Informality and Long-Run Growth

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Abstract

One of the most salient features of developing economies is the existence of a large informal sector. In this paper, we use quantitative theory to study the dynamic implications of informality on wage inequality, human capital accumulation, child labor, and long-run growth. Our model can generate transitory informality equilibria or informality-induced poverty traps. Its calibration reveals that the case for the poverty-trap hypothesis arises: although informality serves to protect low-skilled workers from extreme poverty in the short run, it prevents income convergence between developed and developing nations in the long run. Then we examine the effectiveness of different development policies to exit the poverty trap. Our numerical experiments show that using means-tested education subsidies is the most cost-effective single policy option. However, for longer time horizons, or as the economy gets closer to the poverty trap threshold, combining means-tested education and wage subsidies is even more effective.

Keywords: Child labor; development; education; inequality
JEL classification: O11; O15; O17

I. Introduction

In this paper, we develop a two-sector growth model to analyze the dynamic implications of informality for long-run growth. The model features bidirectional causal links between informality and human capital accumulation, our source of economic growth. On the one hand, the existence of

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an informal sector influences the incentive to accumulate human capital; this is because informality lowers the skill premium and facilitates child labor. On the other hand, human capital affects the size of the informal sector; when the number of high-skilled workers is small, labor demand is low in the formal economy and informality increases. First, we theoretically show that these interdependences between human capital accumulation and informality can be the source of transitory informality equilibria or informality-induced poverty traps. Second, we confront the data to the model to obtain key parameters to match a set of stylized facts that describe the relationships between informality, human capital, child labor, and growth. The calibrated model reveals that the case for the poverty trap is strong. In this context, we explore different policies that could enable a developing country to escape the poverty trap.

The informal economy is defined as the part of an economy that is not taxed, monitored by any form of government, or included in gross national product. Although it is difficult to measure precisely, informality is undoubtedly a widespread phenomenon in developing countries. For example, Schneider et al. (2010) estimate the average size of the shadow economy as a percentage of “official” gross domestic product (GDP), and they obtain an average share of 38.4 percent in Sub-Saharan Africa, 34.7 percent in Latin America and the Caribbean, and 25.1 percent in South Asia. It is usually described as a heterogeneous sector that includes registered firms’ activities hidden from the state, wage employment or self-employment in unregistered small-scale business units, and sometimes home production. We make two clarifications about the concept of informality investigated in this paper.

First, our model aims at capturing informal activities that lead to economic transactions between economic agents, not home production. The size of the informal market has been estimated using direct measurement methods (i.e., household micro surveys) and indirect methods. The latter exploit the correlation between economic activity and monetary indicators (informal activities conduct more transactions in cash), electricity consumption or indicators of aggregate expenditure (Schneider et al., 2010). Second, the nature of the informal economy differs between rich and poor countries. In developed countries, the informal sector is characterized by unreported employment and sales. Informal activities are governed by the same production technology as in the formal sector and are simply hidden from the state for tax, social security, or labor law purposes. The informal economy is of a different nature in developing countries. Although tax evasion also plays a role, developing countries show a dualistic system of production

1 What we refer to as “fiscal informality” ranges from 10 to 20 percent of official GDP (an average of 13.5 percent) in high-income countries (Schneider, 2005).
with registered and unregistered firms. The latter are characterized by low-skill intensive technology, and they provide a precious source of income to many low-skilled individuals in countries where low-skilled wages would fall below subsistence levels in the absence of an informal economy. Our model disregards fiscal informality and focuses on subsistence informality, the overwhelming part of the informal economy in low-income countries.

Subsistence informality is the only way for many people in developing countries to escape extreme poverty and precarious living conditions (Gërxtani, 2004). A large share of informality is tolerated by the state in many developing countries. The reasons are multiple, such as the incapacity of the state to develop or maintain social programs, its incapacity to manage unemployment, the fear of a bankruptcy of the economy, the fear of social tensions, etc. A report by the World Bank (2014, p. 23) states that a third of developing economies do not have any social protection policy or strategy, and the number of such countries has grown very recently, meaning that the effects of many of these programs have yet to be seen. In the absence of social protection, informality is widely tolerated because it provides people with an alternative, in the absence of, for example, unemployment insurance (as argued in Vodopivec, 2013; Robalino and Weber, 2013; Margolis et al., 2012; Charlot et al., 2016, among others) and/or a minimum wage (as argued by, among others, Basu et al., 2012, 2015).

Informality can generate vicious circles through different channels. First, de Paula and Scheinkman (2010, 2011), for example, emphasized the role of value-added taxes in transmitting informality through chain effects – the informality of a firm is correlated with the informality of firms from which it buys or sells. Second, informality reduces the amount of fiscal revenues that the government can allocate to social protection; in turn, this affects the attractiveness of the formal economy through greater tax rates or smaller social benefits (see Zenou, 2008; Leal Ordoñez, 2014). Third, Murphy et al. (1989) or Krugman (1991) developed models of multiple equilibria, in which firms can choose to operate in the informal sector (characterized by low productivity and wages) or in the formal sector (characterized by high productivity and wages, and fixed equipment costs). Each firm has an incentive to move from informality to formality if the demand for the goods produced is large enough. This occurs when the economy-wide average income is high (i.e., when other firms industrialize and pay higher wages). For several reasons, the predominance of subsistence informality can be seen as a result of a coordination failure, impeding the process of industrialization and productivity growth.

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2 As Gërxtani (2004), we argue that the main difference is that some people need the informal sector to survive in developing countries, which is not the case in developed countries.

3 Hence, a firm’s decision whether to industrialize or not depends on its expectation of what other firms will do.
In this paper, we explore the dynamic implications of informality, building on the relationships between informality, wage inequality, human capital accumulation, child labor, and long-run growth. We require the model to be compatible with five major stylized facts (presented in more detail in the next section):

1. the size of the informal economy diminishes with development;
2. the informal sector employs mostly low-skilled workers and exhibits low total factor productivity (TFP);
3. child labor increases with informality;
4. skill premia in poor countries are much smaller than the level predicted by the labor market models used to explain wage inequality in high-income countries;
5. in poor countries, the elasticity of recorded GDP per capita to human capital is close to unity, and school enrolment rates are lower.

We build a two-sector model, in which people choose to join or not to join the informal sector, and we assume the existence of technological differences between sectors – as in Murphy et al. (1989) or Krugman (1991). Then we investigate the implications of subsistence informality on welfare, inequality, growth, and effectiveness of development policies. Our philosophy is to use an abstract economic model, which highlights the major economic mechanisms underlying the formation and persistence of the informal sector and development. Incentives to invest in children’s education and opportunities to obtain income from children will play a key role. Then we confront the theory to the data, calibrate the parameters of our model, and study its dynamic properties. Such a quantitative theory approach is now the dominant research paradigm used by economists incorporating rational expectations and dynamic choice into short-run macroeconomic and monetary economics models (King, 1995). Although the sources of poverty traps have been abundantly documented, they have rarely been submitted to a quantitative assessment.

In our framework, the main link between informality and long-run growth operates through the accumulation of human capital. The incentive to accumulate human capital is lowered by the existence of the informal sector for two reasons. On the one hand, because the informal sector absorbs a large share of the less-skilled labor force, the supply of less-skilled workers to the formal sector is reduced, leading to a smaller skill premium. On the other hand, the occurrence of child labor is facilitated by the existence of the informal economy. Faced with lower skill premia and easier access to child labor, parents tend to choose less schooling for their children.

The model can generate multiple equilibria or a unique equilibrium, depending on the parameter values. In the absence of informality, the
model predicts long-run convergence in income across nations. Informality can slow down this convergence process or it can be the source of a poverty trap. Using the stylized facts above and other consensual parameters from the literature, we calibrate our model and we study its quantitative properties. This allows us to discriminate between the poverty-trap and slow-convergence hypotheses. The calibration exercise reveals that the case for the poverty-trap hypothesis arises: although informality serves to protect low-skilled workers in the short run, it prevents income convergence across countries.

On this basis, we assess the effectiveness of different policy options. Coercive policies, such as a sudden elimination of child labor, would induce large welfare losses for the initial generations of poor people on the transition path. Thus, we consider different Pigouvian policies (subsidizing education to all families, or to low-income families, subsidizing high-skilled formal employment, or low-skilled formal employment) assuming that subsidies are financed by development assistance. Two criteria are used to evaluate these policies: cost effectiveness and the length of the transition required to exit the poverty trap. Among the four subsidies considered, education subsidies paid to low-income families dominate the others in terms of cost efficiency. Moreover, only wage subsidies for low-skill jobs in the formal sector play a distinct and complementary role in the transition to the high-income equilibrium. Whereas the education and the high-skilled formal employment subsidies speed up the accumulation of human capital, the low-skill wage subsidy reduces the threshold at which the informal sector disappears. Therefore, targeted education subsidies are the cheapest single policy, but for medium time horizons, a combination of the two policies is found to be the most cost-efficient choice.

The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we discuss the main stylized facts, and in Section III, we describe the model. The implications of informality are examined in Section IV. In Section V, we calibrate the model and study its quantitative properties. We conclude in Section VI.

II. Stylized Facts

We require our model to be compatible with five major stylized facts (SF1 to SF5) on subsistence informality and development, as illustrated in Figures 1(a)–1(d).

4 In the regression lines of Figures 1(a), 1(b), and 1(d), we exclude observations for socialist countries (marked with a ×) because informality in these countries is of a different nature.
Fig. 1. Stylized facts on informality, education and development

Data sources: for education, Barro and Lee (2013); for informality, Schneider (2005); for GDP, PWT 7.0; for child labor, World Development Indicators (2012); for returns to schooling, Hendricks (2004).

Log (y) = 7.291 + 0.864 Log (x)

(c) Tertiary educated and return to one year of schooling

(d) GDP per capita and tertiary educated in 2000

Fig. 1. Continued

**SF1: informality decreases with development.** Figure 1(a) shows the relation between the proportion of tertiary educated (completed college education) and the ratio of the estimated size of the shadow economy over recorded GDP in the year 2000. The shadow economy includes both activities hidden from the state for tax purposes and subsistence informality. The share of the shadow economy varies between 10 and 20 percent in high-income countries (an average of 13.5 percent); these informal activities are mainly related to tax evasion. The share of the shadow economy is much greater in developing countries, which is because of the importance of subsistence informality. Overall, Figure 1(a) shows a downward-sloping relationship between informality and the proportion of high-skilled workers. Our model will endogenize the size of the informal sector, and it will be consistent with this fact. The rationale is the following. Low-skilled workers are mobile across sectors, whereas high-skilled individuals only work in the formal sector. When the number of high-skilled workers is small, there is little demand for low-skilled labor in the formal sector and formal firms pay low wages to the less educated. Many low-skilled workers then move to the informal sector where wages are more attractive. Informality thus serves to protect low-skilled workers against very low levels of income offered in the formal sector and extreme poverty.

**SF2: the informal sector exhibits lower TFP and employs low-skilled workers.** This is a consensual hypothesis in informality models (Rosenstein-Rodan, 1943; Murphy et al., 1989; Krugman, 1991), which is supported by empirical studies. Maloney (2004) and de Paula and Scheinkman (2011) show that informal firms are managed by less able entrepreneurs, are smaller, and exhibit low capital–labor ratios. They estimate that the cost of capital faced by informal firms is at least 1.3 times the cost of capital of formal firms. Similarly, La Porta and Shleifer (2008) find evidence of a substantial difference between registered and unregistered firms regarding the skills of their managers, and they have suggested that this might drive many other differences, including the quality of inputs and access to finance. Rodrik (2013) points out that there is rapid unconditional convergence between rich and poor countries in manufacturing industries, but this phenomenon is hidden by a persistent specialization of poor countries in low-productivity (formal and informal) activities. Based on these facts, our model defines informality as a sector with lower productivity, low-skilled employment, and constant marginal productivity of labor. By contrast, the formal sector combines high-skilled and less educated workers, and it exhibits decreasing marginal productivity, constant returns to scale, and higher TFP.
**SF3: child labor increases with informality.** One of the underlying aspects of informality is the existence of child labor. We can think of different forms of child labor, from shoeshine boys to children working in mining extraction. In general, children are not reported as part of the official labor force. Even if formal firms employ children, they are not recorded as part of their formal workers by the state agencies. Figure 1(b) plots the percentage of male children who work against the share of the informal economy, expressed as a percentage of GDP in 2000.⁵ We can observe a positive correlation between informality and child labor. Note that the relation would be much steeper if high-income countries were included. Child labor is more likely to occur in poor families working in the informal economy. As these wealth-constrained families have to rely on the income from child labor, their children are unable to attend school and will therefore have little chance of escaping from poverty.

**SF4: Despite very low levels of human capital, returns to schooling are limited in poor countries.** The relationship between the rate of return to one year of college (Hendricks, 2004) and the proportion of college graduates in the labor force (Barro and Lee, 2013) is represented in Figure 1(c).⁶ Although returns to education decrease with human capital, they do not exceed 15 percent per year of schooling in low-income countries. This is much smaller than the level predicted by the labor market models used to explain wage inequality in high-income countries. Indeed, the constant elasticity of substitution (CES) representation is common in labor market studies (e.g., Katz and Murphy, 1992; Card and Lemieux, 2001) and in cross-country analysis of relative productivity (Caselli and Coleman, 2006). Elasticities of substitution between 1.3 and 2 are obtained in most labor market studies including Angrist (1995), Borjas and Katz (2007), and Katz and Murphy (1992). Assuming that college graduates have ten years more education than the less educated, and that wages are equal to the marginal productivity of labor, the thin lines in Figure 1(c) represent the prediction of CES models with elasticities of substitution equal to 1 (Cobb–Douglas), 1.3, or 2.0. None of these models matches the data. The average share of college graduates is around 3 percent in low-income countries. For such countries, the models predict a return to schooling comprised between 26 and 50 percent. The data provided in Hendricks (2004) show a maximum return to schooling of around 15 percent. We conclude that either the elasticities of substitution estimated for developed countries do not fit the

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⁵ More precisely, Figure 1(b) depicts logarithms of percentages on both axes. In the World Bank’s World Development Indicators, child labor is defined as work by children involved in economic activity for at least one hour in the reference week of the survey.

⁶ We use the most recent year of information of Mincerian returns in each country from Hendricks (2004).
production function of developing countries (an elasticity of 4.25 would be needed to match observations), or the structure of the labor market differs across countries.\footnote{Another possibility would be to assume that technologies differ between rich and poor countries, as in Caselli and Coleman (2006).} We plead for the second hypothesis and we see informality as a key factor limiting the skill premium and wage inequality in poor countries. Informality maintains a large skill ratio (i.e., ratio of college graduates to less educated workers) in the formal sector, thus keeping the return to schooling at a low level (Rodrik, 2013).

\textit{SF5: In poor countries, the elasticity of recorded GDP per capita to human capital is close to unity, and school enrolment is lower.} Although many studies point out that education has not generated as much growth as expected in developing countries, it is also reported that education is one of the necessary components for growth. As shown in Figure 1(d), the cross-sectional correlation between the proportion of college graduates in the labor force and GDP per capita is large, and the elasticity is close to unity. Despite scarcity in human capital, contemporaneous school enrolment rates are lower in poor countries.

\section*{III. Model}

We develop a two-period overlapping generations model in infinite discrete time with children and working-age adults. In every period, a single homogeneous good can be produced in two different sectors, the formal and informal sectors (labeled $f$ and $i$). Formal firms employ high- and low-skilled workers whereas the informal sector only employs low-skilled workers. In each period, there is an endogenous number of adults of each type who choose how much to consume and how much to invest in the education of their children. All decisions are made in the adult period of life (i.e., children do not decide anything). Below, we describe the technology, preferences, and the dynamics, and we define the competitive equilibrium path of our economy.

\textit{Production}

A single good is produced in two sectors. Heterogeneity in firm productivity has been documented in the formal sector (Melitz, 2003) as well as in the informal economy. In particular, Fields (1990, 2005) and Günther and Launov (2012) identified the existence of an upper-tier and lower-tier (or easy-entry) parts of the informal economy.\footnote{Maloney (2004) argues that it is difficult to classify firms in each tier, and that there is no consensus on the size of each.} The latter consists of...
employment that is free-entry, low wage, and undesirable relative to formal sector employment. The former consists of employment (either wage or self-employment) that is limited-entry, high wage, and preferred to formal sector employment. Still, the upper-tier sector mainly comprises small-scale, low-productivity, frequently family-based enterprises employing low-skilled workers (Maloney, 2004). Focusing on the interdependencies between informality and human capital accumulation, our model assumes that each sector is characterized by a representative firm. It disregards income heterogeneity between workers of a given type, and productivity heterogeneity between firms of a given sector. The formal sector employs high- and low-skilled labor, and the informal sector only uses low-skilled labor.

Let $h_t$ be the proportion of high-skilled adults at time $t$, and $N_t$ the total labor force of adults. We denote by $H_t = h_t N_t$ and $L_t = (1 - h_t)N_t$ the size of high- and low-skilled labor forces, respectively. Low-skilled workers are assumed to be perfectly mobile across sectors, whereas high-skilled workers have no incentive to join the informal sector. Output $Y_t$ is the sum of output $Y_{f,t}$ produced in the formal sector and output $Y_{i,t}$ produced in the informal sector. Output produced in each sector is given by

\[ Y_{f,t} = A_t H_t^\alpha L_{f,t}^{1-\alpha}, \]  
\[ Y_{i,t} = B L_{i,t}, \]  

where $\alpha$ is the elasticity of output with respect to high-skilled labor in the formal sector, $A_t$ is a time-varying scale factor representing the state of technology, $H_t$ is the quantity of high-skilled workers employed in the formal sector, $L_{f,t}$ and $L_{i,t}$ are the quantities of low-skilled workers employed in the formal and informal sectors, respectively, and $B$ is a scale factor associated with the technology in the informal sector, which is assumed to be constant.

We assume that TFP $A_t$ in the formal sector is endogenous. It is a concave function of the skill ratio in the formal sector.\(^\text{10}\) For simplicity and in reference to the AK model, the elasticity of TFP with respect to the skill ratio equals $1 - \alpha$, i.e.,

\[ A_t = A_0 \left( \frac{H_t}{L_{f,t}} \right)^{1-\alpha}. \]  

\(^9\)Our model does not account for brain waste, which might be responsible for employment of educated workers in informality.

\(^{10}\)This assumption implies that the proportion of high-skilled individuals generates a positive externality on aggregate productivity. It is a particular case of the model of Lucas (1988), and it is also related to other AK models such as the ones presented by Romer (1986) and Rebelo (1991).
For clarity purposes, we write $B = \tilde{\gamma} A_0$, where $\tilde{\gamma}$ is a parameter that allows us to write $B$ in terms of the scale factor $A_0$.\footnote{We require $\tilde{\gamma} \in [0, \alpha]$ to be consistent with SF2. Productivity in the informal sector must be low enough (relative to the formal sector) to ensure that wages of low-skilled workers are not higher than wages of high-skilled workers. This condition is satisfied if $\tilde{\gamma} \leq \alpha$, which follows directly from equation (24).} Moreover, $B$ also defines the minimum wage that can be earned in the informal sector.

Firms choose inputs by maximizing profits

$$Y_{f,t} - w_{h,t} H_t - w_{l,t} L_{f,t}$$

and

$$Y_{i,t} - w_{l,t} L_{i,t},$$

subject to $Y_{i,t} \geq 0$.\footnote{For simplicity, we omit the constraint $Y_{f,t} \geq 0$ because it is never binding in equilibrium.} Under perfect competition, firms in formal and informal sectors choose employment levels by equalizing the marginal productivity of high- and low-skilled workers with their wage rates $w_{h,t}$ and $w_{l,t}$. In the formal sector, these conditions are

$$w_{h,t} = A_t \alpha \left( \frac{L_{f,t}}{H_t} \right)^{1-\alpha},$$

and

$$w_{l,t} = A_t (1 - \alpha) \left( \frac{L_{f,t}}{H_t} \right)^{-\alpha}.$$

The output and employment decisions in the informal sector can be described by the complementary slackness conditions:

$$\frac{w_{l,t}}{\tilde{\gamma} A_0} \geq 1, \quad Y_{i,t} \geq 0, \quad \text{and} \quad \left( \frac{w_{l,t}}{\tilde{\gamma} A_0} - 1 \right) Y_{i,t} = 0.$$

These depict two possible equilibrium regimes, as follows.

1. Output in the informal sector is positive and the wage $w_{l,t}$ of low-skilled workers in both sectors is equal to the constant marginal productivity $\tilde{\gamma} A_0$ of labor in the informal sector. Hereafter, this regime is referred to as the informality regime.
2. Firms in the informal sector produce no output, and the wage $w_{l,t}$ of low-skilled workers in the formal economy exceeds the marginal productivity of labor in the informal sector. Hereafter, this regime is referred to as the formality regime.
Because of the perfect mobility across sectors, low-skilled wages are identical in the formal and informal sectors in the informality regime. Empirical evidence on the wage differential is mixed. On average, formal workers earn more than informal workers. However, Günther and Launov (2012) have shown that this is because of the difference between the formal and the lower-tier of the informal sectors (45 percent of informal employment in Cote d’Ivoire); on the contrary, the upper-tier (55 percent of informal employment) offers higher wages, and is preferred to formal sector employment. The wage differential disappears when individual and firm characteristics (such as firm size, workers’ education level, age) are accounted for – see Pratap and Quintin (2006a, 2006b) on Argentina and El Badaoui et al. (2008, 2010) on South Africa. Alternatively, Maloney (2004) argues that the wage differential is explained by the fact that informal workers receive in-kind benefits, and that part of the payment for young workers also goes to cover implicit training costs.

Preferences

Each adult of type $k \in \{h, l\}$ at period $t$ chooses consumption $c_{k,t}$ and the proportion $q_{k,t} \in [0, 1]$ of children sent to college to maximize utility. The utility function is logarithmic and depends on consumption $c_{k,t}$ and the average future wage $\bar{w}_{k,t+1}$ of children,

$$U_{k,t} = \ln (c_{k,t}) + \beta \ln (\bar{w}_{k,t+1}),$$

where $\beta$ is the rate of preference for the income of children. The average future wage of children is

$$\bar{w}_{k,t+1} = (1 - q_{k,t})w_{l,t+1} + q_{k,t}w_{h,t+1} = w_{l,t+1}(1 + q_{k,t}\sigma_{t+1}),$$

which depends on the value of the skill premium $\sigma_{t+1} = (w_{h,t+1} - w_{l,t+1})/w_{l,t+1}$ in the next period.

Educating a child incurs a monetary cost $\tilde{e}$. Children who have not been educated can work in the informal sector as long as the informal sector exists, and they can supply low-skilled labor when adults, whereas educated children go to school, have no time left to work, and become

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13 Assuming an exogenous wage differential ($\tau$) across sector (capturing expected sanction costs, bribes, etc.), we would have $w_{l,t} = \tilde{\gamma}A_0(1 + \tau)$ in the informality regime. In the slackness condition, adding ($\tau$) is basically equivalent to rescaling $\tilde{\gamma}$.

14 As we observe later, equilibrium high-skilled wages will be constant. Hence, a constant education cost is equivalent to education costs being proportional to high-skilled wages, which implies that education is more difficult to obtain for low-skilled workers than for high-skilled workers.
high-skilled labor when adults. In the informal sector, children receive a fraction $\eta \in [0, 1]$ of the low-skilled wage rate because they lack experience and physical strength compared to adults. The budget constraint is

$$c_{k,t} = w_{k,t} - n_k q_{k,t} \hat{e} + n_k (1 - q_{k,t}) \eta w_{l,t} d_t,$$

(11)

where $n_k$ is the (exogenous) number of children of a $k$-type adult, and $d_t$ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if some output is produced in the informal sector, and 0 otherwise.

Plugging equations (10) and (11) into equation (9) and maximizing utility with respect to $q_{k,t}$, we obtain

$$\hat{q}_{k,t} = \frac{\beta \sigma_{t+1}(w_{k,t} + n_k \eta w_{l,t} d_t) - n_k (\hat{e} + \eta w_{l,t} d_t)}{(1 + \beta) n_k (\hat{e} + \eta w_{l,t} d_t) \sigma_{t+1}}.$$

(12)

Therefore, the optimal level of education is

$$q^*_{k,t} = \begin{cases} 0 & \text{if } \hat{q}_{k,t} < 0 \\ \hat{q}_{k,t} & \text{if } 0 \leq \hat{q}_{k,t} \leq 1 \\ 1 & \text{if } \hat{q}_{k,t} > 1 \end{cases}.$$ 

(13)

Dynamics and Competitive Equilibrium

In the previous subsection, we obtained adults’ optimal decision on the proportion of children to be educated. Hence, given the proportion $h_t$ of high-skilled workers in period $t$, fertility rates $n_h$ and $n_l$, and the equilibrium condition (13), we can compute the proportion $h_{t+1}$ of high-skilled workers in the next period. For simplicity, we assume that high-skilled parents educate all their children; that is, we assume that parameters are such that $\hat{q}_{h,t} \geq 1$, which implies that $q^*_{h,t} = 1$. By contrast, low-skilled parents only educate an endogenous fraction $q_{l,t} \in [0, 1)$ of their children. Therefore, the dynamics of the skill ratio across generations is governed by

$$\frac{h_{t+1}}{1 - h_{t+1}} = \frac{n_h h_t + n_l q_{l,t} (1 - h_t)}{n_l (1 - q_{l,t}) (1 - h_t)} = \frac{n}{1 - q_{l,t}} \frac{h_t}{1 - h_t} + \frac{q_{l,t}}{1 - q_{l,t}},$$

(14)

where $n \equiv n_h / n_l$, $n \in (0, 1)$ is the fertility ratio of high- to low-skilled workers. Also, the number $N_t$ of adults evolves according to

$$\frac{N_{t+1}}{N_t} = n_h h_t + n_l (1 - h_t).$$

(15)

\footnote{An alternative assumption to ensure that $\hat{q}_h \geq 1$ is to assume that $h$ cannot be higher than $\tilde{h} < \alpha$ and parameters are such that $(A_0\alpha / (\tilde{e} n_h) - 1)\beta \geq 1 + (1 - \alpha) \tilde{h} / (\alpha - \tilde{h})$. de la Croix and Docquier (2012) use the same simplifying assumption.}
In addition, the labor-market-clearing conditions are
\[ H_t = \bar{H}_t, \]  
and the supply and demand of high-skilled workers should be equal in equilibrium. In the following, we use \( H \) to denote the equilibrium number of high-skilled workers, and
\[ L_{f,t} + L_{i,t} = \bar{L}_t + \eta n_l (1 - q_{l,t}) \bar{L}_t d_t, \]  
where demand for low-skilled workers in formal and informal sectors should be equal to supply of low-skilled adults and the efficiency units of children who work. Moreover, we impose the following extra condition:
\[ L_{i,t} > \eta n_l (1 - q_{l,t}) \bar{L}_t \quad \text{whenever} \quad L_{i,t} > 0. \]
Some adult workers are required for the functioning of the informal sector. Indeed, it seems reasonable to assume that children cannot work in the informal sector without a minimum amount of infrastructure provided by adults. We now define the intertemporal equilibrium of our economy.

**Definition 1.** Given an initial population size \( N_0 \) and an initial number \( H_0 \) of high-skilled workers, an intertemporal equilibrium consists of sequences of prices \( \{w_{h,t}, w_{l,t}\} \), aggregate quantities \( \{N_t, \bar{H}_t, \bar{L}_t, H_t, L_{f,t}, L_{i,t}\} \), and household decisions \( \{c_{j,t}, q_{j,t}\} \) for \( j = h, l \) and for all \( t \) such that: (a) the household decisions \( c_{j,t} \) and \( q_{j,t} \) maximize utility (9) subject to the constraints (10) and (11); (b) the firms’ choices \( H_t, L_{f,t}, \) and \( L_{i,t} \) maximize profits (4) and (5) subject to the constraint \( Y_{i,t} \geq 0 \); (c) the prices \( w_{h,t}, w_{l,t}, \) and aggregate quantities \( \bar{H}_t, \bar{L}_t \) are such that markets clear, i.e., (16) and (17) hold; (d) aggregate variables \( N_t, H_t \) evolve according to equations (14) and (15); (e) \( \bar{L}_t, L_{i,t}, \) and \( q_{l,t} \) satisfy equation (18).

**IV. Implications of Informality**

In this section, we characterize the existence of two possible transitory regimes, and then we study the implications of informality for human capital accumulation and long-run growth.

**Formality and Informality Regimes**

Two regimes arise as a consequence of informality. On the one hand, the formality regime arises if all low-skilled adults opt for the formal sector and the informal sector disappears. On the other hand, the informality regime arises if the formal and informal sectors co-exist.

The formality regime is characterized by the absence of an informal sector. Then, plugging equation (3) into equations (6)–(8), wages and the
skill premium in the formality regime are
\[ w_{h,t} = A_0 \alpha, \]  
\[ w_{l,t} = A_0 (1 - \alpha) \frac{h_t}{1 - h_t}, \]  
\[ \sigma_t = \frac{\alpha (1 - h_t)}{(1 - \alpha) h_t} - 1. \]

Hence, in the formality regime, the skill premium \( \sigma_t \) decreases with the proportion of high-skilled workers in the economy, and the limit of the skill premium equals infinity when \( h_t \) tends to zero. A model with a single formal sector predicts huge wage disparities when human capital is low.

Production in the informal sector becomes profitable for low-skilled workers if the wage rate paid in the formal sector does not exceed marginal productivity of labor in the informal sector. Combined with the assumption of perfect mobility of low-skilled workers across sectors, this implies that the number of low-skilled workers in the formal sector is proportional to the number of high-skilled workers in the economy, i.e., \( L_{f,t} = \gamma H_t \), where \( \gamma \equiv (1 - \alpha)/\tilde{\gamma} \). Again, plugging equation (3) into equations (6)–(8) and taking into account that \( Y_{i,t} > 0 \), wages and the skill premium in the informality regime are
\[ w_{h,t} = A_0 \alpha, \]  
\[ w_{l,t} = A_0 (1 - \alpha) \frac{1 - h_t}{1 - h_t}, \]  
\[ \sigma_t = \frac{\alpha \gamma}{1 - \alpha} - 1 = \bar{\sigma}. \]

It is clear from equations (19) and (22) that the wage of high-skilled workers is independent of the economy-wide average level of human capital, and of whether informality exists or not. On the contrary, low-skilled wages are constant in the informality regime (see equation (23)), whereas they increase with human capital in the formality regime (see equation (20)).

The following lemma characterizes the emergence of the informality regime, and it shows that informality only arises in economies with low levels of human capital.

**Lemma 1 (The regimes).** The informality regime (resp. formality regime) arises when the proportion of high-skilled workers is not too large (resp. is large enough), i.e., when \( h_t < 1/(1 + \gamma) \) (resp. \( h_t \geq 1/(1 + \gamma) \)).
Proof: Low-skilled adults work in the informal sector if and only if the wage paid in the formal sector does not exceed marginal productivity of labor in the informal sector. From equations (20) and (23), we can conclude that the informality regime arises if and only if $h_t < 1/(1 + \gamma)$. □

The low-skilled wages in the informality regime are at least as high as in the formality regime if and only if $h_t/(1 - h_t) < 1/\gamma$. Also, by Lemma 1, the informality regime exists if and only if $h_t < 1/(1 + \gamma)$, which is equivalent to $h_t/(1 - h_t) < 1/\gamma$. Thus, in low-income countries, the existence of the informal sector prevents low-skilled wages from declining, and prevents the skill premium from increasing. Informality explains why skill premia are limited in poor countries where the proportion of college graduates is low, as illustrated by stylized fact SF4.

Let us denote GDP per capita and recorded GDP per capita by $y_t = Y_t/N_t$ and $y_{f,t} = Y_{f,t}/N_t$, respectively. Consistently with stylized fact SF5, our model predicts that the elasticity of formal output to human capital is equal to unity, as stated in the following proposition.

**Proposition 1 (Human capital and recorded GDP).** In the formality regime, GDP per capita is proportional to the share of high-skilled workers in the labor force (i.e., $y_t = A_0 h_t$) and recorded GDP is equal to GDP per capita (i.e., $y_{f,t} = y_t$). Meanwhile, in the informality regime, GDP per capita exceeds recorded GDP per capita, $y_t > y_{f,t}$, and recorded GDP per capita is proportional to the share of high-skilled workers, $y_{f,t} = A_0 h_t$.

Proof: This follows from equations (1) and (3). □

In the informality regime, wages are constant. Hence, $q_{l,t}$ is equal to

$$ q_{l,t}^* = \frac{\beta(1 - \alpha)(1 + \eta n_t)}{(1 + \beta)[e\gamma + \eta(1 - \alpha)]n_t} - \frac{1}{(1 + \beta)\sigma_{t+1}}. $$

(25)

Note that in case the next-period proportion $h_{t+1}$ of high-skilled workers is not high enough so as to achieve the threshold proportion $1/(1 + \gamma)$ that defines informality, then $q_{l,t}$ is constant and equal to

$$ q_{l,t}^* = \frac{\beta[\alpha(1 + \gamma) - 1](1 - \alpha)(1 + \eta n_t) - n_t(1 - \alpha)[e\gamma + \eta(1 - \alpha)]}{(1 + \beta)[e\gamma + \eta(1 - \alpha)][\alpha(1 + \gamma) - 1]n_t} $$

$$ \equiv \overline{q}_l, $$

(26)

where $e = \tilde{e}/A_0$. Moreover, $q_{l,t}^* \leq \overline{q}_l$ when $\sigma_{t+1} \leq \overline{\sigma}$.

In line with some empirical papers such as Schneider (2005) and Schneider et al. (2010), we define the informality level as the ratio of value added in the informal sector to value added in the formal sector (official GDP), i.e., $I_t = Y_{i,t}/Y_{f,t}$. Note that $I_t \equiv 0$ in the formality regime. Consistent with stylized fact SF1, we have the following.
Proposition 2 (Size of informality). In the informality regime, the relative size of the informal sector, \( I_t \equiv \frac{Y_{i,t}}{Y_{f,t}} \), shows a decreasing relationship with respect to the proportion of high-skilled workers in the labor force.

Proof: In the informality regime, we have

\[
I_t = \frac{Y_{i,t}}{Y_{f,t}} = \frac{1 - \alpha}{\gamma} \left\{ \frac{(1 - h_t)[1 + \eta n_l(1 - q_{l,t})]}{h_t} - \gamma \right\}.
\]

Note that \( q_{l,t} \) is characterized by equation (25). Because equations (24) and (21) characterize a continuous function \( \sigma(h_t) = \sigma_t \) for \( h_t \in [0, 1] \), thus \( q_{l,t} \) defined in equation (25) is continuous. Two cases arise: if \( h_{t+1} < 1/(1 + \gamma) \), then \( q_{l,t} = \overline{q}_l \); and if \( h_{t+1} \geq 1/(1 + \gamma) \), then \( q_{l,t} \) is defined by equation (25). In the former case \( dq_{l,t}/dh_t = 0 \), whereas in the latter case \( dq_{l,t}/dh_t \) can be \( \neq 0 \). To compute this derivative, let \( z_t \) be \( h_t/(1 - h_t) \). This monotonic variable transformation enables us to write equations (14) and (25) as

\[
z_{t+1} = \frac{nz_t + q_{l,t}}{1 - q_{l,t}}
\]

and

\[
q_{l,t}^* = \Omega - \frac{(1 - \alpha)z_{t+1}}{(1 + \beta)[\alpha - (1 - \alpha)z_{t+1}]],
\]

where \( \Omega = [\beta(1 - \alpha)(1 + \eta n_l)]/[(1 + \beta)[\epsilon \gamma + \eta(1 - \alpha)]n_l] \). In order to compute the derivative \( dq_{l,t}/dh_t \), we can plug the latter expression into the former expression and let \( H \) be a mapping from \( \mathbb{R}^2 \) to \( \mathbb{R} \) such that

\[
H(q_{l,t}, z_t) = \frac{nz_t + q_{l,t}}{1 - q_{l,t}} - \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \frac{(1 + \beta)(\Omega - q_{l,t})}{1 + (1 + \beta)(\Omega - q_{l,t})}.
\]

The vectors \((q_{l,t}, z_t)\) such that \( H(q_{l,t}, z_t) = 0 \) characterize the problem. Taking partial derivatives, we obtain the Jacobian

\[
DH(q_{l,t}, z_t) = \begin{bmatrix}
\frac{\partial H(q_{l,t}, z_t)}{\partial q_{l,t}} & \frac{\partial H(q_{l,t}, z_t)}{\partial z_t}
\end{bmatrix} = [DH_1, DH_2]
\]

\[
= \left\{ \frac{1 + nz_t}{(1 - q_{l,t})^2} + \frac{\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \frac{(1 + \beta)}{[1 + (1 + \beta)(\Omega - q_{l,t})]^2}, \frac{n}{(1 - q_{l,t})} \right\}.
\]

Because \( DH_1 > 0 \), by the implicit function theorem, there exists a function \( q_{l,t}(z_t) \) in a neighborhood of \( z_t \) and

\[
\frac{dq_{l,t}}{dz_t} = -[n(1 - q_{l,t})] \left\{ 1 + nz_t + \frac{\alpha(1 + \beta)(1 - q_{l,t})^2}{(1 - \alpha)[1 + (1 + \beta)(\Omega - q_{l,t})]^2} \right\}^{-1},
\]
which implies that

$$\frac{dq_{l,t}}{dh_t} = -[n(1 - ql,t)]$$

$$\times \left\{ (1 - h_t)^2 + nh_t(1 - h_t) + \frac{\alpha(1 + \beta)(1 - ql,t)^2(1 - h_t)^2}{(1 - \alpha)[1 + (1 + \beta)(\Omega - q_{l,t})]^2} \right\}^{-1}.$$  

Furthermore,

$$\frac{dI_t}{dh_t} = -\frac{1 - \alpha}{\gamma} \left[ \frac{1 + \eta n_l(1 - ql,t)}{h_t^2} + \eta n_l \frac{dq_{l,t}}{dh_t} \frac{1 - h_t}{h_t} \right]$$

for all $h_{t+1} \neq 1/(1 + \gamma)$. If $h_{t+1} < 1/(1 + \gamma)$, then $dq_{l,t}/dh_t = 0$ and $dI_t/dh_t < 0$. If $h_{t+1} > 1/(1 + \gamma)$, then

$$\frac{dI_t}{dh_t} = -\frac{1 - \alpha}{\gamma h_t} \left\{ \frac{1}{h_t} + \frac{\eta n_l(1 - ql,t)}{h_t} - \left[ \frac{\eta n_l(1 - ql,t)}{h_t} \right] \right\} \times \left\{ h_t + \frac{(1 - h_t)}{\gamma} + \frac{\alpha(1 + \beta)(1 - ql,t)^2(1 - h_t)n}{(1 - \alpha)[1 + (1 + \beta)(\Omega - q_{l,t})]^2} \right\}^{-1} \right\} < 0,$$

which implies that the informality level $I_t$ always shows a decreasing relationship with respect to $h_t$. □

The existence of the informal sector reduces wage inequality, which can be good for growth because of the negative association between high inequality and long-run growth, as pointed out by some authors (see, among others, Galor and Zeira, 1993; Alesina and Rodrik, 1994). However, informality allows firms to recruit children from poor households for work. The following result establishes the link between child labor and informality, consistent with stylized fact SF3.

**Corollary 1 (Child labor).** In the informality regime, the proportion of children who work decreases as the proportion of high-skilled workers in the labor force increases. Hence, the proportion of children who work increases as the informality level increases.

**Proof:** The proportion of children who work is

$$CL(h_t) = \frac{(1 - q_{l,t})(1 - h_t)n_l}{h_t n_h + (1 - h_t)n_l} = \frac{(1 - q_{l,t})(1 - h_t)}{1 - h_t(1 - n)}.$$  

Hence, taking the derivative with respect to $h_t$, we obtain

$$CL'(h_t) = \frac{-dq_{l,t}}{dh_t} \frac{1 - h_t}{1 - h_t(1 - n)} - \frac{(1 - q_{l,t})n}{[1 - h_t(1 - n)]^2}.$$  

As in Proposition 2, if \( h_{t+1} < 1/(1 + \gamma) \), then \( dq_{l,t}/dh_t = 0 \) and \( CL'(h_t) < 0 \). Whereas if \( h_{t+1} > 1/(1 + \gamma) \) then

\[
CL'(h_t) = (1 - q_{l,t})n \left\{ \frac{1}{[1 - h_t(1 - n)]^2 + \Upsilon} - \frac{1}{[1 - h_t(1 - n)]^2} \right\} < 0,
\]

where

\[
\Upsilon = [1 - h_t(1 - n)] \left\{ \frac{\alpha (1 + \beta)(1 - q_{l,t})(1 - h_t)}{(1 - \alpha)[1 + (1 + \beta)(\Omega - q_{l,t})]^2} \right\} > 0,
\]

and \( \Omega = [\beta(1 - \alpha)(1 + \eta n_t)] / [(1 + \beta)(e\gamma + \eta(1 - \alpha))n_t] \). Moreover, from Proposition 2, we know that \( I \) increases as \( h \) decreases, which implies that the proportion of children who work increases with informality. \( \square \)

### Effect on Long-Run Growth

We now turn to the analysis of the long-run effects of informality; in particular, we study its effects on human capital accumulation. We distinguish three important channels. First, as informality limits the returns to schooling, it is likely to reduce the incentive to acquire human capital. Second, the existence of an informal economy allows firms to hire children for work. Third, there is an income effect as a result of informality that might increase the wage of low skilled workers.

In the formality regime (i.e., \( h_t \geq 1/(1 + \gamma) \)), substituting wage rates (19)–(21) into equation (13) yields

\[
q^*_{l,t} = \frac{\beta (1 - \alpha) h_t}{(1 + \beta)e n_t (1 - h_t)} - \frac{\alpha - h_{t+1}}{(1 + \beta)(1 - \alpha) h_{t+1}} = q_l(h_t, h_{t+1}). \tag{27}
\]

Moreover, human capital dynamics for an economy without informality are governed by

\[
\frac{h_{t+1}}{1 - h_{t+1}} = \frac{n}{1 - q_l(h_t, h_{t+1})} \frac{h_t}{1 - h_t} + \frac{q_l(h_t, h_{t+1})}{1 - q_l(h_t, h_{t+1})} = \varphi(h_t, h_{t+1}). \tag{28}
\]

Therefore, plugging equation (27) into equation (28) characterizes human capital dynamics. To simplify these two expressions, let \( z_t \) be \( h_t/(1 - h_t) \). This variable transformation allows us to write equations (27) and (28) as

\[
q^*_{l,t} = \frac{\beta (1 - \alpha)}{(1 + \beta)e n_t} z_t - \frac{(1 - \alpha) z_{t+1}}{(1 + \beta) \alpha (1 + z_{t+1}) - z_{t+1}} \equiv q_l(z_t, z_{t+1})
\]

and

\[
z_{t+1} = \frac{n}{1 - q_l(z_t, z_{t+1})} z_t + \frac{q_l(z_t, z_{t+1})}{1 - q_l(z_t, z_{t+1})} \equiv \varphi(z_t, z_{t+1}).
\]
Moreover, the properties of the dynamical system are not modified by this transformation. The following proposition describes the long-run convergence of human capital in the formality regime:

**Proposition 3 (Long-run convergence in the formality regime).** The dynamical system characterized by equations (27) and (28) displays a globally stable steady state $h_{st}^* > 0$ and an unstable steady state $h_{st}^* = 0$ in $h \in [0, 1]$, if and only if parameters satisfy the following condition $(1 + \alpha \beta)en_i < \alpha((1 - \alpha)\beta + (1 + \beta)en_i)$.

**Proof:** The proof is divided into three steps.

**Step 1.** There exists a function $\psi$ that determines $z_{t+1}$ given $z_t$ and its slope is positive for all $z_t \geq 0$, i.e., $z_{t+1} = \psi(z_t)$ and $\psi'(z_t) > 0$.

Let $F$ be a function $F : \mathbb{R}^2 \to \mathbb{R}$ such that $F(z_t, z_{t+1}) = \varphi(z_t, z_{t+1}) - z_{t+1}$. The vectors $(z_t, z_{t+1})$ such that $F(z_t, z_{t+1}) = 0$ characterize human capital dynamics. Taking partial derivatives, we obtain the Jacobian

$$DF(z_t, z_{t+1}) = \left[ \frac{\partial \varphi(z_t, z_{t+1})}{\partial z_t}, \frac{\partial \varphi(z_t, z_{t+1})}{\partial z_{t+1}} \right] = [DF_1, DF_2]$$

$$\frac{1}{(1 - q_t)^2} [n(1 - q_t) + q_1(1 + nz_t), q_2(1 + nz_t) - (1 - q_t)^2],$$

where

$$q_1 = q_1(z_t, z_{t+1}) = \frac{\partial q_1(z_t, z_{t+1})}{\partial z_t} = \frac{\beta(1 - \alpha)}{en_i(1 + \beta)} > 0,$$

$$q_2 = \frac{\partial q_1(z_t, z_{t+1})}{\partial z_{t+1}} = -\frac{\alpha(1 - \alpha)}{(1 + \beta)[\alpha(1 + z_{t+1}) - z_{t+1}]^2} < 0,$$

for all $z_t$. Because $DF_2 < 0$, by the implicit function theorem, there exists a function $z_{t+1}(z_t) = \psi(z_t)$ in a neighborhood of $z_t$ (for all $z_t$) and

$$z'_{t+1}(z_t) = \psi'(z_t) = -\frac{n(1 - q_t) + q_1(1 + nz_t)}{q_2(1 + nz_t) - (1 - q_t)^2}.$$ 

Moreover, $\psi$ is increasing for all $z_t \geq 0$ (i.e., $\psi'(z_t) > 0$), because the numerator is strictly positive if $z_t \geq 0$, while the denominator is negative.

**Step 2.** The dynamical system displays two steady-state values in $z \geq 0$ (i.e., 0 and $z_+ > 0$), and these are the only ones.

The steady-state values are the vectors $(z_t, z_{t+1})$ such that $z_t = z_{t+1}$, or the values of $z$ such that $F(z, z) = 0$. Note that equations (27) and (28) become

$$q_1(z, z) = z \frac{1 - \alpha}{1 + \beta} \left[ \frac{\beta}{en_i} - \frac{1}{\alpha(1 + z) - z} \right] \quad (29)$$
and
\[ z = \frac{nz + q_l(z, z)}{1 - q_l(z, z)}, \quad (30) \]
respectively. Plugging equation (29) into equation (30) and rearranging terms, we obtain
\[ F(z, z) = q_l(z, z)z + q_l(z, z) - (1 - n)z. \]
Clearly, \( z = 0 \) satisfies \( F(0, 0) = 0 \) because \( q_l(0, 0) = 0 \). Because we are interested in the remaining solutions to the problem \( F(z, z) = 0 \), we substitute \( q_l \), divide by \( z \), and equalize to 0. The solutions to the resulting equation can be rewritten as the roots of the following grade 2 polynomial of \( z \):
\[ a_2z^2 + a_1z + a_0 = 0, \]
where
\[ a_0 = -\left[ 1 + \alpha \beta + \frac{(1 + \beta)(1 - n)en_l\alpha}{1 - \alpha} \right], \]
\[ a_1 = (1 + \beta)(1 - n) - (1 - \beta + 2\alpha\beta), \]
\[ a_2 = (1 - \alpha)\beta. \]
Because \( a_0 < 0 \) and \( a_2 > 0 \), the roots of the polynomial are \( z_- < 0 \) and \( z_+ > 0 \). Hence, the steady-state values of the dynamical system are \( z_- \), 0, and \( z_+ \).

**Step 3.** \( \lim_{z \to +\infty} \psi'(z) = 0 \).

Rewrite \( \psi'(z_t) \) as
\[ \psi'(z_t) = \frac{[n(1 - q_l)/(1 + nz_t)] + q_1}{-q_2 + [(1 - q_l)^2/(1 + nz_t)]}. \]
Note that the denominator goes to infinity when \( z_t \) goes to infinity, whereas the numerator goes to 0 or to a constant because \( q_1 \) is a constant:
\[ -\infty < \lim_{z_t \to +\infty} \frac{n[1 - q_l[z_t, \psi(z_t)]]}{1 + nz_t} = -n \frac{\beta}{1 + \beta } \frac{1 - \alpha}{en_l} < +\infty, \]
\[ 0 \leq \lim_{z_t \to +\infty} -q_2 = +\infty, \]
and
\[ \lim_{z_t \to +\infty} \frac{(1 - q_l)^2}{1 + nz_t} = +\infty. \]
From Steps 1 and 2, we know that the system is well defined and displays two different steady-state values in $z \geq 0$: 0 and $z_+ > 0$. A necessary and sufficient condition for the instability of the 0 steady state is $\psi'(0) > 1$, which is equivalent to $(1 + \alpha\beta)e_{nl} < (1 - \alpha)\beta + (1 + \beta)e_{nl}$. Moreover, Step 1 implies that $\psi'(z_t) > 0$ for all $z_t > 0$. Hence, the series $z(t)$ is monotonic, either increasing or decreasing. Finally, Step 3 ensures that $z_{t+1} = \psi(z_t) < z_t$ for all $z_t > z_+$, and we can conclude that $z_+$ is globally stable. □

In the informality regime, i.e., $h_t < 1/(1 + \gamma)$ or $z_t < 1/\gamma$, we have $q_{l_t}^* = \bar{q}_l$ if $h_{t+1} < 1/(1 + \gamma)$, which is satisfied if $1 - n \geq \bar{q}_l(1 + \gamma)$.\[16\] This condition is satisfied if the fertility ratio $n$ is low enough, and both the relative productivity $\tilde{\gamma}$ of the informal sector and the education cost $\tilde{e}$ are sufficiently high. In this case, the dynamics of the skill ratio $z_t$ are governed by

$$z_{t+1} = \frac{n}{1 - \bar{q}_l}z_t + \frac{\bar{q}_l}{1 - \bar{q}_l} \equiv \phi(z_t), \quad (31)$$

where $\phi(z_t)$ is a linear function of $z_t$ with $\phi(0) > 0$ and a slope smaller than one if $n < 1 - \bar{q}_l$.

**Proposition 4 (Long-run effects of informality).** There exists a threshold $\hat{n}$ for the fertility ratio such that, if $n$ is greater than $\hat{n}$, the economy converges towards the unique steady state of the formal regime, $h_{ss}$. Otherwise, if $n \leq \hat{n}$, there exists a poverty trap in the informality regime. The threshold $\hat{n}$ is defined as

$$\hat{n} \equiv 1 - \frac{(1 + \gamma)(1 - \alpha)}{(1 + \beta)\eta n_l} \left[ \frac{\beta(1 + \eta n_l)}{e\gamma + \eta(1 - \alpha)} - \frac{n_l}{\alpha(1 + \gamma) - 1} \right].$$

**Proof:** Human capital dynamics are determined by equation (31). Thus, a stable poverty trap with informality emerges if and only if $\phi(1/\gamma) \leq 1/\gamma$, and $n/(1 - \bar{q}_l) < 1$. The former condition is equivalent to $1 - n \geq \bar{q}_l(1 + \gamma)$. In addition, this condition ensures that $1 > \bar{q}_l + n$. Hence, the former condition is sufficient for the latter condition to be satisfied. Substituting $\bar{q}_l$ by equation (26) determines $\hat{n}$ as a function of the other parameters of the model ($\gamma, \alpha, \beta, \epsilon, \eta, n_l$). When $n \leq \hat{n}$, there exists a steady-state level of human capital such that $h_{ss} < 1/(1 + \gamma)$. □

Hence, the key condition on parameters governing the dynamic properties of the model is the following.

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\[16\] This follows from equation (14).
**Condition 1.** \( n \leq 1 - \bar{q}_I (1 + \gamma). \)

As \( \bar{q}_I \) is given by equation (26), this condition virtually involves all the parameters of the model. If it holds, then informality is the source of a poverty trap; otherwise, informality is a transitory phenomenon. This condition is satisfied if the fertility ratio \( n \) is low enough, and both the relative productivity \( \tilde{\gamma} \) of the informal sector and the education cost \( \tilde{e} \) are sufficiently high. Moreover, it ensures that \( h_{t+1} < 1/(1 + \gamma) \) in the informality regime from equation (14). In Section V, we check whether calibration parameters satisfy this condition or not.

The previous two propositions characterize the equilibrium path of the skill ratio. Figure 2(a) shows the dynamics with and without informality. The solid line corresponds to an economy with informality if the skill ratio is lower than \( z_0 = 1/\gamma \), while the dashed line corresponds to an economy without informality. For high enough levels of human capital, there is no informal sector and both lines coincide. As predicted by Proposition 3, without the informal sector the skill ratio converges to the point \( A_1 \) as long as the initial skill ratio is larger than 0. However, if the informal sector is at work, Proposition 4 states that there can be poverty traps such as the one presented in Figure 2(a). The linear part of the solid line crosses the 45° line and the skill ratio converges to the point \( A_2 \) if the initial skill ratio is lower than \( z_0 \).

Figure 2(b) presents three different possibilities of skill ratio dynamics with informality. In all cases, there is a jump from the formality regime to the informality regime because of child labor in the informal sector. Dynamic B is a possible situation without poverty traps. It might arise if condition 1 does not hold. This occurs, for example, if the education cost \( \tilde{e} \) is low enough. Dynamic A is a case with a poverty trap in the informality regime, and convergence to a high proportion of high-skilled workers in the formality regime. Dynamic C, however, corresponds to a case where parameters are such that there is no stable steady state without informality. Because of the existence of the informal sector, the poverty trap makes the economy converge to point \( C \), which is characterized by a low proportion of high-skilled workers in the economy.

**V. Quantitative Assessment**

We have shown that informality might slow down income convergence across countries or that it might be the source of a poverty trap, depending on whether the model exhibits multiple equilibria or uniqueness. In this
Fig. 2. Dynamics of human capital accumulation with informality
section, we confront the theory with the data, calibrate the model, and discriminate between these two hypotheses.

**Parametrization**

The model is calibrated under the assumption that one period (or generation) represents 30 years, and that individuals are considered high-skilled if they have at least 10 years of education. Our parametrization strategy is based on the following principles.

1. Parameters are calibrated so as to be compatible with observations for industrialized countries (i.e., the United States or an average of G7 countries) and a representative least-developed economy.
2. In the benchmark, the situation of the United States is considered as a possible steady state without subsistence informality. Because education statistics vary between the United States and European countries, we also simulate variants in which the average situation of the G7 countries (Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom, and the United States) is a steady state. Least-developed countries might be out of the steady state and are characterized by the informality regime.
3. We require our calibrated model to be compatible with the stylized facts described in the introduction. The underlying assumptions of our model are such that these stylized facts are matched.
4. Developing countries and the United States share the same exogenous characteristics: \( A_0, e, \eta, \alpha, \gamma, \beta, n_h, \) and \( n_l. \)
5. Several scenarios are used to check whether our conclusions are robust to the identifying assumptions.

As for the skill premium in industrialized countries (\( \sigma^{\text{rich}} \)), we use recent data from Hendricks (2004). The return to schooling observed in the United States is equal to 7.83 percent per year of schooling, implying a skill premium of 112 percent for ten years of education (\( \sigma^{\text{US}}_t = 1.12 \)). This value will be used in the benchmark scenario. Other values will be used in the robustness scenarios. The average return to schooling in the G7 countries amounts to 6.00 percent per year of schooling, implying \( \sigma^{\text{G7}}_t = 0.80 \). In addition, Hendricks (2004) reports a return to schooling between 12 and 15 percent in the least-developed countries, or equivalently a level of \( \sigma^{\text{poor}}_t \) between 2.5 and 3.0.

As for human capital in industrialized countries (\( h^{\text{rich}} \)), we use Barro and Lee data (Barro and Lee, 2013) on the proportion of individuals aged 25 and over with tertiary education in the year 2000. The US proportion of workers with at least one year of college completed is equal to
31 percent in 2000 ($h^{US} = 0.31$). This value will be used in the benchmark scenario. Other values will be used in the robustness scenarios. In the G7 countries, this proportion is equal to 20 percent ($h^{G7} = 0.20$). Note that Barro and Lee also provide data on the proportion of individuals with tertiary education started but not completed: this amounts to 50 percent ($h^{USn} = 0.50$).

As for parameters affecting household decisions, the fertility ratio $n$ of high- to low-skilled workers is set to 0.57 from Kremer and Chen (2002). They show that $n$ does not vary much with the level of development – it is stable across countries and over time. In the benchmark, as we can observe in the United States and other developed economies, we assume no population growth, which implies $n_h = 0.65$ and $n_l = 1.15$. We assume these parameters are constant across countries. This generates a negative relationship between the average fertility rate and development because the proportion of low-fertility, high-skilled households increases with development. Although this underestimates the average fertility rate in the least-developed countries, endogenizing fertility would make the occurrence of a poverty trap more likely.

Other parameters are identified to match the above identifying assumptions. Plugging $h^{rich}$ and $\sigma^{rich}$ into equation (21), we obtain $\alpha = 0.49$ in the benchmark. From equation (24), this requires $\gamma$ to be equal to 4.24, which implies that $\tilde{\gamma}$ is 0.12, and the threshold proportion of college graduates below which the informality regime is observed is 19 percent ($h_{thres}$).

Assuming that the US economy is in the steady state, we obtain $\beta = 0.19$ from equations (13) and (14). Haveman and Wolfe (1995) and Knowles (1999) suggest that the education cost is around 15 percent of the time endowment of parents while children live with their parents. This implies that, if children live with their parents for 15 years, $e = 0.04$ in the benchmark.\footnote{For example, de la Croix and Doepke (2003) assume that children live 15 out of 30 years with parents.} The relative productivity $\eta$ of children compared to low-skilled adults matches the empirical evidence presented by Horrell and Humphries (1995). In the benchmark scenario, we use $\eta = 0.34$ to have 25 percent of the income of low-skilled families coming from child labor in the least-developed countries.\footnote{We obtain a relative productivity of children compared to parents higher than Doepke and Zilibotti (2005) who obtain 0.1 to match the same empirical fact. However, Goldin and Sokoloff (1984) claim that that the relative productivity of children and females compared to males rose from around 0.3 in the North of America (0.58 in the South) to 0.5 from 1820 to 1850, which is in line with our value.}

Table 1 shows the identifying assumptions and provides the fitted values for identified parameters in the benchmark scenario and in five variants.
Table 1. **Identifying assumptions and fitted parameter values**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Benchmark</th>
<th>Scenario 1</th>
<th>Scenario 2</th>
<th>Scenario 3</th>
<th>Scenario 4</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^\text{rich}$</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.80</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\sigma^\text{poor}$</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h^\text{rich}$</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.50</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n = n_h/n_l$</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.57</td>
<td>0.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$n_l$</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.27</td>
<td>1.09</td>
<td>1.15</td>
<td>1.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$e$</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.02</td>
<td>0.04</td>
<td>0.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\alpha$</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.68</td>
<td>0.31</td>
<td>0.49</td>
<td>0.31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\beta$</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.23</td>
<td>0.20</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\eta$</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0.35</td>
<td>0.33</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$\gamma$</td>
<td>4.24</td>
<td>1.91</td>
<td>8.98</td>
<td>3.67</td>
<td>7.78</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>$h_{\text{thres}}$</td>
<td>0.19</td>
<td>0.34</td>
<td>0.10</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0.11</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Column 1 gives the benchmark values. In Scenario 1, $h^\text{rich}$ is given by the proportion of individuals with some tertiary education (not necessarily completed). In Scenario 2, the proportion of individuals with tertiary education and the skill premium in rich countries are calibrated using data for the G7 countries. In Scenario 3, we use a lower level for the skill premium in the least-developed countries. Scenario 4 combines scenarios 2 and 3. Results for alternative scenarios 1–4 are provided in Figure A1 in the Appendix.

**The Case for Multiplicity**

Figure 3(a) depicts the human capital dynamics with parameter values obtained in the benchmark scenario. As predicted by Proposition 4, a poverty trap emerges in the presence of informality, first because the informal sector does not allow high-skilled wages to increase enough so as to encourage education, and second because the existence of informality opens the door to child labor. Hence, in our benchmark numerical exercise, countries starting with less than 19 percent of college graduates (i.e., 60 percent of the US level) are stuck in a poverty trap, and their proportion of educated individuals converges to a long-run proportion of about 7 percent. By contrast, countries with an initial proportion of educated individuals above 19 percent converge to the high steady state. It can be noticed that some high-income countries are below that threshold. However, the threshold level of human capital must be taken with caution. We show below that the threshold is divided by 2 when the average of the G7 countries is used as a reference for the good steady state. This also represents about 60 percent of the G7 level. The reason for this is that the proportion of college graduates is greater in the United States than in the other G7 countries (because of the inclusion of workers with one or two year(s) of college).
Fig. 3. Human capital dynamics $h_{t+1}(h_t)$ (a) and proportion $q_l(h_t)$ (b) of educated children with and without the informal sector.
What is important is that a poverty trap emerges in virtually all calibration scenarios.

As can be seen in Figure 3(b), human capital dynamics are driven by the proportion $q_l$ of children of low-skilled parents. In the informality regime, a constant share of children are educated. The discontinuity in $q_l$ results from the fact that child labor is only possible in the informality regime. In the formality regime, education investment $q_l$ increases up to a point where parents do not find it profitable to educate so many children (because the skill premium decreases). Hence, above a certain level of human capital, the average proportion of educated children decreases.

These two figures explain why the poverty trap emerges. The existence of the informal sector reduces the return to education and increases the opportunity cost of sending children to school (as they can only work in the informal sector). Therefore, the proportion $q_l$ is lower in the informality regime than in the formality regime for proportions $h_t$ of high-skilled workers between 4 and 19 percent. Because agents do not internalize the externality of education on TFP and the low number of highly educated children, the proportion of high-skilled workers remains low and stable over time. For lower levels of human capital ($h_t < 0.04$), the income effect leads to higher education investments in the informality regime.

In the Appendix, we simulate the human capital dynamics under the four alternative sets of identifying assumptions (see Figure A1). In all cases, a poverty trap emerges, except in Scenario 2, which shows a “bifurcation” or borderline configuration. In all cases, the threshold level of human capital defining the poverty trap always corresponds to about 60 percent of the steady-state proportion of educated individuals in rich countries (the United States or the G7 countries). The long-run level of human capital in the poverty trap is particularly low in Scenarios 3 and 4. This situation results from the fact that $q_l$ becomes very low in these two scenarios.

**Banning Child Labor**

The existence of a poverty trap or low steady state because of informality is partly driven by the fact that children can work in the informal sector. Child labor is responsible for the discontinuity in the dynamics of human capital depicted in Figure 3(a).

Edmonds and Pavcnik (2005) or Bharadwaj et al. (2013) explain that the abolition of child labor is difficult to enforce in developing countries. They recommend the use of subsidies to reduce child labor, by increasing profitability and easing the access to education. Before studying such subsidies in this subsection, we consider an economy starting from the
informality-regime steady state (with child labor) at time 0, and we simulate the effect of a sudden elimination of child labor. We look at the transition from the low steady state to the high steady state. The transition occurs because, in the absence of child labor, the discontinuity disappears in Figure 3(a) and the formality-regime steady state becomes unique. Figure 4(a) shows the dynamics of human capital using the benchmark parameters except for the relative productivity $\eta$ of children that we set to 0 to ban child labor. The transition would last around 200 years (or seven periods) to reach the new steady state. At the same time, we can also observe that in the first period after we abolish child labor, the proportion of high-skilled individuals is higher than the threshold value that defines the informality regime. Hence, the economy reaches the formality regime if child labor is banned in one period.

The question that follows is how welfare will be affected over time if children cannot work. In Figure 4(b), we compute the welfare loss as a percentage of the initial steady-state level with child labor and informality. We first compute the new utility level after child labor is banned, and we then derive the hypothetical amount of consumption compatible with that level of utility if the average future wage of children was constant at $w_{inf,k}^{ss}$ – this level is denoted by $\tilde{c}_{k,t} = \exp(U_{k,t} - \beta \ln w_{inf,k}^{ss})$ for a type-$k$ worker. Finally, we compute the percentage deviation of consumption with respect to the initial steady state with informality, $(\tilde{c}_{k,t} - c_{inf,k}^{ss})/c_{inf,k}^{ss}$, and we use this as a consumption-equivalent variation in utility.

The utility level of high-skilled workers is not modified as their wage is constant along the transition path. For the low-skilled workers, however, consumption falls by about 40 percent in the first period that child labor vanishes. As time passes, the wage and the utility level of low-skilled workers increase to overcome the consumption level observed in the steady state with informality. Another pattern that we can depict from Figure 4(b) is with regard to the average consumption deviation. In the initial periods, it is relatively closer to the consumption deviation of low-skilled workers than the consumption deviation of high-skilled workers, but it approaches the consumption deviation of the highly skilled over time. Hence, as the economy evolves, the proportion of high-skilled workers increases, and the weight of the low-skilled workers on the average deviation diminishes.

Clearly, part of the first period welfare loss is a result of the absent income from children. Moreover, if children do not work, then parents

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19 In a previous version of this paper, we have also simulated the effects of a sudden elimination of informality. As in Meghir et al. (2015), this basically implies preventing workers and firms from using an existing technology. For the low-skilled, the welfare loss of such a coercive policy amounts to 80 percent.
(a) Transition from low to high steady states

(b) Welfare loss due to transition

Fig. 4. Transition from informality to formality
face higher incentives to invest in their children’s education. Hence, more income is used to pay for their children’s education, and they consume less. As the economy evolves, the higher proportion of high-skilled adults in the formal sector increases the wages of low-skilled workers because the economy leaves the informality regime. Two different effects produce the growth of wages and consumption over time: the complementarity between high- and low-skilled workers, on the one hand, and the increase in TFP, on the other hand. In summary, child labor and informality protect poor and less-educated adults from a sharp wage cut in the short run, but these prevent the accumulation of human capital necessary to observe economic growth in the long run.

Implications for Development Policy

In the previous sections, we established the result that the existence of an informal sector combined with human capital externalities can generate a poverty trap. We also showed that without informal activities, such as child labor, low-skilled workers would suffer initially a quite dramatic drop in wages. In this section, we analyze alternative (Pigouvian) policies that could help the economy to escape the poverty trap and converge towards the high-income steady state, without banning child labor or informality. We examine the cost efficiency of such policies under the constraint that wage losses during the transition should be avoided.

We consider the situation of a developing country trapped in the low-income steady state, and we assume that it will obtain a windfall gain (which might come from different sources, such as foreign aid or the discovery of natural resources). How can the country use such a windfall gain in the most efficient way in order to escape the poverty trap? To answer this question, we analyze different policy instruments that address the human capital externality and the child labor trap, and we compare their discounted costs. We first consider each instrument in isolation and then we examine whether a combination of two instruments might be a cheaper alternative.

Alternative Pigouvian Policies. On one hand, we consider the introduction of education subsidies that are either paid unconditionally to all families or

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20 In the case of a resource-rich country, it would have to be assumed that the natural resource sector operates independently from the rest of the economy, excluding thereby Dutch disease effects.
targeted to low-skilled parents. The latter policy can be interpreted as the education component of existing conditional cash transfers.\footnote{For example, the Oportunidades/Progresa program in Mexico or the Bolsa Familia scheme in Brazil – these programs are targeted towards low-income families and provide grants for children conditional on school attendance.} On the other hand, we analyze wage subsidies for jobs in the formal sector, allowing for different subsidy rates for low-skill and high-skill jobs.\footnote{Equivalently, the government could implement a combination of an output subsidy in the formal sector and a (progressive) tax on income from the formal sector. An output subsidy has the same effect as subsidizing high-skilled and low-skilled workers in the formal sector at the same rate. Adding a progressive income tax would be equivalent to differentiating the effective subsidy rates received by high- and low-skilled workers.} To sum up, we introduce the following policy variables in the model:

- an education subsidy at rate $s^e_t$ (paid to all families or targeted to low-skilled parents);
- a wage subsidy for low-skilled workers in the formal sector at rate $s^l_t$;
- a wage subsidy for high-skilled workers in the formal sector at rate $s^h_t$.

From the assumptions of the model it is immediately clear that it would be inefficient to pay education subsidies to high-skilled parents as they educate all their children even without receiving any subsidies. Hence, the general education subsidy is less cost-efficient than the targeted education subsidy. As we show below, the wage subsidy for high-skilled workers has similar effects as an education subsidy to all parents. This type of wage subsidy is therefore also dominated by the targeted education subsidy.

**Policy Effects in the Informality Regime.** In the informality regime, the introduction of subsidies does not change the income of low-skilled workers. Subsidizing low-skilled workers draws them into the formal sector, but as long as the informal sector exists, the low-skill wage is determined by the (exogenous) productivity in the informal sector. By contrast, the income of high-skilled workers is increased one-by-one by the subsidy. Hence, wages (including subsidies) and the skill premium in the informality regime are:

$$\tilde{w}_{h,t} = A_0\alpha(1 + s^h_t);$$
$$\tilde{w}_{f,t} = \tilde{w}_{i,t} = \frac{A_0(1 - \alpha)}{\gamma};$$
$$\tilde{\sigma}_t = \frac{\alpha\gamma}{1 - \alpha}(1 + s^h_t) - 1.$$

The number of low-skilled workers in the formal sector is given by $L_{f,t} = (1 + s^l_t)\gamma H_t$. The informal sector disappears if marginal productivity
of low-skilled workers in the formal sector exceeds the minimum wage in the informal economy (i.e., if \( L_{f,t}/H_t \leq (1 + s_t')\gamma \)). This condition is equivalent to

\[
h_t \geq \frac{1}{1 + \gamma(1 + s_t')}. \tag{32}
\]

The role of the two types of wage subsidies in the formal sector can now be made clear. Subsidizing high-wage jobs increases the skill premium but it has no effect on the allocation of workers between sectors. By contrast, a subsidy for low-wage jobs in the formal sector does not affect the skill premium but it does lower the critical human capital level at which the economy leaves the informality regime.

In turn, the budget constraint of adults is modified by the introduction of an education subsidy as follows:

\[
c_{k,t} = \tilde{w}_{k,t} - n_k q_{k,t} \tilde{e} (1 - s_t^c) + \eta n_k (1 - q_{k,t}) d_t \tilde{w}_{l,t}.
\]

The proportion of children who go to school is therefore equal to

\[
q_{l,t}^* = \frac{\beta (1 - \alpha)(1 + n_t \eta)}{(1 + \beta)[\epsilon \gamma (1 - s_t^c) + \eta (1 - \alpha)]n_l - 1 - \alpha - \frac{\alpha[1 + \gamma (1 + s_{l+1}^h)] - 1}{(1 + \beta)(1 + \gamma (1 + s_{l+1}^h)) - 1}}.
\]

Subsidizing high-skilled workers in the next generation \((t + 1)\) has similar qualitative effects as subsidizing education for the current generation \(t\). Obviously, an expected rise in the future skill premium increases the incentive to send children to school. There is, however, a decisive difference between the two types of subsidies: an education subsidy can be targeted towards low-skilled parents and is therefore more cost-effective (as high-skilled parents educate all their children even without subsidies). Moreover, subsidizing the wages of relatively rich workers rather than the education of poor children seems politically less feasible.

The preceding results enable us to highlight the different (and possibly complementary) roles of the two most promising policies: targeted education subsidies and wage subsidies for low-skilled workers in the formal sector (see Figure 5). If the economy is initially stuck in the inferior steady state \((B_2)\), then the introduction of targeted education subsidies increases the incentive of low-skilled parents to invest in their children’s education, and the informal sector schedule shifts upwards in Figure 5. If the subsidy rate is sufficiently high, then the country can escape the poverty trap with
the help of this single policy instrument; the new situation of the economy could then be described by Dynamic A in Figure 2(b).

By contrast, the subsidy for low-skilled workers in the formal sector pulls workers out of the informal sector and decreases the critical skill ratio from $z_0$ to $z_1$ in Figure 5 without changing the informality schedule. It is clear that such a low-wage subsidy has no effect on human capital accumulation if it is too small, or if the economy is too far below the critical skill ratio; the subsidy rate must be sufficiently high to eliminate informal sector employment entirely. Wage subsidies should therefore only be used as a temporary policy allowing the transition to the formality regime to accelerate.

As the two types of subsidies address different aspects of the transition to the high-income equilibrium, they can be implemented jointly and their combined use might possibly reduce the overall cost of escaping the poverty trap. This issue will be taken up below in the simulations. In any case, we assume that subsidies are abolished as soon as the economy reaches the formality regime.\(^{23}\)

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\(^{23}\) To avoid clutter, Figure 5 does not depict the policy-induced change in the dynamics of the formality regime. The two policies have different effects on the formality schedule. Whereas education subsidies shift the formality schedule unambiguously upwards, the introduction of low-skill wage subsidies has ambiguous effects: a positive income effect (low-skilled parents receive a higher income, which is partly spent on the education of their children) and a negative substitution effect (low-wage subsidies decrease the future wage differential,
Cost-Efficient Policies. The calibrated model can now be used to calculate, for each policy, the minimum windfall gain necessary to enable the country to escape the poverty trap. This windfall gain (or discounted cost of policy) depends on the time horizon within which the economy leaves the informality regime. Consider a constant subsidy of each type, $s^k_t \equiv s^k$ for $k \in \{e, l, h\}$. The horizontal axis of Figure 6 indicates the time needed to achieve a level of human capital that ensures convergence to the high steady state, or, equivalently, the number of periods $T$ needed to achieve a proportion of high-skilled workers higher than the threshold value $h_T > 1/(1 + \gamma)$ delimiting the two regimes. For each value of $T$, we compute the subsidy rate required to exit the poverty trap and the discounted cost of the policy using a discount factor equal to $0.99^{120} \cong 0.2994$. The vertical axis of Figure 6 shows the total discounted cost of policies for a country with an initial population of 20 million inhabitants and a scale factor $A_0$ of 112,900.24

24 Parameter $A_0$ is set to 112,900 so that GDP per capita in the United States is 35,000 in 2005 US$ (PPP adjusted), which is close to the value in PWT 7.0. The discount factor is
As expected, targeted education subsidies are more cost-efficient than unconditional education subsidies or high-skill wage subsidies at any time horizon. A windfall of 1.5–2 billion 2005 US$ (PPP adjusted) per year is needed to help a country of around 20 million inhabitants escape from the poverty trap within one or two generations (30 or 60 years). As the initial skill ratio of this economy is far below the critical level, low-skill wage subsidies are not efficient if they are used as a single policy instrument.

Moreover, as Figure 6 makes clear, policies that take more time to leave the informality regime have lower discounted costs. Consider, for example, education subsidies targeted to low-skilled parents. The total discounted cost of attaining the critical human capital ratio is lower if the policy is implemented over several generations using a low subsidy rate (by opposition to a high-subsidy policy, which operates within one generation). The reason for this result is twofold. First, within a generation, the marginal cost of subsidizing education increases with the proportion of children who are educated. Second, targeted education subsidies have a cumulative impact over time: in each generation, they provide an incentive for low-skilled adults to educate a larger proportion of their children. In the following generation, these high-skilled children will provide education to all their offspring, although they do not receive the (targeted) education subsidy.

Combination of Policies. The preceding results leave scope for a cost-reducing combination of policies. As the marginal cost of a single policy increases with its rate, it might be more cost-efficient to combine two instruments using lower rates. We explore this possibility by combining targeted education subsidies and low-skill wage subsidies. As we have argued above, the latter should only be used as a transitory measure. Hence, in the simulations reported in Figure 7, while education subsidies are used in all periods, low-skill wage subsidies are only used in one period (i.e., when they enable the economy to reach the formality regime within the next generation).25 Therefore, education subsidies are implemented in all

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25 Alternatively, one could assume that the subsidy is phased out gradually if it takes several generations to attain the critical human capital level. This possibility is disregarded in our search of the cheapest policy combination.
generations, whereas low-skill wage subsidies are only implemented during one generation. Moreover, the subsidy rate of low-skill wages is set so as to make the informal sector disappear within this generation. Figure 7 shows that using both instruments is cheaper than using a single instrument for time horizons that exceed four generations (150 years). Note that for slightly richer countries (that are closer to the critical skill ratio), a combination of the two policy instruments is likely to be more cost-efficient even for shorter time horizons.

Our policy findings can be summarized as follows. First, among four possible education and wage subsidy schemes, two policies dominate the others in terms of cost efficiency: education subsidies to low-income families and wage subsidies for low-skill jobs in the formal sector. Second, these two policies play distinct and possibly complementary roles in the transition to the high-income equilibrium. Whereas the education subsidy speeds up the accumulation of human capital, the low-skill wage subsidy reduces the threshold at which the informal sector disappears. Third, targeted education subsidies are the cheapest single policy but for longer time horizons a combination of the two policies turns out to be the most cost-efficient choice.
VI. Conclusion

In this paper, we establish a theoretical relation between education, child labor, and the informal sector. In the data, we observe a direct relation between informality and education; countries with high proportions of tertiary educated workers tend to show lower levels of informality than countries with low proportions. Moreover, child labor is part of the informal sector, and the data show that countries with more informality have more children involved in production activities. With these facts in mind, we construct an overlapping generations model that is able to reproduce these relations in line with the previous findings of other authors.

The model is able to explain, or to give a complementary view of, the documented fact that less-developed countries present higher levels of inequality than developed countries but much lower levels than standard models predict. The introduction of the informal sector in a model with complementarity between high- and low-skilled workers lowers the skill premium (and makes it constant). In other words, we view informality as a possible channel to reduce the skill premium in developing countries.

The reduction in inequality as a result of informality generates several effects in the short and long run. On one hand, low-skilled workers might obtain a higher salary with the existence of an informal sector than in its absence, because there is an alternative sector where they can supply their working hours. However, this sector is not controlled by state agencies, and it enables children to use their time to work and to generate an extra source of income for the household. Hence, the model is able to replicate the relations between informality and education, and between child labor and education, in line with the data: the share of high-skilled workers is negatively correlated with informality, and informality is positively correlated with child labor. On the other hand, the model has several predictions for the long run. The trade-off between child income and the future education of children is taken into account, and this is key to generate poverty traps due to informality and child labor. The “low” inequality observed in developing countries and the opportunity cost of sending children to school can have a pernicious effect on parents. They might not provide enough education for their children so as to increase the aggregate proportion of educated workers in the labor force. Parents do not internalize the positive externality of aggregate education on firms’ productivity. Therefore, the informal sector can prevent the economy from developing as it would in the absence of informality.

The model is calibrated to reproduce several facts observed in the data. The model is also calibrated to evaluate different policies considered to reduce the size and effects of informality. The calibration exercise reveals that the case for the poverty-trap hypothesis is strong: although informality
serves to protect low-skilled workers from extreme poverty in the short run, it prevents income convergence between developed and developing nations. Sudden elimination of child labor or informal activities would induce severe welfare losses for poor people on the transition path.

Hence, we analyze non-coercive policies that could help the economy to escape the poverty trap and to converge towards the high-income steady state. We analyze the cost efficiency of Pigouvian policies under the constraint that wage losses during the transition should be avoided. Assuming that an inflow of resources is provided to a developing country (e.g., in the form of foreign aid), we analyze the effects of different subsidies. Informality can be reduced by diminishing education costs or by making the formal sector more attractive. Hence we consider four possible subsidies on education and formal firms’ wages. Subsidizing education is the most cost-efficient policy, and it can be targeted towards low-skilled parents in order to reduce costs. Subsidizing high-wage jobs increases the skill premium but it has no effect on the allocation of workers between sectors. Moreover, the increase in the skill premium gives similar incentives to parents on children’s education as reducing education costs. By contrast, a subsidy for low-wage jobs in the formal sector does not affect the skill premium but it does lower the critical human capital level necessary to skip the poverty trap. Because of the possible complementary effect of different subsidies, we analyze the cost efficiency of a combination of subsidies on education to low-income parents and low-skilled formal firms’ wages. Although targeted education subsidies are the cheapest single policy, for longer time horizons, or as the economy gets closer to the poverty trap threshold, a combination of the two policies is found to be the most cost-efficient choice.
Appendix

Fig. A1. Alternative scenarios 1–4
(c) Scenario 3

(d) Scenario 4

Fig. A1. Continued
References


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