# Suppression and hypothesis testing: does suppressing stereotypes during interactions help to avoid confirmation biases?

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*Abstract*

*Recent work indicates that trying not to think in stereotypical terms increases the accessibility of stereotypical information, which paradoxically results in more stereotypical judgments. The present study translated the colour-blindness ideology in general and stereotype suppression research in particular into an hypothesis testing setting. Participants who were asked to suppress their stereotypes when selecting a set of questions were indeed less guided by ambient stereotypes than control participants, thereby showing a reduction of the classical confirmation orientation in question preferences. Still, compared to control participants, suppressors also later reported more polarized impressions such that consistent targets were seen as more stereotypical and inconsistent ones as more counter-stereotypical. Moreover, group evaluations were more stereotypical for suppressors than for controls indicating that suppression had led to stronger activation of the stereotypical representation. Results are discussed in light of the prevailing belief regarding the benefits of political correctness and colour-blindness. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.*

Social perceivers often interact with people about whom they do not know much. In such situations, preconceptions help partners getting acquainted because they provide useful information for dealing with the immediate interaction. For example, given current beliefs about the likely personalities of, respectively, hairdressers and engineers, people will probably not choose the same topics of discussion when interacting with a member of one or the other group. Clearly thus, people try their best to behave

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in a socially adapted way and choose the right thing to say and do when interacting with another person. Clearly, stereotypes provide the kind of tools people can rely upon to achieve these goals (Fiske, 2000; Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Macrae & Bodenhausen, 2000). Research however has shown that the use of stereotypes as hypotheses guiding the interaction commonly leads to confirm the preconceptions about the target (Snyder & Stukas, 1999). Still, because of social or personal norms and pressures, people may also wish to keep away from stereotypes. This is especially true in today's so-called politically correct or colour-blind context (Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). When this is the case, any reference to stereotypes is likely to be avoided during the interaction so as to make sure that one is not being prejudiced toward the target. The present research examines how attempts at suppressing stereotypes may operate during social interactions and whether this strategy indeed helps avoiding the confirmation of preconceptions.

## HYPOTHESIS TESTING

Research on hypothesis testing usually considers whether preconceptions about a target person guide the collection of additional evidence (Snyder & Haugen, 1994). A *confirmation orientation* is revealed when the interaction strategy, i.e. the questions chosen, tends to elicit evidences confirming the pre-conceptions. Such a process may then result in *behavioural confirmation* (self-fulfilling prophecy): the target actually comes to behave in a way that is consistent with the perceiver's preconceptions. *Perceptual confirmation* arises when a given behaviour is seen, evaluated, or interpreted as more congruent with the perceiver's a priori beliefs than it really is. The first aim of the present study is to investigate whether explicit attempts at avoiding the use of stereotypes during interactions hinders a confirmation orientation in the selection of questions. The second ambition of the study is to examine whether different impressions are formed on the basis of the collected information as a function of whether a priori views were initially suppressed or freely considered. In other words, our interests focused on two out of the three confirmation levels outlined above: confirmation orientation, which concerns the collection of information, and perceptual confirmation, which concerns the impressions formed.

In typical hypothesis-confirmation studies, one participant (the perceiver) is provided with a hypothesis about another participant (the target). In contrast to a free interaction paradigm, a question selection paradigm affords control over the kind of questions that perceivers prefer (Snyder & Swann, 1978; Trope & Bassok, 1982; see also Klayman & Ha, 1987). Different strategies are identified as a function of whether diagnostic or biased questions are favoured. Diagnostic strategies are observed when participants select questions that best discriminate between the hypothesis and the alternative. Such questions are answered by yes or no and ask about features associated either with the hypothesis or with the alternative. They are respectively labelled matching and non-matching questions. As an example, think of engineers. A question that matches the stereotype could be 'Are you interested in new technology?', whereas a question that does not match the stereotype could be 'Do you like bodybuilding?'. Interestingly, a preference for matching questions can also be seen as a confirmatory strategy because they are hypothesis-true questions: a yes answer tends to confirm the hypothesis. In contrast, the selection of non-matching questions can be seen as a disconfirmatory strategy to the extent that positive answers would disconfirm the hypothesis. Alternatively, biased questions also reveal the presence of clear confirmatory tendency or even hypothesis preservation strategy. Indeed, biased questions are such that answers have greater probabilities to confirm than to disconfirm the hypothesis. Finally, biased questions can be constraining or leading when they could not be answered by yes or no and that any answer would lead to confirm the hypothesis (for a review, see Dardenne, Leyens, & Yzerbyt, 1997).

In a seminal study, Snyder and Swann (1978) asked their participants to interact and test whether the target was extravert or introvert by choosing questions from a list. When asked to test an extraversion hypothesis, participants overwhelmingly selected questions testing for the presence of extraversion. The reverse pattern was obtained when the introversion hypothesis was tested. Globally, perceivers exhibited a marked preference for questions that matched their hypothesis. Subsequent work confirmed this tendency even when questions were freely formulated (Swann & Giuliano, 1987). In sum, matching questions, that is, questions most likely to trigger positive answers, are typically favoured in social interactions. A reason for this may be that asking questions for which the expected answer is positive leads perceivers to feel adapted to the target who, in turn, may experience the interaction as being personalized. Matching questions may thus be seen by both perceivers and targets as particularly likely to render the interaction positive.

As suggested by Snyder (1992), perceivers may not only be motivated to get along with the targets. That is, other motivations could be at work when perceivers meet with targets. As a case in point, perceivers may try and get to know the targets and form as accurate an impression as possible during the interaction. When trying to get along with each other, people try to render the interaction as smoothly and pleasantly flowing as possible such that partners feel at ease. This motivation is seen as involving an empathy goal whose function is to achieve 'regulation and facilitation of social interaction' (Snyder, 1992). When trying to get to know the other person, instead, perceivers seek to acquire additional knowledge about the target in order to discover who the other person really is. This clearly corresponds to an information-seeking goal whose function concerns 'the acquisition and use of social knowledge' (Snyder, 1992). There is some debate as to which motivation most clearly contributes to using stereotypic preconceptions and, therefore, leads to confirmation processes and associated outcomes (e.g. Dardenne & Leyens, 1995; Snyder, 1992; Snyder & Haugen, 1994; Snyder & Stukas, 1999). One intriguing issue, however, concerns the impact of political correctness on the unfolding of these interaction motives. In fact, it may be assumed that motivations to get along or get to know can still be operating even when coupled with the explicit intent to avoid using the prevailing stereotypes. People who do their best to stay away from stereotypes may see this as either making the target feel more at ease or, alternatively, they may consider that stereotype suppression allows them to be most accurate in investigating who the target really is. So, the two main interaction goals that have been identified in the social interaction literature seem quite compatible with the presence of colour-blindness concerns. As far as we know, no research has examined the impact of stereotype suppression on the emergence of hypothesis confirmation in an interview setting.

## STEREOTYPE SUPPRESSION

For social or personal reasons, people may want to avoid using stereotypes when judging or when interacting with others. Ideologies such as colour-blindness strongly encourage people to avoid building upon stereotypic knowledge and rely on views that are devoid of a priori expectations derived from the knowledge of people's group membership. In spite of the ambitions of political correctness with respect to intergroup relations, a large body of research demonstrates that actively keeping away from stereotypes entails some paradoxical consequences. For instance, Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten (1994) showed that forming impressions while suppressing stereotypes results in initial less stereotyped descriptions of the target. However, more stereotyped descriptions of another member of the same category rapidly show up as the consequence of suppression. Such an ironic effect has been labelled the 'rebound effect' (Wegner, Schneider, Carter, & White, 1987). Macrae and colleagues (1994) also found evidence for rebound effects in reaction times on lexical decision tasks performed

right after a suppression episode. Findings such as these indicate that suppression processes, although initially decreasing manifestations of stereotypical contents, result in these contents becoming more accessible (see also Monteith, Sherman, & Devine, 1998) and more likely to be used in subsequent judgments. More strikingly, Macrae and colleagues (1994) have reported some paradoxical consequences of stereotype suppression in behavioural reactions. Specifically, participants were asked to wait in a room where one of the chairs was covered with belongings suggesting the presence of a skinhead. Compared to control participants, participants who had earlier been asked to suppress the stereotype of skinheads while forming an impression sat further away from the critical chair.

Cognitive mechanisms underlying the rebound phenomenon have been theorized in Wegner's (1994) ironic process model. According to Wegner, the intention to suppress thoughts triggers a monitoring process and an operating process working hand in hand. The controlled operating process searches for distracters, while the automatic monitoring process scans consciousness in search of suppression failures. Every time the monitoring process detects unwanted thoughts, the operating process is initiated and proposes a new, hopefully more efficient, distracter. To be able to detect forbidden thoughts, the monitoring process requires those very thoughts that ought to be avoided to be cognitively activated. A depletion in available cognitive resources or the disappearance of the person's motivation to suppress thoughts results in perturbing or even stopping the controlled operating process, leaving the automatic monitoring process unaffected. Without the complementary action of the operating process, activated unwanted thoughts are revealed through the occurrence of a rebound effect. In other words, thoughts that had to be suppressed become more present than if no attempt at suppression was made.

Up to now, studies on stereotype control have typically been concerned with the suppression of stereotypical thoughts when forming impressions of specific group members. Suppression consequences were examined lying on judgments and/or behaviours toward *other* members of the same group. Moreover, rebound was usually observed either for targets performing ambiguous behaviours potentially interpreted as stereotype-consistent or for undescribed members of the suppressed group.


## OVERVIEW OF THE STUDY AND HYPOTHESES


Our study aimed at examining how suppression takes place *during social interactions*. Indeed, to the extent that suppression leads to less stereotypic descriptions when forming impressions (Macrae et al., 1994), signs of active suppression should reveal when suppression operates during social interactions. More specifically, the evocation of stereotype-related issues during an interaction should likely be influenced by perceivers' suppression attempts. In other words, although people who freely use their preconceptions are expected to display classical confirmation orientations and favour questions matching the stereotype, such a pattern should be less or non present among suppressors.

To investigate the above issue, the stereotype of female hairdressers proved ideal. Indeed, a pilot study confirmed that the members of this category are often considered to be quite sociable but also somewhat intellectually challenged. Participants in the present study were provided with a series of questions pertaining to intelligence and sociability. For each question, they were requested to indicate the extent to which they wanted to ask the question to the target whom they thought was a female hairdresser. Before making actual choices, half of the participants were also asked to suppress stereotypes. In addition, participants were provided with either a goal to get to know or a goal to get along with the target.

The consideration of these two interaction motivations led to a series of specific hypotheses depending on whether participants were or were not asked to suppress their stereotype. Turning to the control condition first, our predictions were that stereotypical knowledge would be used to ensure a

smooth and pleasant interaction all the more when the prevailing motivation is to get along with the target. That is, compared to the get to know motivation, the activation of a get along goal should prompt attempts to adjust to the target and an inclination to favour questions unlikely to make her feel uncomfortable. For that reason, questions matching hairdressers' stereotype, that is, questions that fit with a lack of intelligence to which the target is expected to give a positive answer, will likely be favoured (i.e. 'Are you interested in the success of Top Models?'). In addition, non-matching questions, likely revealing the target's lack of intelligence in case of negative answers (i.e. 'Are you interested in political events?'), are expected to be avoided. Indeed, answering no to such questions might lead the target to feel quite uncomfortable and such a risk would certainly not be taken when instructions request participants to get along.

As we see it, the intelligence-related dimension of the stereotype may prove to be much more critical than the sociability dimension. Indeed, whereas the former dimension refers to the negative part of the stereotype—assumed lack of intelligence—, the latter refers to the positive aspect— assumed sociability. In all likelihood, devoting attention to the target's assumed lack of intelligence would probably be more appealing than testing for her sociability. Moreover, avoiding any question that would make the target feel uncomfortable because of a possible negative answer to questions testing for intelligence would probably be more of a concern than forcing the target to reveal her lack of sociability. As a consequence, we globally expected the free contemplation of stereotypes in the control condition to trigger confirmation orientations and especially so for the intelligence-related dimension.

As far as stereotype suppression is concerned, we predicted that it would reduce the propensity to use stereotype-based strategies in interaction contexts. That is, the tendency both to favour matching *and* to avoid non-matching questions should decrease when suppression is at work compared to a control condition. As a matter of fact, preferring some questions over others would unmistakably suggest the existence of a priori views about the target. Again, the intelligence-related dimension should be the most critical here because suppression is expected to specifically concern the negative side of people's stereotypes. That is, even if very general instructions to suppress stereotypes were provided, they may be interpreted as restricted to negative aspects because perceivers would see less reasons to suppress positive a priori views.

In addition to a close inspection of the impact of suppression and interaction goals at the level of the selection of questions, we also wanted to examine a series of other possible *consequences of suppression* in the course of social interactions. First, we focused on impressions made about the target. Previous suppression work usually examined the occurrence of rebound effects for either ambiguous behaviours or unspecified members of the critical stereotyped group. In our study, we wanted to investigate whether rebound effects also emerge when targets are quite consistent with the stereotype. Moreover, and this is something that has never been examined, we were also curious to see what impression would result after suppression for markedly *inconsistent* targets. For that reason, the actual answers of the target were manipulated so that she appeared as either a stereotype-consistent or inconsistent hairdresser. In other words, our hairdresser's answers clearly reflected either the lack of intelligence or the presence of intelligence. Again, because participants would have no apparent reason for suppressing positive aspects of the stereotype, suppressors were expected to pay particular attention to the negative aspects of the stereotype.

Because we hypothesized that stereotype suppression would lead to an increased activation of perceivers' stereotypical representations, we predicted that the target's answers would likely be appraised as more stereotypical when they happen to fit to this representation and result in more polarized impressions of the target. Conversely, any pattern of answers that would indicate substantial divergence between the target and the stereotypical representation of the group should result in contrast. Because we expected earlier suppression efforts to impinge especially on the

intelligence-related aspects, we expected suppression consequences to be stronger for that dimension than for the sociability dimension.

In order to further assess the impact of the suppression on the activated stereotypical representation, we also measured participants' evaluations of the target's group, that is of hairdressers, in general. Indeed, the specific activation of stereotypical contents, as classically reported in the suppression literature, should result in the stereotypical representation of the group as a whole becoming more extreme. That is, compared to a context in which stereotypes were freely considered, the suppression of stereotypes was expected to wind up with more extreme evaluations of the group on the suppressed dimensions.

To sum up our predictions with respect to the impression measures, we expected the stereotypical representation to be more activated after stereotype suppression than in the control condition. For that reason, we hoped that group evaluations would be consistently more extreme in the context of suppression, independently of the stereotype-consistency of the target. In contrast, the evaluations of targets were expected to differ as a function of the stereotype-consistency of the evidence conveyed by the target's answers. On the one hand, participants' impressions of a stereotype-consistent target were expected to be more extreme after stereotype suppression than in the control condition because of the assimilation to a more extreme stereotypical representation. On the other hand, because stereotype-inconsistent answers would be perceived to be very dissimilar from the stereotypical representation, the resulting impressions of a stereotype-inconsistent target were expected to be contrasted away from that representation, particularly when the stereotype is strongly activated as in the suppression condition.

## METHOD

### Participants

A total of 109 first and second year psychology students (89 females and 20 males; *mean age* $= 19.78$, $SD = 3.30$) enrolled at the Catholic University of Louvain at Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, volunteered to take part in an experiment on impression formation in exchange of course credit.

### Materials

Female hairdressers served as the stereotyped category for our study. Pilot work indicated that students thought female hairdressers to be quite sociable but not very intelligent. A list of 42 questions was created such that 14 questions were irrelevant and neutral with respect to the stereotype (i.e. 'Do you have breakfast every morning?'), whereas all others were diagnostic ones. That is, they discriminated between the hypothesis and the alternative and could be answered by yes or no.[1] Fourteen questions were diagnostic of intelligence (i.e. 'Are you interested in political events') or lack of intelligence (i.e.

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[1]The set of questions was elaborated on the basis of extensive pilot work requiring participants from the same population to imagine 100 intelligent, dumb, sociable, or cold persons and evaluate how many of them would answer yes to each question. Sixteen participants evaluated questions with respect to intelligent and stupid persons in one of two possible orders, and 16 other participants evaluated those questions with respect to sociable and unsociable persons. A series of analyses allowed us to select one group of questions diagnostic of intelligence and another group of questions diagnostic of lack of intelligence. Both questions testing intelligence and lack of intelligence were thought to elicit slightly more 'yes' answers for sociable than for cold persons. We also determined questions that were diagnostic of sociability and lack of sociability. Questions testing sociability were not diagnostic of intelligence or lack of intelligence, but questions testing lack of sociability were thought to elicit slightly less 'yes' answers for dumb than for intelligent persons. Neutral questions were diagnostic neither for the intelligence-lack of intelligence dimension nor for the sociability-lack of sociability dimension.

'Are you interested in the success of Top Models?'), and 14 questions were diagnostic of sociability (i.e. 'Do you often go out with your friends?') or lack of sociability (i.e. 'Do you sometimes go alone to the movies?'). That is, whereas half of diagnostic questions was framed in stereotype-consistent way, (i.e. they tested for lack of intelligence or presence of sociability), the other half was framed in stereotype-inconsistent way (i.e. they tested for presence of intelligence or lack of sociability).

A female confederate who was unknown to participants answered all the questions and her responses were recorded and stored into a computer. One response was recorded for each neutral question. Questions testing for the presence of sociability and lack of sociability each were associated with two responses. One response was meant to reveal the presence of sociability and the other was made to indicate a lack of sociability. Participants always received a proportion of five to seven sociable answers to the set of questions testing for sociability, as well as to the set of questions testing for lack of sociability. The target's level of sociability was thus held constant. Similarly, two responses were recorded for each question testing for the presence of intelligence and lack of intelligence. One answer was selected to reveal intelligence and another was meant to reveal a lack of intelligence. Stereotype-consistent targets conveyed answers lacking of intelligence to each question testing either intelligence or lack of intelligence. Stereotype-inconsistent targets conveyed a proportion of five to seven intelligent answers to the set of questions testing intelligence, as well as to the set of questions testing lack of intelligence.

## Experimental Design

Participants were randomly assigned to one of eight experimental conditions. Each condition comprised 11 to 15 participants. After the stereotype has been activated but before interacting with the target, participants were either asked to try to get along with or to get to know the target person, either with or without additional instructions to suppress stereotypical ideas. Participants were then requested to select questions for the interaction. Next, they were either confronted with a target very consistent or inconsistent with the stereotype depending on the answers the target gave to the questions. The design was thus a 2 (suppression: present vs absent) $\times$ 2 (goal: getting along vs getting to know) $\times$ 2 (stereotype-consistency of the target's answers: consistent vs inconsistent).

## Procedure and Dependent Measures

The first dependent measure was participants' preferences for questions. After being confronted with the target's answers, participants' impressions about her were collected. Next, the activated stereotypical representation was assessed through participants' evaluations of the target's group. At appropriate points in the experimental session, participants also answered several manipulation check questions.

Upon participants' arrival in the laboratory, a male experimenter informed them that the study consisted in interacting by means of an intranet network. First, participants had to complete a one-page self-description questionnaire, a task the interaction target was allegedly busy doing in another room. Exchanging the self-descriptions was said to serve providing partners with initial information about each other such as their date of birth, sex, if they were student or otherwise employed, what kind of study/job they were doing, and if they liked it. In all instances, participants read that the target was a young female hairdresser who very much liked her job.

To ensure the evocation of the stereotype, participants were asked to take 5 min to write down how most people would describe a typical day in the life of a female hairdresser. Participants were then

asked to indicate on twelve 9-point scales ranging from 1 ( = not at all) to 9 ( = very much) what most people think about female hairdressers on a series of characteristics. The questions read as follows: 'According to most people, to what extent are female hairdressers . . . '. Two scales pertained to intelligence (intelligent, cultivated), two to lack of intelligence (stupid, naïve), two to sociability (sympathetic, pleasant), and two to lack of sociability (arrogant, cold). Four additional scales were stereotype-irrelevant (patient, conservative, courageous, ordered).

After the stereotype had been made salient, participants were or were not provided with suppression instructions (i.e. Macrae et al., 1994; for a review see Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Additionally, they were asked either to try to get along with or to get to know the target (see Appendix 1). Next, the 42 questions appeared individually on the computer screen in a random order. Participants had to report the extent to which they wanted to ask each question on a scale ranging from 1 ( = not at all) to 9 ( = very much).

After questions were rated for the upcoming interaction, a series of open-ended questions assessed participants' selection strategies. Items referred to why some questions were preferred over others, whether some kind of questions were more frequently selected, which kind of questions that would be and why, and whether certain types of questions were avoided. The last question explicitly asked participants about the strategy they had used during the selection phase. Specifically, the question was 'Did you use a specific strategy when selecting the questions that you would ask your partner?'.

Participants were then informed that all the questions for which their preference was greater than five on the 9-point scale would actually be passed on to the target. Concretely, questions selected on that basis were presented again one at a time on the computer screen and read aloud by participants into the computer microphone. Participants were led to believe that their questions were recorded and sent to the target via the intranet. After a variable number of seconds, participants heard the alleged answer of the target through the computer.

The answers of the target provided an opportunity to introduce the final manipulation. Participants were confronted with a target either very consistent or inconsistent with the stereotype of female hairdressers. That is, the target came across as sociable and not very intelligent or as sociable and intelligent. After all answers were heard, participants reported their impressions of the target using the same scales as the ones that ensured the evocation of the stereotype at the beginning of the experiment. The questionnaire started as follows: 'To what extent do you think your partner is . . . ?'. Next, participants were given the same set of scales again and asked to evaluate the group of female hairdressers as a whole.

Finally, manipulation check questions assessed participants' compliance with the goals they had been assigned at the outset of the study and the strategies they used during the interaction. Specifically, questions were as follows: 'When selecting the questions, to what extent did you try to make the interaction pleasant?', 'When selecting the questions, to what extent did you try to gather information about the partner?', 'To what extent do you think that the partner found your questions pleasant?', 'To what extent did you actually learn things about the partner?'. Additional questions were: 'Do you have contacts with people of that profession in every day life (family, friends . . . )?', 'To what extent do you wish to encounter the partner face to face?'. Participants were then thoroughly debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

## RESULTS

Manipulation check questions were analysed first. Then, participants' preferences for questions were examined in order to determine how suppression and goals affected perceivers' tendencies to solicit

evidence likely to confirm a priori expectations. Next, the impressions of the target were examined in order to evaluate the impact of stereotype suppression on the way participants took into account the information conveyed by the target. Finally, evaluations of the target's group were considered so as to verify the influence of suppression on the stereotypical representation.

## Manipulation Checks

Several questions checked for stereotype activation and compliance with the interaction goal and the suppression instructions. They were analysed using a 2 (suppression: present vs absent) $\times$ 2 (goal: getting along vs getting to know) $\times$ 2 (stereotype-consistency of the target's answers: consistent vs inconsistent) ANOVA.

### Stereotype Activation

The two intelligence-related scales were reversed and an index was computed on basis of the four scales referring to the intelligence/lack of intelligence (I-LI) dimension (alpha $= 0.70$) as a means to evaluate stereotype activation. A comparable sociability/lack of sociability (S-LS) index was computed after reversal of the two scales referring to lack of sociability (alpha $= 0.70$). Analyses on the I-LI and S-LS indexes revealed no significant effects. This pattern confirmed that all participants shared the same stereotypic views about hairdressers when starting the experiment. Whereas the mean score on the I-LI index was 4.87, the S-LS index's mean was 7.25. That is, female hairdressers were considered moderately intelligent and very sociable.

### Goal Manipulation

Confirming the success of our manipulation, participants instructed to get along with the target reported having tried harder to make the interaction pleasant, $M = 7.39$, $SD = 1.32$, than those instructed to get to know her, $M = 6.17$, $SD = 1.68$, $F(1, 101) = 19.59$, $p < 0.0001$. Neither suppression, $F(1, 101) = 0.35$, $p > 0.55$, nor stereotype-consistency of the target's answers, $F(1, 101) = 0.84$, $p > 0.36$, influenced participants' responses. In contrast, goals did not affect the extent to which participants reported having tried to collect information about the target, $F(1, 101) = 1.57$, $p > 0.21$ ($M = 6.75$, $SD = 1.36$ and $M = 7.07$, $SD = 1.30$ for get along and get to know conditions, respectively). Suppression, $F(1, 101) = 0.01$, $p > 0.93$, and stereotype-consistency of the target's answers, $F(1, 101) = 0.13$, $p > 0.72$, had no impact on the amount of information that participants tried to gather. Another question revealed that get along participants thought more, $M = 5.16$, $SD = 1.44$, than get to know participants, $M = 4.21$, $SD = 1.51$, that the target found their questions pleasant, $F(1, 101) = 12.02$, $p < 0.0008$. The extent to which participants actually thought that they learned things about the target was pretty similar in both groups although get along participants tended to report that they learned more, $M = 6.55$, $SD = 1.20$, than get to know participants, $M = 6.11$, $SD = 1.37$, $F(1, 101) = 3.14$, $p < 0.08$. No other effects were significant.

### Strategy Used During the Selection of Questions

Participants also answered a series of open-ended questions after the question selection phase. Responses were classified into several categories (see below) by coders who were blind to the

hypotheses and were analysed by means of chi-square analysis as a function of suppression (present vs absent) and goal (getting along vs getting to know).

Analyses showed that trying to get along led participants to report having chosen questions facilitating contact or allowing to encounter the target more often (46%) than trying to get to know the target (15%), $\chi^2(1) = 12.46$, $p < 0.001$. Get to know goals however led more often than get along goals to report favouring the selection of subjectively diagnostic questions, $\chi^2(1) = 5.77$, $p < 0.01$ with 21% vs 5%, and of questions allowing to know the target, $\chi^2(1) = 9.80$, $p < 0.002$ with 43% vs 16% of the participants reporting having favoured those kind of questions. Questions about the target's personality were also more frequently reported to have been preferred when get to know (38%) rather than get along (7%) goals were made salient, $\chi^2(1) = 14.84$, $p < 0.001$. Moreover, get to know goals led more than get along goals to report having avoided trivial questions, $\chi^2(1) = 12.86$, $p < 0.001$ with 55% vs 21%, and questions that do not allow to know the target, $\chi^2(1) = 11.34$, $p < 0.001$ with 26% vs 4%. In contrast, get along goals led more often than get to know goals to report avoiding personal or intimate questions, $\chi^2(1) = 4.19$, $p < 0.04$ (21% vs 8%), direct or 'embarrassing' questions, $\chi^2(1) = 13.02$, $p < 0.001$ (39% vs 9%), insinuating questions, $\chi^2(1) = 6.01$, $p < 0.01$ (25% vs 8%), and intellectual or culture-related questions, $\chi^2(1) = 6.06$, $p < 0.01$ (36% vs 15%).

### Additional Questions

We also checked that all groups of participants had similar amount of contact with hairdressers in everyday life. Moreover, participants did not differ in their wish to encounter the target face to face after the interaction. No effects reached significance. All in all thus, our manipulations appear to have been quite successful allowing us to examine the focal dependent measures.

## Selection of Questions

The expression of preferences for the various questions allowed us to examine how stereotype suppression and interaction goals affected the propensity to solicit evidence likely to confirm a priori views about the target. Because our hypotheses for positive and negative aspects of the stereotype differ, each dimension is reported successively. Results concerning neutral questions are presented last. The preference for questions was examined by means of a 2 (suppression: present vs absent) × 2 (goal: getting along vs getting to know) × 2 (match of the question: matching vs non-matching) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor.

### Intelligence/Lack of Intelligence Dimension (I-LS)

The preferences for each of the seven questions testing for intelligence and the seven questions testing for lack of intelligence (alpha = 0.74 and alpha = 0.57, for each index respectively) revealed a significant goal × match interaction, $F(1, 105) = 10.88$, $p < 0.001$. Specifically, get along goals elicited preferences for matching questions over non-matching questions, $F(1, 55) = 7.31$, $p < 0.009$, $M = 5.58$, SD and $M = 5.08$, $SD = 1.48$, respectively. That is, questions testing for lack of intelligence were favoured over questions testing for intelligence. In contrast, the opposite pattern emerged when get to know goals were salient, $F(1, 52) = 3.02$, $p < 0.09$. Non-matching questions were preferred, $M = 5.54$, $SD = 1.25$, over matching questions, $M = 5.24$, $SD = 1.21$. That is, questions testing for intelligence were thus preferred over the ones testing for lack of intelligence.

Figure 1. Preferences for matching, i.e. questions testing for the lack of intelligence, and non-matching, i.e. questions testing for intelligence, as a function of goals and suppression. Note: The question was 'To what extent would you like to ask this question?' Ratings were made on 9-point scales ranging from 1 ($=$ not at all) to 9 ($=$ very much)

Most importantly, the goal $\times$ match interaction was significantly affected by our suppression manipulation, $F(1, 105) = 3.66$, $p = 0.05$ (see Figure 1). Separate analyses indeed revealed that the goal $\times$ match interaction was significant when stereotypes were freely considered, $F(1, 49) = 11.56$, $p < 0.001$. In contrast, the interaction was not significant anymore when stereotypical views were suppressed, $F(1, 56) = 1.13$, $p > 0.29$. In line with our predictions, suppressors avoided to reveal stereotypical thoughts through their preferences for questions. Additional analyses showed that freely considering stereotypes translated in marked preferences for matching over non-matching questions when trying to get along, $F(1, 26) = 6.98$, $p < 0.01$ ($M = 5.52$, $SD = 1.25$, and $M = 4.81$, $SD = 1.65$, respectively) and for non-matching over matching questions when trying to get to know the target, $F(1, 23) = 4.76$, $p < 0.03$ ($M = 5.76$, $SD = 1.21$ and $M = 5.15$, $SD = 1.31$, respectively). In sharp contrast, suppressors manifested no preference for matching over non-matching questions whether trying to get along, $F(1, 28) = 1.41$, $p > 0.24$ ($M = 5.63$, $SD = 1.48$, and $M = 5.33$, $SD = 1.28$, respectively), or to get to know the target, $F(1, 28) = 0.06$, $p > 0.80$ ($M = 5.31$, $SD = 1.13$, and $M = 5.36$, $SD = 1.27$, respectively).

*Sociability/Lack of Sociability Dimension (S-LS)*

Analyses of the preferences for questions testing for sociability and lack of sociability (alpha $= 0.60$ and alpha $= 0.53$, for each index respectively) indicated that the first were preferred, $M = 6.44$, $SD = 1.27$, over the latter, $M = 5.71$, $SD = 1.24$, $F(1, 105) = 40.23$, $p < 0.0001$. This is not surprising since interacting mainly implies manifesting sociability. A main effect of goal also came out significant, $F(1, 105) = 4.54$, $p < 0.03$. Trying to get to know the target elicited a greater preference than trying to get along with her for both questions testing for sociability and questions testing for lack of sociability ($M = 6.29$, $SD = 1.20$ and $M = 5.88$, $SD = 1.28$ for get to know and get along goals respectively). In sum, this does nothing but indicate the impact of get to know goals on tendencies to collect a greater amount of information. Suppression did not interact with match of the questions,

$F(1, 105) = 0.33, p > 0.56$. As expected, participants did not manage to control manifestations of their a priori views regarding the target's sociability. Because there is no obvious reason to suppress stereotypical positive views, stereotype suppression instructions may have spontaneously been interpreted as restricted to stereotypical negative ideas. No other effects were significant.

### Neutral Questions

Analyses of the preferences for neutral questions (alpha $= 0.73$) revealed no effect of our suppression manipulation, $F(1, 105) = 0.20, p > 0.65$, nor of goals, $F(1, 105) = 2.24, p > 0.13$. The interaction similarly was not significant, $F(1, 105) = 0.38, p > 0.53$.

## Impressions Formed

After all the answers to the selected questions were provided, participants' impressions of the target and her group were assessed. That is, we examined how information that was very consistent or inconsistent with the stereotype was taken into account to form impressions as a function of whether stereotypes were initially suppressed or freely considered and as a function of interaction goals. Evaluations were submitted to a 2 (suppression: present vs absent) $\times$ 2 (goal: getting along vs getting to know) $\times$ 2 (stereotype-consistency of the target's answers: consistent vs inconsistent) $\times$ 2 (judgment: target vs group) ANOVA with repeated measures on the last factor and are reported for the two dimensions of the stereotype successively.

### Intelligence/Lack of Intelligence Dimension (I-LI)

An index was computed based on four 9-point scales referring to the I-LI dimension after reversing the two intelligence scales (alpha $= 0.78$ and alpha $= 0.70$, for target and group evaluations respectively). Specifically, higher scores indicate impressions that the target or the group more strongly lacks intelligence and more closely corresponds to the stereotype of female hairdressers.

Confirming the success of our manipulation, consistent answers emanating from the target led participants to evaluate her and her group as being less intelligent, $M = 4.33, SD = 1.28$, than inconsistent answers, $M = 3.43, SD = 1.02, F(1, 101) = 19.75, p < 0.0001$. A main effect of judgment, $F(1, 101) = 21.67, p < 0.0001$, revealed that group evaluations were more in accordance with the stereotype, $M = 4.09, SD = 1.08$, than impressions of the target, $M = 3.66, SD = 1.38$.

A significant stereotype-consistency by judgment interaction also emerged, $F(1, 101) = 20.57, p < 0.0001$. Follow-up analyses revealed that the target was evaluated very differently with regard to her intelligence depending on whether she provided stereotype-consistent or inconsistent answers to the questions, $F(1, 101) = 31.66, p < 0.0001$ ($M = 4.32, SD = 1.38$ and $M = 3.00, SD = 1.05$, respectively). Comparatively, the stereotype-consistency of the target's answers affected group evaluations less strongly, $F(1, 101) = 5.05, p < 0.02$, ($M = 4.34, SD = 1.19$ and $M = 3.87, SD = 1.00$, after reception of consistent and inconsistent answers, respectively). Another way to look at this interaction is to compare impressions of the target and of her group. In fact, the provision of consistent answers led participants to evaluate the target as being very similar to the group, $F(1, 51) = 0.007, p > 0.93$. Inconsistent answers however led participants to evaluate the target as being more intelligent than her group, $F(1, 51) = 41.87, p < 0.0001$. In other words, the inconsistent information provided by the target had more impact on participants' judgments of the target than on the evaluations of the group as a whole.

Figure 2. Impression of a female hairdresser partner (target) and of the group of hairdressers in general (group) as a function of suppression and stereotype-consistency of the target's answers. Note: Ratings were made on 9-point scales for a series of traits. The question was 'To what extent do you think that the partner (vs hairdressers in general) is/are . . . ?' (1 = not at all; 9 = very much). Scores were calculated on the basis of the four traits related to the I-LI dimension. Higher scores mean more stereotypical impressions (i.e. lack of intelligence)

We also found a significant interaction involving judgment and suppression, $F(1, 101) = 7.51$, $p < 0.007$. Specifically, whereas suppressing or using stereotypes led to similar impressions of the target, $F(1, 101) < 0.01$, $p > 0.95$ ($M = 3.69$, $SD = 1.55$ and $M = 3.64$, $SD = 1.21$, respectively), suppressors expressed more stereotypical views of the group, $F(1, 101) = 5.78$, $p < 0.01$ ($M = 4.35$, $SD = 1.12$) than control participants ($M = 3.83$, $SD = 1.05$). This pattern is quite reminiscent of the classical post-suppressional rebound effect. Suppression causes strong activation of stereotypical contents which results in more extreme stereotypical representation.

Importantly, the three-way interaction between judgment, suppression, and stereotype-consistency of the target's answers was also significant, $F(1, 101) = 9.24$, $p < 0.003$ (see Figure 2). Separate analyses for each judgment revealed a significant two-way interaction for the target impressions, $F(1, 101) = 4.75$, $p < 0.03$. Although the impressions of targets who provided consistent and inconsistent answers were different both for suppressors, $F(1, 54) = 29.86$, $p < 0.0001$, and controls, $F(1, 47) = 6.24$, $p < 0.01$, initially suppressing stereotypes led participants to form more differentiated impressions of the consistent and inconsistent targets than initially considering stereotypes. In stark contrast, the two-way interaction for the evaluation of the group was not significant, $F(1, 101) = 0.08$, $p > 0.77$. Suppressors expressed more extremely stereotypical views of the group than controls both after consistent and inconsistent answers.

Decomposing the three-way interaction as a function of stereotype-consistency of the target's answers revealed a significant two-way interaction when answers were inconsistent, $F(1, 50) = 16.56$, $p < 0.0002$, but not when they were consistent, $F(1, 51) = 0.05$, $p > 0.83$. That is, consistent answers

always led participants to appraise the target as being similar to the group. It is important to remember however that suppressors' evaluations were more stereotypical than those of controls. Conversely, inconsistent answers led the target to be evaluated less stereotypically than the group after initial suppression, $F(1, 26) = 43.05$, $p < 0.0001$, but not in the control condition, $F(1, 23) = 0.04$, $p > 0.83$. No other effects were significant.

### Sociability/Lack of Sociability Dimension (S-LS)

An index was computed based on four 9-point scales referring to the S-LS dimension after reversing the two lack of sociability scales (alpha $= 0.87$ and alpha $= 0.71$ for target and group evaluations, respectively) such that higher scores indicate greater sociability.

Not surprisingly, we found no influence of the stereotype-consistency of the target's answers on evaluations of sociability, $F(1, 101) = 0.09$, $p > 0.76$. Indeed, sociability was not manipulated and the target always appeared to be sociable. In other words, stereotype-consistency specifically referred to the target's level of intelligence. Interestingly, goals affected sociability-related evaluations, $F(1, 101) = 4.63$, $p < 0.03$. Compared to get to know goals, get along goals during the selection of questions, that is, attempts at being sociable, led participants to later evaluate the target and the group as being more sociable, $M = 7.31$, $SD = 1.25$ and $M = 7.73$, $SD = 1.02$, respectively.

## DISCUSSION

In the present study, we wanted to check whether the intentional avoidance of a priori beliefs about other people's group membership impacts on actual social interaction. Indeed, a long untested assumption of the colour-blindness perspective is that staying away from one's general beliefs and attitudes about social groups in general should have positive consequences for the particular individuals one is dealing with and, in the long run, for the group to which they belong. The evidence accumulating in the suppression literature induced us to question this assumption. Indeed, a number of studies showing the emergence of rebound effects after a suppression episode suggests that explicit attempts at restraining stereotypic preconceptions should backfire and end up in the increased activation of the stereotype. Our ambition was to examine this issue more thoroughly in the context of a hypothesis-testing situation.

In this study, we relied on a computer interaction and confronted our participants with a female hairdresser, a category for which there is indeed a widely shared stereotype stressing both sociability and lack of intelligence. We examined the role of such goals as 'get to know' or 'get along' on the selection of specific questions and the formation of an impression of the target and her group. Specifically, our aim was to investigate how stereotype suppression would affect the often-reported tendency to seek expectation-confirming evidence as well as the judgment of the interaction target and the group with which she was associated. Another novel feature of our study is that characteristics of the target were manipulated such that she came across as being either clearly consistent or clearly inconsistent with the stereotype. Finally, we expected our suppression manipulation to affect the negative facet of the stereotype, namely lack of intelligence, more strongly than its positive side, i.e. sociability.

Replicating earlier studies (Dardenne & Leyens, 1995; Leyens, Dardenne, & Fiske, 1998), our findings indicated that the concern to get along with the target led participants to preferentially select questions testing for critical stereotypical characteristics over ones testing for counter-stereotypical

features. In contrast, the desire to get to know the target led to the reverse pattern of question preferences. Clearly, the motivation to get along elicited adjustments to the target's assumed level of intelligence. As manipulation checks indicated, doing so was in fact thought to make the interaction easier and to help make the target feel more at ease. In contrast, the motivation to get to know the target encouraged participants to take directions opposite to stereotypical views. In all likelihood, information-seeking goals seemed to risk making the target feel somewhat ill at ease. Indeed, get to know goals led participants to rely on stereotypical knowledge as they favoured questions running counter their preconceptions. In other words, these participants checked whether the stereotype was in fact wrong. In sum, both kinds of interaction goals led perceivers to rely on their stereotypical knowledge when selecting questions, although in a markedly different way. Our findings thus confirmed that different interaction goals facilitate or hinder the examination of unique attributes of interaction partners (Fiske, 1993; Hilton & Darley, 1991; Leyens et al., 1994).

As we had suspected, stereotype suppression strongly influenced participants' selection of the questions they wanted to ask the target. Concretely, suppressors showed no preference for one kind of questions over the other whether their goal was to get along with or to get to know the target. That is, they stayed away from using their stereotypical knowledge. Indeed, favouring those questions matching the stereotype might reveal the existence of prejudice or the presence of assumptions regarding the target's lack of intelligence. As it happens, any preference for questions testing for counter-stereotypical characteristics may similarly indicate the reliance on stereotype. Indeed, how would any kind of question be favoured over the other without the presence of a priori views? Stereotype suppression thus appears to prevent, or at least curb, often-reported tendencies toward confirmation. This surely seems to be good news from a colour-blindness perspective.

Although less relevant for our hypotheses, suppression did not influence participants' preferences for sociability-related questions. Interaction goals, in contrast, affected participants' preferences such that get to know motivations led to collect a greater amount of information about sociability and lack of sociability altogether. In all instances, however, those questions that were testing for sociability were preferred over questions that tested for lack of sociability. This hardly constitutes a surprise. Indeed, this reflects the strong link between sociability and any setting involving a forthcoming interaction.

Social interactions however are not restricted to the selection of questions. Impression formation processes are also at work and may constitute other sources of confirmation bias. That is, bias can emerge when the evidence conveyed by targets is appraised and integrated in terms of pre-existing knowledge. As it turned out, information that was consistent and inconsistent with the stereotype resulted in more clearly differentiated impressions of the target for suppression than for control participants. Moreover, compared to the control condition, suppression generated more extreme stereotypical representations of the group as a whole. As a set, these findings suggest that some hyperactivation of stereotypical knowledge took place for suppressors when they met with the information emanating from the target. This is very much reminiscent of the rebound effect reported in the suppression literature.

Obviously, stereotypical knowledge is likely to be useful when little or no additional information is available in order to make the judgments. This is precisely what happens for group evaluations. Similarly, stereotypical knowledge helps evaluating ambiguous group members. In our study, we wanted to see whether the use of a priori knowledge about social groups may help forming impressions of unambiguous group members. We expected that similarity of the target with the stereotypical representation of the group would likely lead to assimilation whereas dissimilarity would rather lead to contrast. Our data show that participants' impressions of the consistent target were very similar to their evaluations of the group both in the control condition, where presumably the stereotype was being used freely, and in the stereotype suppression condition. For both target and group judgments,

suppression led to more stereotypical evaluations when confronted to consistent answers. In stark contrast, participants' impressions of the inconsistent target substantially diverged from the evaluation of the group only when stereotypical views were suppressed.

Our preferred account of the present findings rests on the increased activation of the stereotype as a result of the suppression attempts (Macrae et al., 1994; Wegner, 1994; Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). In other words, because suppressors more strongly activate the semantic network associated with the stereotyped group and therefore entertain a very prototypical view of the group, they end up assimilating (vs contrasting) more the information coming from the target towards (vs away from) their stereotypic expectations. The merits of this explanation, notwithstanding a number of alternative explanations, is to provide a satisfactory account for every one of the results, that is for the complete pattern of the findings.

One alternative resides in suppressors' awareness that given the questions that they selected, they were somehow prevented from testing for the presence of specific stereotypical and counter-stereotypical characteristics. As a result of the apparent (and truly) non-biased character of their own questions, it may be the case that the evidence conveyed by targets was seen as more reliable and indicative of the target's real nature. That is, subjectively more diagnostic evidence would underlie more confident impressions of the targets. At one level, this interpretation is problematic in that one could also argue that the absence of any serious test for the stereotyped features may result in raising participant's suspicion regarding the information that is later collected. But there is another problem with this interpretation. Indeed, even if one accepts the idea that target impressions may be polarized because the evidence would come across as more valid and reliable, this account does not explain why suppressors would always end up with more stereotypical evaluations of the group as a whole. In other words, there is no reason for information regarding any specific member of the group to influence evaluations of the group in the same direction. As a matter of fact, even if such strong influence of a target member on the evaluation of the group were to exist, it would be very surprising to see stereotype-inconsistent information leading to more rather than less stereotypical group evaluations, as we found was the case after stereotype suppression.

A second alternative explanation rests on the inferences that participants could possibly draw from the confrontation with suppression instructions themselves (Foerster & Liberman, 2001; Liberman & Foerster, 2000). Because people are told not to use their stereotypes, they may come to think that they would have done so otherwise. Specifically, instructions to suppress stereotypes in a get along context might be interpreted as indicating the experimenter's belief that the target is likely to confirm the stereotype. Suppressors might therefore conclude that the avoidance of stereotypic thoughts can only contribute to make the interaction pleasant and the target feel better at ease. When participants are confronted with stereotype-consistent answers, the inferences about the experimenter's knowledge would serve as extra-confirmation. As a result, a consistent target should be judged more stereotypically by suppressors than by controls. In contrast, instructions to suppress stereotypes in a get to know context might be seen as indicative of the experimenter's belief that the target is likely to disconfirm the stereotype. Suppression would then be seen to help knowing the target better by allowing counter-stereotypical characteristics to be exposed. Stereotype-inconsistent answers on the part of the target would again come and confirm participants' working assumption. As a consequence, a stereotype-inconsistent target would be judged even less stereotypically by suppressors than by controls.

In order to test the viability of this conversational hypothesis, we examined a series of critical cells. Compared to controls, suppressors evaluated consistent targets more stereotypically when they were in a get along context, $t(28) = 2.05$, $p < 0.05$ ($M = 4.63$; $SD = 1.40$ and $M = 3.64$; $SD = 1.35$, respectively). Still, inconsistent targets were not evaluated less stereotypically by suppressors than controls in a get to know context, $t(26) = 0.54$, $p > 0.59$ ($M = 3.04$; $SD = 1.26$ and $M = 3.31$; $SD = 1.17$, respectively). Moreover, even if such conversational inferences convey potentially useful information

to form an impression of the target, they hardly explain that group evaluations were always more stereotypical in the suppression condition than in the control condition. Although further studies should more deeply investigate the respective influence of the subjective diagnosticity of the evidence and of the inferences deriving from suppression instructions in interaction contexts, the hyper-activation of stereotypical contents seems to be the most compelling explanation to account for the observed pattern of findings.

Interestingly, participants' evaluation of the target's intelligence differed as a function of suppression but not as a function of goals. This may appear as a surprise given the clear preference of questions caused by interaction goals. Note however, that selection strategies are much more similar than they may look at first sight. Although get along and get to know goals seemed to favour confirmation and disconfirmation strategies respectively, what confers its impact to a given strategy is the set of underlying expectations at work when selecting the questions. Relevant to this point is a study by Evett, Devine, Hirt, and Price (1994) showing that only a minority (about 30%) of their participants spontaneously selected disconfirming, that is non-matching, questions. Still, among these participants as well as among those who preferred matching questions, an overwhelmingly large majority (more than 90%) expected to receive expectancy-confirming answers. With this finding in mind, it is clear that even if participants' interaction goals influenced the kind of questions they selected, the target's answers should not be more surprising whether participants were trying to get along with or to get to know her. To the extent that participants' expectations about the answers they may get were indeed similar, their reactions to the evidence should hardly differ.

To sum up, we clearly showed that social motives lead perceivers to rely on their stereotypes in social interactions, although in a radically different manner, depending on the specific goal. Most importantly, the active suppression of stereotypical knowledge prevented the unfolding of the well-known tendency toward confirmation. Although this pattern may look promising from the perspective of colour-blindness, the true consequence of suppression is far less positive. Indeed, stereotype suppression appeared to increase perceptual confirmation. In fact, the evidence conveyed by the target had a stronger impact on participants' impressions when stereotypes had initially been suppressed than when they had been freely considered. That is, because stereotype suppression led more extreme stereotypical representation to be activated, consistent and inconsistent evidence were respectively assimilated and contrasted. In short, even though suppressors showed less of a propensity to select a homogeneous set of questions because they selected matching as well as non-matching questions, evidence conveyed by the target affected their impressions more strongly. Whereas suppression reduces confirmatory bias in information collection, the resulting impressions get in fact polarized. Moreover, the benefit that one particular group member may incur as a result of his or other being recognized as a poor instance of the group does not even generalize to the group. In fact, any deviant seems to be recognized even more as an exception that seems to validate the stereotype (Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Yzerbyt, Coull, & Rocher, 1999). More research is needed to delineate the boundary conditions and the specific mechanisms involved when people actively suppress stereotypic beliefs during social interactions. As for the present efforts, they suggest that intentions to avoid stereotypes is of little help to prevent the occurrence of all confirmation biases in the context of social encounters.

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## APPENDIX 1: EXPERIMENTAL INSTRUCTIONS

Suppression instructions:

*It is now very important that, during the interaction that you are going to have with your partner, you try not to think about a priori ideas that you might have about him/her or about his/her profession or study field.*

Get along instructions:

*Your objective in this interaction is to render the conversation as pleasant, enjoyable, and fluid as possible. Try to put your partner in a position that would not be uncomfortable. Ideally, your partner should come out from this interaction with the feeling to have had a good time.*

Get to know instructions:

*Your objective in this interaction is to get to know your partner and to discover who he/she really is.*