4) and (5) are solved with these parameters to find the value of η with such a growth. It gives $\eta = 0.0583$.
3. Next, I compute what the growth rate would be if the survival parameters from cohorts born one century before are imputed. I take $\theta = 0.5$, $\eta = 0.0588$, the α and β estimated on the cohort born in 1840 in the USA ($\beta = -0.018$, $\alpha = 5.37$), and solve for γ which leads to $\gamma = 0.0366$, implying an annual growth rate of GDP per capita of 1.80%. This is the annual growth obtained with the 20th century characteristics as implicitly contained in η and θ , but a 19th century survival level.
4. The same exercise is repeated with pre-industrial levels of the survival parameters. I still take $\theta = 0.5$, $\eta = 0.0588$, together with the α and β estimated on the cohort born in 1625-1674 in Geneva ($\beta = -0.005$, $\alpha = 1.45$), and solve for γ which leads to $\gamma = 0.0245$, implying an annual growth rate of GDP per capita of 1.19%.

Column (a) of Table 2 summarizes the results. The relatively short lives of people before the Industrial Revolution made knowledge accumulation slow. An economy endowed with the characteristics of modern growth but pre-industrial survival would grow at 1.19% per year, instead of 1.97% with late 20th century survival. The impact of increased longevity on

Model	(a) Lucas	(b) Lucas	(c) Ben-Porath	(d) Ben-Porath	US data
Benchmark calibration	1930	1650	1930	1650	
1650→1850	+ 0.61%	+ 0.74%	+0.30%	+ 0.60%	+1.16%
1850→1930	+ 0.17%	+ 0.17%	+0.11%	+ 0.19%	+0.81%
1650→1930	+ 0.78%	+ 0.91%	+ 0.41%	+ 0.79%	+1.97%

Table 2: Gain in Annual Growth Rates Obtained by Increased Longevity & US data

growth through the contact time effect is to increase annual growth rates by +0.61% over the 1650-1850 period, and by +0.17% over 1850-1930. On the whole, it can explain 40% of the increase in growth rate over the last two centuries (+0.78% over +1.97%), which is quantitatively significant.⁵ Let us finally stress that most of the rise in growth comes from early increases in longevity, i.e. those taking place before and during the 19th century. The more recent improvements in longevity appear to matter less for growth.

An alternative analysis can be obtained by taking the initial period as benchmark to calibrate η rather than the final one. Now calibrate η to give a realistic growth rate over the seventeenth century (=0%) with the survival parameters of the cohort born in 1625-1674 in Geneva. This yields $\eta = 0.4144$. Implementing the 19th century survival in this environment leads to $\gamma = 0.0148$ (hence an increase in annual growth of +0.74%) and implementing the 20th century survival leads to $\gamma = 0.0182$. Column (b) of Table 2 summarizes the gains in growth for both periods. The choice of the benchmark to calibrate η does not matter much for the results. For comparison, Table 2 also provides data for the US from Bolt and van Zanden (2014).⁶

5 Incentive Effect

A second effect of longer lives is to change the incentives for people to invest in the future. The so-called *Ben-Porath mechanism*, following Ben-Porath (1967)'s seminal contribution, belongs to this category. According to this theory, the return to investment in education

⁵Recent growth models that build on Lucas (2009) include Lucas and Moll (2014) and Perla and Tonetti (2014), but they do not develop the demographic side of their model.

⁶Growth in 1850 refers to growth in the nineteenth century, while growth in 1930 refers to the twentieth century.

depends on the length of time during which education will be productive, i.e. a longer active life makes initial investment in human capital more profitable. Longer education makes future income higher. Provided that human capital is an engine of growth, this may in turn sustain permanent income growth. The first authors to put this argument at work in an endogenous growth model were de la Croix and Licandro (1999). Further contributions are in Kalemli-Ozcan, Ryder, and Weil (2000), Boucekine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002), Soares (2005) and Cervellati and Sunde (2015). Quantifications of the effect can be found in de la Croix, Lindh, and Malmberg (2008) and Córdoba and Ripoll (2013). A complementary mechanism argues that longer lives give stronger incentives to save and invest. Following the intuition of the life-cycle hypothesis, Nicolini (2004) claims that the increase in adult life expectancy must have implied less farmer impatience and could have caused more investment in nitrogen stock and land fertility, the increase in agricultural land, and higher production per acre in hyphen 18th century England.

With these models, the same exercise as with the “contact time” model can be repeated: calibrate the set-up to modern growth, and then feed in the mortality conditions of the pre-industrial era keeping the other parameters constant and compare the growth rates. Let us first summarize the set-up linking mortality to growth through education incentives.

THE HOUSEHOLD PROBLEM: An individual born at time $t, \forall t \geq 0$, has the following expected utility:

$$\int_t^{t+\bar{a}} c(t, z) S(z-t) e^{-\rho(z-t)} dz, \quad (6)$$

where $c(t, z)$ is the consumption of a generation t member at time z and ρ is the pure time preference parameter. Risk neutrality is assumed for simplicity.

There is a unique material good, the price of which is normalized to 1, which can be used for consumption. Every working household produces a quantity of good $y(t)$ using human capital $h(t)$ according to the following simple technology: $y(t) = h(t)$. A household’s human capital depends on the time spent on education, T , on the average human capital $\bar{H}(t)$ of the society at birth, and on the state of technology A :

$$h(t) = A\bar{H}(t)T. \quad (7)$$

With $\bar{H}(t)$ the typical externality which positively relates the future quality of the agent to the cultural ambience of the society (through for instance the quality of the school). Technology parameter A is a scale parameter that allows to match the observed growth rate of human capital and output.

Equation (7) relates the human capital of an individual to the human capital of the society when this individual started his/her education (“at birth”). This implies that, along a balanced growth path with T constant and $H(t)$ growing, old workers are less productive than younger ones at any instant t , because they were educated long before, when average human capital was not as high as today. This contrasts with the contact time approach, in which old workers are those with the highest skills (on average) as they had more opportunities to improve their knowledge by meeting people than young workers.

The inter-temporal budget constraint of the agent born at t is:

$$\int_t^{t+\bar{a}} c(t, z)R(t, z)dz = \int_{t+T}^{t+\bar{a}} h(t)R(t, z)dz. \quad (8)$$

The left-hand side is the current cost of all future contingent life-cycle consumptions. The right-hand side is the current value of contingent earnings. $R(t, z)$ is the contingent price paid by members of generation t to receive one unit of the physical good at time z in the case where they are still alive. By definition, $R(t, t) = 1$.

Individuals enter the labor market at age T with human capital $h(t)$, and produce $h(t)$ per unit of time. They work until death.⁷

The problem of the representative individual from generation t is to select a consumption contingent plan and the duration of his or her education to maximize the expected utility subject to the inter-temporal budget constraint, and given the per capita human capital and the sequence of contingent wages and contingent prices. The corresponding first-order necessary conditions for a maximum lead to the following optimal rule for T :

$$T S(T) e^{-\rho T} = \int_T^{\bar{a}} S(a) e^{-\rho a} da, \quad (9)$$

The left-hand side is related to the opportunity cost of postponing the entry in the labor market, while the right-hand side is the marginal benefit of increasing education measured by the increase in the discounted flow of future wages.

AGGREGATE HUMAN CAPITAL: The productive aggregate stock of human capital is computed from the human capital of all generations currently at work:

$$Y(t) = H(t) = \int_{t-\bar{a}}^{t-\bar{T}} S(t-z)h(z)dz, \quad (10)$$

⁷In the original version of Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002), they have a disutility of labor increasing with age and they choose a retirement age optimally.

where $t - \bar{T}$ ($= t - T$ along a BGP) is the last generation that entered the job market at t and $t - \bar{a}$ is the oldest generation still alive at t . The average human capital at the root of the externality (7) is obtained by dividing the aggregate human capital by the size of the population:

$$\bar{H}(t) = \frac{H(t)}{P}. \quad (11)$$

Hence, the dynamics of human capital are given by:

$$H(t) = \int_{t-\bar{a}}^{t-\bar{T}} S(t-z) \frac{AH(z)T}{P} dz, \quad (12)$$

and its growth rate g , along a balanced growth path, should satisfy:

$$1 = \frac{AT}{P} \int_T^{\bar{a}} S(z) e^{-gz} dz. \quad (13)$$

As shown in Boucekkine, de la Croix, and Licandro (2002), a rise in life expectancy (either through an increase in α or a drop in β) increases the optimal length of schooling. Moreover, along a balanced growth path, a rise in life expectancy has a positive effect on economic growth for low levels of life expectancy and a negative effect on economic growth for high levels of life expectancy. Intuitively, the total effect of an increase in life expectancy results from combining three factors: (a) agents die on average later, thus the depreciation rate of aggregate human capital decreases; (b) agents tend to study more because the expected flow of future wages has risen, and the human capital per capita increases; and (c) the economy consists more of old agents who received their schooling a long time ago. The first two effects have a positive influence on the growth rate, but the third effect has a negative influence.

QUANTIFICATION: I now proceed with the quantitative analysis in four steps.

1. First, the pure rate of time preference ϱ is set to 4% per year.
2. Next, A is calibrated to give a realistic growth rate with a recent estimate of the survival function. I consider that the growth rate of the last century is 1.97% per year. Given the value of ϱ , and taking the α and β estimated on the cohort born in 1930 in the USA ($\beta = -0.037$, $\alpha = 33.42$), Equations (9) and (13) are solved to find $A = 0.17$. Along this balanced growth path, $T = 20.8$, which is too high.⁸
3. Next, I compute what the growth rate would be if the survival parameters from cohorts

⁸There are several ways to fix this problem: lower the return to schooling, introduce a fixed retirement age, or assume that some part of the schooling was achieved before age a_0 .

born one century before are imputed. Taking $\varrho = 0.04$, $A = 0.17$, and the α and β estimated on the cohort born in 1840 in the USA ($\beta = -0.018$, $\alpha = 5.37$), I solve for γ which leads to $\gamma = 0.0186$, implying an annual growth rate of GDP per capita of 1.86%. This is the annual growth obtained with the 20th century characteristics as implicitly contained in η and θ , but a 19th century survival level.

4. The same exercise is repeated with pre-industrial levels of the survival parameters. Still taking $\varrho = 0.04$, $A = 0.17$, together with the α and β estimated on the cohort born in 1625-1674 in Geneva ($\beta = -0.005$, $\alpha = 1.45$), and solving for γ , I find $\gamma = 0.0156$, i.e. an annual growth rate of GDP per capita of 1.56%. Schooling in this simulation is $T = 15.8$.

What can be concluded from this exercise is that the rectangularization of the survival curve can be held responsible for one-fifth of the increase in growth rates over the last two centuries (explaining +0.41% over +1.97%), and one-fourth of the increase in schooling (5 years over 20). Column (c) of Table 2 summarizes these results. The effects are smaller than with the contact time model. If, instead of calibrating the parameter A to reproduce 2% of growth in the twentieth century, A is chosen to reproduce the absence of growth in the seventeenth century, the results are magnified as shown in column (d) of Table 2. Longevity increases account for an increase in annual growth of +0.6% between 1650 and 1850 and +0.79% between 1650 and 1930.

Similar results have been debated in the literature. Assuming a perfectly rectangular survival function, Hazan (2009) argues that if it was true that longevity increased schooling investment through the incentive mechanism of Ben-Porath (1967), an increase in expected lifetime working hours should also be observed, while what is observed on US data is that lifetime labor supply actually decreased over the last century. This observation led him to conclude that the Ben-Porath mechanism cannot be responsible for the observed rise in education and growth.

It is easy to understand that Hazan (2009)'s critique cannot be true in general. Consider the following example illustrated in Figure 2. Households live for three periods. In period 1, they can either work or get education. In periods 2 and 3, they work. If they do not get education, their income per period is 22. If they get an education, their income per period is 40.

- Suppose first that they have a 50% chance of dying during the second period but if they survive, they live through the third period for sure. If they do not get an education,




Figure 2: Example with Increasing Longevity & Schooling but Decreasing Lifetime Labor Supply

their expected lifetime income is: $22 + 0.5 \times 22 + 0.5 \times 22 = 44$ and their expected lifetime labor supply is: 2. If they get an education, their expected lifetime income is: $0.5 \times 40 + 0.5 \times 40 = 40$ and their expected lifetime labor supply is 1. The best choice is to get no education and work 2 units on average.

- Suppose now that they are certain to survive in period 2, but they have a 50% chance of dying in period 3. This is a shift in the survival function - a rectangularization. If they do not get an education, their expected lifetime income is: $22 + 22 + 0.5 \times 22 = 55$ and their expected lifetime labor supply is: 2.5. If they get an education, their expected lifetime income is $40 + 0.5 \times 40 = 60$ and their expected lifetime labor supply is: 1.5. It is now best to get an education, as a response to lower mortality, and to work 1.5 units on average.

Hence, to summarize, the drop in mortality has the following consequences: Education goes from 0 to 1, income goes from 44 to 60, labor supply goes from 2 to 1.5, and the Ben Porath mechanism is compatible with a shorter lifetime labor supply.

More generally, Cervellati and Sunde (2013) show that Hazan (2009)'s claim relies on the rectangular survival function he assumed, and that the Ben Porath mechanism can be reconciled with decreasing lifetime labor supply when the survival function is not perfectly rectangular.⁹

⁹Other mechanisms can also reconcile Ben Porath with the facts, such as imperfect financial markets, see Hansen and Lønstrup (2012), or a utility cost of studying, higher than the one of working, see Sanchez-Romero, d'Albis, and Prskawetz (2015).

6 Conclusions

In this chapter, I discuss two effects that relate longevity to human capital accumulation. The first effect is by increasing the contact time between persons. Living longer allows to benefit from more occasions to learn from others and increases the contact time between any two individuals. It makes ideas better and the diffusion of ideas faster. In this very simple set-up, aging is always good, as it does neglect retirement and increased frailty.

The second effect goes by modifying the incentives faced by people. Longer lives increases their horizon, and makes investment in education profitable. This translates into higher growth when coupled with a model where human capital is the engine of growth. In this set-up, ageing above a certain point becomes unfavorable for growth, as the knowledge acquired at school of the elders is becoming obsolete with time.

I have made the point that increases in longevity are quantitatively significant to explain the acceleration of growth over the last two centuries. Following the contact time model, longer lives can explain forty percent of the increase in growth rate over the last two centuries. The explanatory power of the the incentive model is lower, with observed increases in adult longevity explaining one-fifth of the increase in growth rates over the last two centuries, and one-fourth of the increase in schooling.

In both models, the early increases in longevity are particularly relevant for growth. The drop in mortality of young adults is conducive to growth, much more that improvements at later ages. These results stress it is important to model longevity with a rich enough survival function, like the BLC function we propose, and not to limit the analysis to rectangular survival functions (certain survival up to a certain age).

On the whole, the analysis shows that beyond geographical, institutional and cultural determinants of growth, demographic factors should also be considered. In terms of perspectives for future growth, it seems there is nothing more to expect from the mechanisms highlighted here for developed countries, where the rectangularization of the survival curve is close to completion. But there is more to expect in countries where mortality of adults at younger ages is still high.

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