Tajfel, H. (1978*b*). Social categorization, social identity and social comparison. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H. (1981). *Human Groups and Social Categories*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Tajfel, H. & Turner, J. C. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), *The Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth.

Tajfel, H., Billig, M., Bundy, R. & Flament, C. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 1, 149–178.

Turner, J. C. (1978*a*). Social categorization and social discrimination in the minimal group paradigm. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. London: Academic Press.

Turner, J. C. (1978*b*). Social comparison, similarity and in-group favouritism. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between Social Groups: Studies in the Social Psychology of Intergroup Relations*. London: Academic Press.

Turner, J. C. (1983*a*). Some comments on . . . 'the measurement of social orientations in the minimal group paradigm'. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 13, 351–367.

Turner, J. C. (1983*b*). A second reply to Bornstein, Crum, Wittenbraker, Harring, Insko and Thibaut on the measurement of social orientations. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 13, 383–387.

Received 15 September 1987; revised version received 25 February 1988

British Journal of Social Psychology (1988), 27, 301–318 *Printed in Great Britain*

Context effects on intergroup discrimination: In-group bias as a function of experimenter's provenance

José M. Marques*
Air Force Academy, P-2710, Sintra, Portugal

Vincent Y. Yzerbyt
Université de Louvain, Faculté de Psychologie, Voie du Roman Pays 20, 1348 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium

John B. Rijsman
Department of Psychology, University of Tilburg, 5000 LE Tilburg, The Netherlands

Two studies investigated the joint effect of in-group identification and experimenter's membership status on the overt emergence of in-group bias. In Expt 1, 117 male Belgian undergraduates were asked to describe Belgian vs. North African students of their university. As predicted, the evaluative meaning of the descriptions, as a function of the experimenter's provenance, showed an in-group bias when the experimenter was an 'outsider' as opposed to when he was an 'insider'. In Expt 2, 50 female undergraduates were first asked to report their identification with each of four groups. Experimenter's Provenance was then manipulated in the same way as in Expt 1 and the subjects were asked to allocate money to the groups. It was predicted and found that subjects would show stronger in-group bias when comparing an in-group to an out-group in the outsider condition than in the insider condition, and that no differences in favouritism would arise when comparisons concerned out-groups only. The general conclusion of the two experiments is that overt manifestations of in-group favouritism are an additive function of in-group identification and search for social coordination with the experimenter on in-group superiority, the latter aspect being stronger when the experimenter is perceived as an outsider (i.e. someone with whom social coordination is not taken for granted) relative to the subject's real-life membership category. Some implications are drawn with respect to the minimal group paradigm.

In-group favouritism has been defined as 'any tendency to favour in-group over out-group members on perceptual, attitudinal or behavioural dimensions [including] partisan

*Requests for reprints.

intergroup attitudes, sociometric preferences for the in-group, discriminatory intergroup behaviour and more favourable evaluations of the products and performances of the in-group than the out-group' (Turner, 1981, p. 66). As studied in the minimal group paradigm, intergroup discrimination basically depends on a categorization made by the experimenter (e.g. Billig, 1973; Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Brewer, 1979; Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Tajfel, 1982*a*, *b*; Turner, Sachdev & Hogg, 1983) and on the perceived significance of the social comparison situation for the subject's social identity (Turner, 1975).

Social identity has been defined as 'that part of the individuals' self-concept which derives from their knowledge of their membership of a social group (or groups) together with the value and emotional significance of that membership' (Tajfel, 1982*b*, p. 24). Thus, when compared with a relevant out-group, the individual's self-concept is put at stake. A way to maintain or to enhance the self (i.e. to achieve a state of positive self-esteem, cf. Oakes & Turner, 1980) is to increase the position occupied by the in-group as compared with the out-group along a significant dimension of value. This process has been related to a need 'to provide social meaning through social identity to the intergroup situation' (Tajfel, 1978, p. 86). But how is such social meaning assigned to the situation? Three contributions may help find an answer to this question.

Social identity and social validation

According to Festinger (1950), people attempt to compare their interpretations of reality with those of others as a means to achieve a feeling of accuracy through the generation of consensus. Also, Festinger (1954) contended, people want to think of themselves as better than others on some dimensions of ability. As a result, they will look for consensus as a means of validating their own sense of subjective superiority. Like this author, we believe that intergroup discrimination becomes meaningful to the subjects only if its emergence can be socially validated. However, whereas Festinger still believed that consensus is but a compensation for lack of objective criteria of truth, a social constructionist view implies that meaning is never intrinsically objective but, rather, that it is always an outcome of social coordination (e.g. Rijsman, 1983; Tajfel, 1978).

Social constructionism and social identity

Social constructionism is by no means new in psychology. It was an essential notion in the writings of Vygotsky (1962), as well as in those of more sociologically oriented psychologists (e.g. Berger & Luckman, 1966; Mead, 1934), and is currently defended with renewed strength by several American (e.g. Gergen, 1982) and European (e.g. Doise & Mugny, 1981; Harré, 1982; Moscovici, 1972) authors. This general perspective was also adopted by Rijsman in his analysis of the dynamics of social comparison and social identity (for an overview, see Rijsman, 1983, 1987). According to this author, any meaning assigned to an object depends on a social coordination of actions towards it, which are translated into symbolic references. This is not only true for objects external to the person, but applies to the self as well. However, the pattern of action related to the meaning of self is absolutely unique: it necessarily entails *preference* relative to the others. As a result, the meanings assigned to the self are accepted only to the extent that they rely on social coordinations supportive of such preference. But, whereas in some cases social coordination of actions towards the self is implicitly expected to carry a positive orientation (e.g. most mother–child interactions), other instances of social life require that positive orientations from relevant others be negotiated, namely, through the production of assertive cues of self-positivity.

One such cue of superiority is group membership. Indeed, when group membership is used as a component of the symbolic definition of Self, the person attempts to evoke an attitude of preference from relevant others through an 'unequivocal' demonstration of the superiority of his/her in-group. Such an effort becomes relevant especially when the person is not sure yet about the other people's preferences. In brief, it seems likely that, in situations which put the Self at stake through the symbolic cue of group membership, the subject would increase his/her assertiveness regarding the in-group's superiority. This would occur more strongly when social validation is not assumed to exist on that matter. In the minimal group paradigm, the relevant other towards whom communication is established in the process of social validation is the experimenter himself/herself.

Experimenter's status and intergroup relations

The role of the experimenter in intergroup situations has been neglected by most of the literature on intergroup relations. An exception to this rule is Billig's (1976) discussion on the effects of the experimenter's perceived 'legitimacy', 'power' and 'neutrality' on intergroup conflict, a discussion which, in our option, is quite close to the social constructionist standpoint that we described above. This author has discussed the 'ideological' function of social categories and group labels which, according to him, depend more on the values they are socially assigned with than on objective properties held by their instances. Billig further contended that many results obtained by research on intergroup relations are affected by these ideological criteria, which lead the subject to behave according to the status they assign to the experimenter.

Social validation in the minimal group paradigm

The three standpoints just outlined may help us to explain our idea with respect to the minimal group paradigm (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy & Flament, 1971). We may speculate that when relevant (e.g. powerful) others are judged to be on the subject's side, he/she would be much less motivated to demonstrate self-superiority than when they are perceived as 'outsiders',* i.e. people with whom social coordination of beliefs on the relative superiority of the self is not *a priori* assumed to exist.

The minimal group paradigm actually stands as a nice illustration of the conditions which may trigger the proposed dynamics of social validation of self-positivity. Usually, an experimenter coming from an institution or status group other (and generally higher in status) than that of the subjects, divides them in two groups on the basis of some idiosyncratic criterion (like painting preferences or the toss of a coin) and asks them to

* The contrast 'insider vs. outsider' is used here with the same meaning as 'in-grouper vs. out-grouper', to the extent that an 'outsider' has the same status as an 'out-grouper'. However, for simplification, we refer to the 'outsider' as a member of an out-group other than the one which is directly involved in the social comparison.

allocate money to unknown in-group and out-group members. Because the situation is entirely new to the subjects and, because it severely constrains their options, subjects are forced to rely on whatever perceptual cues and behaviour strategies they can. These cues and strategies are provided to them by the experimenter – a person who is supposed to get a clear-cut feedback on the subject's conduct. Self-positivity is threatened, first, because the values attached to the intergroup distinction are far from being clear and, second, because the experimenter takes a *neutral* (as opposed to preferential) stance with regard to it. More generally, a potentially important source of social validation of self-positivity comes into the subject's life, explicitly puts his/her social identitity at stake, and implicitly shows an attitude of neutrality regarding the relative superiority of the groups involved. Money allocations become the only behaviour strategy through which cues of in-group superiority may be made salient and, in turn, group membership becomes the only usable criterion for self-positivity.

What we propose, therefore, is that a proper analysis of the emotional–cognitive dynamics involved in the minimal group context should take into account the fact that the experimenter is, indeed, a part of the system: if he/she is perceived as coming from the same societal category as the subject, then the subject would presumably take for granted that a social coordination exists between his/her cognitions about self-superiority and the experimenter's. In this case, the subject would not feel like producing any explicit cues for self-superiority and, consequently, in-group favouritism would arise under a disguised or weak form. But if, in turn, the experimenter is perceived as an 'outsider' (which most often would be the case), then the subject would attempt to be persuasive about his/her positivity. Because intergroup discrimination is the sole dimension on which this may be pursued, the subject would become assertive, specifically by evoking salient cues of in-group superiority.

Overview of the experiments

Two experiments were conducted in order to test the hypothesis that in-group bias is partially a function of the experimenter's membership relative to that of the subjects. In Expt 1, Belgian students from the Catholic University of Louvain were asked to evaluate two target categories: 'Belgian students of Louvain' (in-group) and 'North African students of Louvain' (out-group)*. Half of the subjects were informed that the study was being carried out by a student organization from their university (insider), and the other half were told that it was being carried out by an organization emanating from the Free University of Brussels (outsider)†. The likability rating of the traits assigned by the subjects to both target categories in the two conditions was later ascertained by a group of judges blind to the experimental manipulations. In Expt 2, Louvain students were presented with a survey supposedly carried out by a student committee. They were told that this survey's goal was to learn about their feelings concerning four cultural projects, each one being submitted by a different student group. First, the identification of each subject with each of these groups was measured. Next, the subjects were told that the student committee issued either from the Catholic University of Louvain (insider) or from the Free University of Brussels (outsider). Finally, subjects were asked to allocate money to the projects by means of a matrix similar to those employed in the minimal group studies.

Our hypothesis in Expt 1 was that intergroup discrimination would arise more strongly in the outsider than in the insider conditions. However, because previous research has shown that intergroup discrimination corresponds more to in-group bias than to out-group derogation (Brewer, 1979), we can specify this hypothesis as follows: subjects would perceive the category of Belgian students significantly more positively in the outsider than in the insider condition, but their perception of the North African category would not differ in the two conditions. This hypothesis extended to Expt 2 as follows: in-group bias would be higher in the outsider than in the insider condition, and this difference would be positively related to the strength of identification with the in-group.

* The choice of Belgian students and North African students was based on a pilot study on inter-nationality judgements and sociometric choices. This study indicated that, on the Louvain-la-Neuve campus, North African students were by far the group least preferred by Belgian students. North African students were clearly rejected and were perceived as the most dissimilar national group as compared with the category of Belgian students ($t = 16.28$, d.f. $= 34$, $P < 0.001$, two-tailed). The correlation between sociometric choices and similarity ratings was 0.82 ($P < 0.05$, $n = 6$ nationalities).

† For religious and political purposes, the Belgian universities may be seen as forming a 2 (French vs. Flemish) × 3 (Catholic vs. lay/free vs. state) factorial. There is a sharp distinction, which is well known by all Belgian students, between the Catholic University of Louvain and the Free University of Brussels (lay/free).

Experiment 1

Method

Subjects. Subjects were 120 male Belgian undergraduates enrolled at the Catholic University of Louvain at Louvain-la-Neuve, aged 17 to 24. They were asked to fill in a questionnaire. Sixty subjects were told that the survey was being conducted by a student committee emanating from the Free University of Brussels (outsider). The other 60 were told that the committee emanated from the Catholic University of Louvain (insider). Three subjects were excluded from this condition because they were personal acquaintances of the interviewer. A group of four female and 10 male Louvain undergraduates, aged 18–24 years, served as 'blind' judges for evaluating the connotative meaning of the traits provided by the subjects.

Procedure. Single subjects were randomly approached at public places on campus. One male interviewer blind to the experimental conditions asked them whether they were students in the Catholic University of Louvain, and whether they would agree to fill in a questionnaire on 'student matters'.

Questionnaire. The questionnaire depicted a headline identifying the University from which the interviewer was supposed to come (Brussels or Louvain). The written instructions were as follows:

> We are a group of students from Brussels [Louvain] University, and we are interested in the existing relationships in your [our] university, between us, Belgian students, and students coming from North African countries. We would like to know your opinions about these two groups of people. Please write out the characteristics that you believe to be the most important, the most frequent, and/or the most typical of persons belonging to each of these groups. It goes without saying that persons are all different from one another and that, often, it is not easy to describe a group in general terms. However, it is also true that certain features are more present in certain groups than in others. This is why we ask you to select the 10 most important, most frequent, and/or most striking characteristics of people belonging to each of these groups.

The order of presentation of the target categories was balanced. An additional question asked for the subject's nationality.

Data analysis. Traits given by only one subject were discarded and synonyms were collapsed under only one trait name. (A check on the synonymity was done by six independent judges and, when at least four of them agreed on the synonymy of any two traits, the least frequent trait name was encoded under the most frequent one.) The remaining traits were submitted to a factor correspondence analysis* following the standard procedures described, for instance, by Sousa & Leyens (1987), as a means of finding out the trait clusters typically associated with each category as a function of Experimenter's Provenance. Only these traits were given to the blind judges who were to rate their likability on a seven-point scale ranging from 'unlikable' (= 1) to 'likable' (= 7).

Results and discussion

Intercategory similarities. The count and selection of words yielded 357 different traits, corresponding to 1547 occurrences. The factor correspondence analysis yielded three factors which explained, respectively 46.33, 30.67 and 23.00 per cent of the total variance of the 357 traits × 4 categories matrix.

Table 1. Relative positions of the four categories on the three factors of the factor correspondence analysis

	Factors					
	1		2		3	
	Factor[a]	Weight	Factor	Weight	Factor	Weight
Insider						
Belgian	0.73	24.5	0.83	47.7	0.13	1.6
North African	−0.77	28.9	0.14	1.4	−0.66	42.3
Outsider						
Belgian	0.81	26.6	−0.89	47.8	−0.19	2.8
North African	−0.69	19.9	−0.22	3.0	0.79	53.3

[a] Factor score of the *n*th factor.

As can be seen in the 'weight' and on the 'factor' columns of Table 1, the first factor differentiates between the Belgian and the North African categories, regardless of experimenter's provenance. This simply indicates that the in-group–out-group dimension was relevant in the eyes of our subjects. More importantly, factors 2 and 3 account for no less than 53 per cent of the total variance. Factor 2 shows that the Belgian category is differently described according to experimenter's provenance. Factor 3 shows a similar effect for the North African category. Therefore, these factors depict the items which discriminate best between the two target categories in the two experimental conditions.

* Factor correspondence analysis (FCA) is a data analytic technique which has been developed mainly in France (Benzécri, 1973; Cibois, 1987; Lebart, Morineau & Tabard, 1977), although there is growing interest in the English-speaking literature (Greenacre, 1984; Nishisato, 1980). FCA allows a multidimensional representation of dependence between the rows and the columns of a two- or a three-way contingency table, by using an algorithm based on the chi-squared distance between row and column categories (Tenenhaus & Young, 1985).

Almost all of these items (which are listed in Table 2) have a good quality of representation. This means that their variances are quite satisfactorily accounted for by the factors.*

Table 2. Associations with the strongest contributions to the variances of the second and third factors of the factor correspondence analysis

	Insider				Outsider		
	F	Weight	CO^2		F	Weight	CO^2
Factor 2							
Unappreciative	1.35	1.0	0.65	Fashionable	−1.45	1.5	0.62
Ambitious	1.35	0.8	0.83	Conservative	−1.45	0.5	0.62
Easy-mannered	1.07	0.8	0.83	Goes to lectures	−0.90	0.6	0.71
Anti-establishment	0.93	0.6	0.60	Conscientious	−1.09	0.6	0.83
Closed-minded	0.36	0.6	0.75	School achiever	−1.09	0.6	0.83
Discrete	0.69	0.5	1.00	Active	−0.76	0.4	0.97
Happy	0.98	0.5	0.86	Different	−0.76	0.4	0.97
Clean	0.98	0.5	0.86	Honest	−0.68	0.4	0.88
Sectarian	0.98	0.5	0.86	Open-Minded	−0.27	0.4	0.62
Difficult person	0.56	0.3	0.86	Communicative	−0.50	0.3	0.82
				Self-willed	−0.38	0.3	0.59
Factor 3							
Athletic	−0.86	1.2	0.74	Motivated	1.50	2.6	0.70
Welcoming	−0.62	1.1	0.60	Persecuted	1.50	1.6	0.70
Wedded to Arab	−1.03	1.1	0.58	Well-dressed	1.19	1.3	0.87
Badly spoken of	−1.24	1.1	0.58	Approachable	1.19	1.3	0.87
Courageous	−0.75	0.8	0.53	Distant	0.79	1.0	0.77
Integrated	−0.41	0.7	0.79	Serious-minded	0.67	0.9	0.95
Male chauvinist	−0.87	0.7	0.59	Depressed	0.87	0.7	0.75
Grant holder	−0.75	0.4	0.53	Bad French	0.81	0.6	0.41
Stay in family	−0.75	0.4	0.53	Elite	0.81	0.6	0.41
Generous	−0.75	0.4	0.53	Lazy	0.88	0.5	0.57
Nationalist	−0.75	0.4	0.53	Interesting	0.88	0.5	0.57
Irrespectful	−0.65	0.4	0.98	Cheerful	0.22	0.5	0.97
Pessimistic	−0.47	0.3	0.59	Sincere	0.88	0.5	0.57
				Resourceful	0.53	0.4	0.72

Note. Factor 2 stands for the opposition between the Belgian categories, and Factor 3 for the opposition between the North African categories as a function of experimenter's provenance.
F = factor score of the *n*th factor.
CO_2 = squared cosine of the item vector and the factor.

In brief, what Tables 1 and 2 show is that the two social categories of Belgian students and North African students were differently described according to the experimenter's

* Because the variances are maximized by the chi-squared based algorithm of FCA, we assumed that the choice of items with both extreme positions on a factor and heavy weights on the same factor correspond to the most discriminating (thus most typical) ones for the category which is positioned on the same side of the factor, as contrasted with the category positioned on the opposite side.

alleged provenance. However, this fact does not inform us about any existing process related to in-group favouritism.

Value connotations as a function of experimenter's provenance and group identification. Table 3 shows the means and standard deviations of the likability ratings made by the judges on the 48 traits listed in Table 2, as well as their grand mean and standard deviation by target category. These data were analysed by means of an ANOVA taking target category and experimenter's provenance as within-subject factors.

Table 3. Means and standard deviations of the traits which best differentiate the target categories as a function of experimenter's provenance

Insider	Mean	SD	Outsider	Mean	SD
Belgian students					
Unappreciative	2.64	1.60	Fashionable	4.86	1.03
Ambitious	5.57	1.02	Conservative	4.36	1.55
Easy-mannered	4.64	1.22	Goes to lectures	4.64	1.01
Anti-establishment	3.79	1.48	Conscientious	5.07	1.27
Closed-minded	2.36	1.15	School achiever	4.93	1.00
Discrete	4.79	1.53	Active	6.50	0.76
Happy	6.21	0.80	Different	5.07	1.44
Clean	5.43	1.22	Honest	6.29	0.99
Sectarian	2.29	1.20	Open-minded	6.43	0.76
Difficult person	4.07	1.21	Communicative	6.21	0.80
			Self-willed	6.00	0.04
Grand mean	4.18_c	0.47		5.49_a	0.73
North African students					
Athletic	5.86	0.77	Motivated	5.71	0.99
Welcoming	6.43	0.65	Persecuted	3.36	1.82
Wedded to Arab	4.50	1.74	Well-dressed	5.36	1.01
Badly spoken of	4.07	1.21	Approachable	5.86	1.23
Courageous	5.86	0.77	Distant	3.07	1.38
Integrated	5.71	0.83	Serious-minded	4.64	1.28
Male chauvinist	2.93	1.86	Depressed	3.07	1.44
Grant holder	4.36	1.50	Bad French	4.64	1.28
Stay in family	4.93	0.92	Elite	4.71	1.68
Generous	5.93	1.00	Lazy	3.21	1.53
Nationalist	4.93	1.54	Interesting	5.93	1.21
Irrespectful	1.93	1.49	Cheerful	6.36	1.01
Pessimistic	2.86	1.66	Sincere	6.36	1.01
			Resourceful	6.14	0.86
Grand mean	4.64_b	0.50		4.89_b	0.54

Notes. Grand means correspond to the average of trait likability scores by category; grand standard deviations correspond to the standard deviation of the means of traits by category.
Grand means with the same subscript are not different at a $P = 0.05$ level.

According to our hypothesis, the Belgian category should be significantly more positively evaluated in the outsider than in the insider condition, whereas no difference was expected for the North African category. This is exactly what our results show: no main effect emerged for target category ($F < 1$, d.f. = 1, 13, n.s., MSE = 0.11), but a strong main effect was found for experimenter's provenance ($F = 58.10$, d.f. = 1,13, $P < 0.001$, MSE = 0.15). The traits were more positive in the outside condition ($X = 5.19$) than in the insider condition ($\bar{X} = 4.41$); more importantly, the experimenter's provenance × target category interaction proved to be very significant ($F = 26.13$, d.f. = 1, 13, $P < 0.001$, MSE = 0.15). A Duncan's multiple range test ($P = 0.05$) indicated that the traits were more positive in the in-group/outsider condition than in all the others. Interestingly, the grand mean of the in-group/insider condition was also significantly lower than those of the other conditions.

Our results thus support the idea that varying experimenter's provenance induces stronger shifts in the positivity of in-group ratings compared with out-group ratings. The tendency to evaluate the in-group in more favourable terms (as assessed by the judges) only occurred when the experimenter was perceived as an outsider. For an insider, the typical traits assigned to the in-group were even more negative than those assigned to the out-group.

Experiment 2

Clearly, the results of Expt 1 showed that in-group biases can emerge only when the experimenter is perceived as an outsider relative to the subjects' real-life membership group. However, several criticisms appear quite relevant with regard to this experiment. One is that our dependent measure is only an indirect evaluation of our initial targets. One might thus expect a shift in the results if the stimuli were to be judged directly. A second possible criticism is that because Expt 1 dealt with a perceptual variable – trait attributions – no evidence was provided for the speculation that results in the minimal group paradigm, which are traditionally obtained by having subjects allocate money to each other, are influenced by the status assigned to the experimenter. As a case in point, although the definition of in-group favouritism encompasses both perceptual (e.g. trait attributions) and behavioural (e.g. money allocations) responses, it has been found that, under certain conditions, they do not correlate (Sachdev & Bourhis, 1984). Indeed, one could imagine that blaming one in-group member verbally does not necessarily entail a decrease in *de facto* protection of this person. Finally, criticisms have been made regarding the fact that in-group biases, as they have been measured in the minimal group paradigm, stand for nomothetic phenomena which might conceal potential individual differences in money allocation strategies (Branthwaite, Doyle & Lightbown, 1979). Although we did not use money allocations as a dependent variable in Expt 1, it is true that our handling of the data in that experiment strongly 'averaged' the subjects' original responses.

This second experiment was run in order to rule out the above potential problems. We now decided to tap group identification in a direct manner, by questioning the subjects on a series of normative and conative issues about several groups. The questions were inspired by attitude measures as proposed, for instance, by Ajzen & Fishbein (1980). Also, our main dependent measure was created after Tajfel *et al.*'s (1971) money allocation matrices.

This provided us with a measure that we could easily compare with those employed in most minimal group studies.

Again, our manipulated independent variable was experimenter's provenance, i.e. a student of the same vs. a different university as the subject. However, because several target groups were used in this experiment, it was now possible to examine more precisely the joint effect of strength of identification to a group and experimenter's provenance on the emergence of in-group bias. The prediction was that the impact of experimenter's provenance would be a positive function of strength of identification with a group. This corresponds (1) to a main effect of experimenter's provenance (insider vs. outsider), (2) to a main effect of type of comparison (in-group–out-group vs. out-group–out-group) and (3) to an interaction.

Method

Subjects. Subjects were 51 female Belgian students aged 18–26, enrolled at the Catholic University of Louvain. They were all approached in public libraries on campus by a female interviewer. One subject was discarded for failure to answer all questions.

Procedure. Subjects were asked whether they agreed to answer a questionnaire on student matters. This questionnaire was divided into two parts (booklets 1 and 2). Subjects were first given booklet 1. Once this booklet was completed, the interviewer handed out booklet 2 and asked the subject to tick a few additional items on the same topic. The between-subjects factor was introduced by means of a title page of booklet 2. For about half of the subjects, it depicted the logo of the Catholic University at Louvain-la-Neuve (insider). The rest of the subjects could clearly see that the booklet emanated from the Free University of Brussels (outsider).

Questionnaire. Booklet 1 contained 16 pages. The title page simply mentioned 'Survey among the students of Louvain-la-Neuve: Wishes of the student population'. The second page explained the purpose of the survey. Its goal, subjects read, was to highlight students' preferences regarding a series of projects which were supposed to get started in the following year:

> Because budget restrictions end in the autumn, the National Education Department will again finance a series of cultural projects. In this vein, the Belgian University Council has asked a number of experts to prepare the budget allocation plan for the autumn 1987–spring 1988 period. We students should let our preferences be known to the Council, so that the plan corresponds better to our true needs. Thus we would like to know your feelings about a series of projects which have already been submitted. They concern students nationwide and, more specifically, the students of this campus.

Subjects were then reminded that their participation was entirely voluntary and that the questionnaire was anonymous. The important point, they were told, was to understand well the goals of each group from which they were to get a short description. Finally, subjects were made aware that they would be given a second booklet upon completion of the first one.

On pages 3 and 4, subjects were asked to provide their global profile as students, in terms of their housing arrangements, leisure time, money income, etc. This was aimed at making up the cover story. Pages 5–8 presented the four projects, one on a page, by means of a 200-word description. The order of presentation of the projects was balanced across subjects and conditions. The projects were supposedly submitted by a gay lesbian group, a group of NATO supporters, a student group aiming at spreading the Louvain student traditions nationwide and a radical Muslim student group. In each description, the target group presented its rationale and the specific activities planned for the following year on the Louvain campus.

Pages 9–16 contained the identification measures. Questions were 11 Likert-type items: 'To what extent do you agree with the goals of this group?', 'How would you like to become a member of this group?' and 'Would you be ready to help building up this group?' were rated on scales ranging from 'definitely yes' (=7) to 'definitely no' (= 1); 'Would you agree to work for this group?' was to be answered on a scale ranging from 'I would' (=7) to 'I wouldn't' (=1); four questions were evaluated on a scale with endpoints labelled 'approve' (=7) and 'disapprove' (=1). These were: 'As far as the goals of this group are concerned, people who are important in your eyes would . . .', 'If you joined this group, your parents would . . .', 'If you joined this group, your professors would . . .', and 'If you joined this group, your friends would . . .'; 'How would you like to hold a position of responsibility in this group?' was to be rated on a scale ranging from 'very much so' (=7) to 'not at all' (=1); one item presented a six-point scale ranging from 'I fully approve' (=6) to 'I fully disapprove' (=1) and was framed 'Will you approve if this group gets financial support from the government?'; lastly, 'In your opinion, what is the proportion of students on this campus who will approve this group's goals?' was rated on a scale from 'less than 10 per cent (=1) to 'between 90 and 100 per cent' (=10), with each scale position showing the 10 per cent range to which it corresponded.

Upon returning booklet 1, the subject received booklet 2. The last three pages of this booklet contained a series of money allocation matrices. The first page explained at length how to answer the matrices. It was indicated that 'the government will choose only two projects out of the four', and that 'the available budget ranges from a low 700 000 Belgian francs to a high 2 500 000 Belgian francs for the two groups together'. Because there were four groups (A, B, C, D), 12 matrices were to be filled in (A/B, A/C, A/D, B/C, B/D, C/D, and their reverses). Subjects would then read: 'Here is an example. Imagine that you have to allocate money to groups A and B, and that you must choose among the following alternatives (in thousands of Belgian francs):

Group A	500	600	700	800	900	1000	1100
Group B	200	400	600	800	1000	1200	1400
	1	2	3	4	5	6	7

If you chose to give 500 000 to group A and 200 000 to group B, then you should circle the '1' in the row below the money amounts. If, on the other hand, you believed that the best way to allocate the money was by giving 900 000 to group A and 1 000 000 to group B, then you should circle '5' . . ., etc.'* To get our allocation scores, we recorded the amount of bias towards any group in any pair of projects, and summed the scores on the two scales concerning the same pair. Taking, for example, two projects A and B, the scales were A/B and B/A (top row/bottom row). Consider, for simplicity, that A stood for an in-group and B for an out-group; the scales were scored from +3 (maximum in-group discrimination) to −3 (altruism, maximum in-group profit, maximum joint profit) on the A/B scale, and from −3 (altruism) to +3 (maximum in-group discrimination, maximum in-group profit, maximum joint profit) on the B/A scale. Summing the two scales yields a score of +6 standing for maximum in-group discrimination, a score of 0, for 'fairness', and a score of −6, for maximum in-group profit, maximum joint profit, altruism. Because we were exclusively interested in the emergence of an in-group bias, we decided to simplify the matrices by confounding altruism, maximum in-group profit and maximum joint profit.

Once booklet 2 was returned, the subject was fully debriefed on the deceptions of the study.

Level of identification. The 11 identification scores obtained by means of booklet 1 were divided by the number of scale points available to each question. This allowed us to sum the 11 scales which concerned each project so as to get four raw identification scores by subject. As indexed by Cronbach's alpha, the internal consistency of the 11 items was 0.89, 0.92, 0.93 and 0.92, respectively for the gay, the NATO, the Louvain student tradition and the Muslim group.

Next, for each subject, we rank ordered the four raw identification scores from highest to lowest (e.g. I, II, III, IV), as a means of selecting the two pairs of groups corresponding, respectively, to the most liked and the most disliked (in-group–out-group) and to the two most disliked (out-group–out-group) ones. These pairs (corresponding to the matrices involving comparisons I/IV and III/IV) defined our second independent variable, type of comparison. Ties (n = 6) were discarded and 44 subjects remained for further analyses.

* In order to rule out a possible confounding effect on the money allocation matrices between choices maximizing joint profit and choices implying positive in-group discrimination (cf. Brewer, 1979; Turner, 1978), the matrix clearly presented the subject with these two alternatives. Varying the order of presentation of the groups (bottom row–top row) enabled us to check whether, for example, a Bf 1 100 000–1 400 000 choice corresponds to a maximum joint profit, maximum in-group profit or maximum altruism strategy (Bf 1 400 000–1 100 000 in the corresponding reverse matrix), or to a maximum in-group discrimination strategy (Bf 500 000–200 000 in the reverse matrix, assuming the 'in-group' to be presented in the top row).

Dependent measure. The money allocation scores of each pair were then used as the dependent variable of in-group bias.

Results and discussion

Differences between raw identification scores. To make sure that, prior to being informed about the interviewer's origin, subjects did not differ as to their preferences for the target groups, we performed a one-way MANOVA on their raw identification scores, by taking experimenter's provenance as the between-subjects factor. The MANOVA revealed no significant differences between the two groups of subjects ($F < 1$, d.f. = 4,39, n.s). As can be seen in Table 4, all univariate tests confirm the above result.

Table 4. Raw identification scores of the target groups as a function of experimenter's provenance

	Group			
Experimenter's provenance	Gay	NATO	Student	Muslim
Insider				
Mean[a]	34.48	58.10	70.67	45.52
SD	12.50	21.30	21.77	17.60
Outsider				
Mean[a]	37.74	59.00	70.30	43.91
SD	17.48	17.79	20.54	17.60
	$F < 1$	$F < 1$	$F < 1$	$F < 1$

Note. Forty-four subjects were included in the present analysis, 21 in the insider condition and 23 in the outsider condition; d.f. = 1, 42.
[a] The averaged sum of the 11 items is multiplied by 10. Higher scores mean greater identification.

Also, we performed two one-way ANOVAs on both the in-group–out-group and the out-group–out-group differences between raw identification scores. Again, experimenter's provenance (insider vs. outsider) had no impact on the magnitude of the raw identification scores ($F < 1$, d.f. = 1, 42, n.s.; $F = 1.28$, d.f. = 1, 42, n.s., respectively for in-group–out-group and out-group–out-group). These tests show unequivocally that the two groups of subjects were equivalent before the experimental manipulation.

In-group bias as a function of experimenter's provenance. Using the money allocation scores as the dependent variable, a 2 (insider vs. outsider) × 2 (in-group–out-group vs. out-group–out-group) repeated measures ANOVA was run in order to test our hypothesis. Results are in line with the prediction. Experimenter's provenance and type of comparison alike had a significant impact on money allocations ($F = 11.26$, d.f. = 1, 42, $P < 0.002$, MSE = 5.53; $F = 6.91$, d.f. = 1, 42, $P < 0.02$, MSE = 3.43, respectively). Not surprisingly, when the subjects identified significantly more with one group as compared to another – the in-group–out-group condition – they favoured their preferred group more ($\bar{X}$ I/IV = 1.80) than when identification with both groups was very low ($\bar{X}$ III/IV = 0.73). More importantly, when the experimenter was supposed to be from Brussels (outsider), subjects displayed more in-group bias ($\bar{X} = 2.07$) than when she was thought to be from Louvain ($\bar{X} = 0.38$). Lastly, the interaction of type of comparison and experimenter's provenance was marginally significant ($F = 2.77$, d.f. = 1, 42, $P = 0.10$, MSE = 3.43). The provenance of the experimenter had a greater impact on money allocations involving in-group–out-group comparisons than on comparisons between two outgroups (see bottom row of Table 5). A Duncan's multiple range test ($P = 0.05$) was performed in order to check for the relative magnitude of these means. As predicted, only the mean of the in-group–out-group/outsider condition was significantly different from the means of the other conditions.

The above results are in line with our hypothesis: subjects were more influenced by the provenance of the experimenter in discriminating between a group to which they identified strongly and a group to which they did not identify than in discriminating between two out-groups. However, it might be objected that these results do not parallel those obtained in Expt 1. According to this objection, to parallel Expt 1, Expt 2 should take experimenter's provenance so that an experimenter emanating from the rival university would stand as an outsider only to those subjects who identify with the Louvain

Table 5. Money allocations as a function of type of comparison, experimenter's provenance and most preferred group

1	Experimenter's provenance			
	Insider		Outsider	
Type of comparison: Most preferred group	In-group–out-group	Out-group–out-group	In-group–out-group	Out-group–out-group
Anyone				
Mean[a]	0.57	0.19	2.91	1.22
SD	2.16	0.75	2.79	2.13
n[b]	21	21	23	23
Only Louvain tradition				
Mean	0.31	0.19	3.37	1.25
SD	2.21	0.83	2.90	2.05
n	16	16	16	16
Other than Louvain tradition				
Mean	1.40	0.20	1.86	1.14
SD	1.95	0.45	2.41	2.48
n	5	5	7	7

[a] Scores range from −6 to +6, with higher scores standing for stronger in-group bias.
[b] Because type of comparison is a within-subject factor, subjects in the in-group–out-group and out-group–out-group conditions are the same.

tradition group above all the others. The same applies to the insider condition, of course. Therefore, one could expect an interaction between experimenter's provenance and type of comparison to emerge only for these subjects. For the other subjects, i.e. those whose most liked groups are 'non-Louvain' groups, the experimenter would appear as an outsider in any case. Such a mismatch between the insider–outsider and the in-group–out-group dimensions would strongly moderate or even disallow the psychological status of the former.

Experimenter's status as insider and outsider. In order to discover whether the above findings were due to the meaningfulness of the insider–outsider manipulation only to subjects who identified most with the Louvain tradition target, we conducted subgroup analyses on subjects whose most preferred group was any of the remaining three, as compared to the former group of subjects. To be in line with the possibility which was mentioned above, one would expect the gay–NATO–Muslim subjects to show only a significant main effect of type of comparison, with no significant experimenter's provenance or interaction effects. On the contrary, Louvain tradition subjects should provide us with strong main and interaction effects.

As shown in Table 5, the allocations made by subjects who preferred either the gay, the Muslim or the NATO group above any of the others revealed a non-significant effect of type of comparison ($F = 1.66$, d.f. = 1, 10, n.s.). However, this may be due to the fact that the sample size is too small ($n = 12$). Indeed, the eta coefficient (Rosenthal & Rosnow, 1984) relative to this effect reached a high value of 0.38, indicating that significance could easily be achieved with a somewhat larger sample. Experimenter's provenance, on the other hand, failed to approach significance, even in prospective terms ($F < 1$, d.f. = 1, 10, n.s.), and the same applies to the interaction between the two variables ($F < 1$, d.f. = 1, 10, n.s.). These results seem to support the idea that the insider–outsider dimension was, indeed, meaningless to these subjects.

The results obtained with the subjects who identified the most with the Louvain tradition group provided us with a quite different picture: this time, significant main effects emerged for experimenter's provenance, ($F = 12.16$, d.f. = 1, 30, $P < 0.002$, MSE = 5.60) and for type of comparison ($F = 5.80$, d.f. = 1, 30, $P < 0.03$, MSE = 3.49). Also, in clear support of our hypothesis, as well as of the above reasoning, the interaction was significant ($F = 4.58$, d.f. = 1, 30, $P < 0.05$, MSE = 5.60): in-group bias was stronger for the in-group–out-group comparisons in the outsider condition than in the insider condition, and out-group–out-group comparisons yielded more bias in the outsider than in the insider condition as well, but, in both cases, biases were stronger in the outsider than in the insider condition (see Table 5). Furthermore, the size of this interaction, as indexed by eta is stronger in the present analysis (eta = 0.36) than in the global analysis (eta = 0.25).

General discussion and conclusions

Taken together, our results support the idea that in-group bias, either in the form of trait ascriptions or in the form of resource allocations, is not context-free. Rather, it depends on the characteristics of the person to whom it is expressed (in this case, the experimenter with whom the subject develops the meaning of the intergroup situation).

In Expt 1, the subjects described their own group more positively than the out-group on traits sensitive to the intergroup comparison. But this occurred only when the experimenter was an outsider. Experiment 2 yielded a similar effect. In this case, subjects favoured (i.e. allocated more money to) a group with which they strongly identified more when the experimenter was an outsider than when she was an insider. When identification with the group was weak, no such experimenter effect was found. Furthermore, when the impact of the insider–outsider manipulation was examined only for those subjects to whom it appeared relevant (i.e. those who identified the most with the Louvain Tradition group), results were even more conclusive.

Our findings thus support the idea that, on engaging in intergroup discrimination, subjects presumably attempt to communicate to the experimenter that they consider their in-group as more deserving or more positive than the out-group. The social comparison situation may thus be viewed as a communication setting. However, any communication setting implies, at least to some extent, that the interactants believe that they share some mutual knowledge. The assertive component of a message is the reverse function of the strength or the extent of this belief (cf. Smith, 1982; Sperber & Wilson, 1986). Therefore, if the experimenter is perceived as someone who does not share the subject's conception of the dynamics involved in the judgemental setting (which appears to be the case in most instances of the minimal group paradigm as well as in our outsider condition), then overt favouritism towards the in-group is more likely to emerge. If, on the contrary, the experimenter is believed to share these conceptions (and, eventually, the concerns attached to it), then the subject is less likely to express a pre-existing set of relevant cognitions about the in-group's superiority.

It is worthwhile to note that the above idea is not dissimilar from Tajfel's (1982 *a*) claim that 'social categorization cannot be considered as a "static" variable which somehow leads people to behave in a constant and uniform manner . . . the functional relevance of social comparisons with other groups, *or even with the same group from one situation to another*, enters into a continuously changing dynamic relationship' (p. 239, italics added).

A recent derivation of this idea, is Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell's (1987) self-categorization theory, which states, among other things, that 'factors which tend to enhance the salience of shared in-group memberships will tend to increase the level of . . . intergroup competition' (p. 65). Because our standpoint is different from, though not necessarily opposed to, this one, some readers may find it interesting that they be compared with each other.

As a case in point, it might be argued that self-categorization theory provides an adequate and parsimonious alternative explanation for our results: the experimenter's status as an outsider may have increased the salience of the in-group, thus increasing in-group favouritism relative to the insider condition. This might explain, for instance, why the subjects rated North African students more positively than Belgian students in the insider condition of Expt 1: the lack of salience of their membership of the Belgian students category presumably led them to evaluate the targets according to some level of categorization other than the group. However, this explanation is not as compelling as it might seem. Specifically, it is hard to believe that the in-group–out-group dimension was not *salient* in this condition. Subjects were quite explicitly made aware of it: the trait assignment task was performed with group labels presented side-by-side and the instructions explicitly induced an in-group–out-group differentiation by stating that the

study's goal was to learn about the relations between 'us Belgian students' and 'North African students'. In addition, North African students were considered as a relevant out-group, not only in terms of inter-category differentiations, but also in terms of sociometric responses given by pilot subjects. Even though one admitted that the salience of the in-group–out-group dimension was weaker in the insider than in the outsider condition, one should also recognize that, even in the former condition, it should be strong enough for in-group favouritism (rather than, as was the case, *out-group* bias, i.e. out-group favouritism) to arise.

The same argument also applies to our second experiment. Here, the subjects were asked to allocate money by means of a matrix which could not be more explicit in inducing intergroup differentiations. Moreover, the subjects were faced with these differentiations *prior* to the manipulation of experimenter's provenance. These two facts seem to rule out a tentative explanation of our results in terms of differential degrees of category salience, and they bring to light two further differences between our standpoint and Turner *et al.*'s (1987).

One difference is that, whereas for Turner *et al.* (1987) our data would mean *absence* of in-group favouritism in the insider condition due to a lack of cognitive salience of the in-group–out-group dimension, our suggestion is that in-group favouritism simply did not overtly emerge in this condition, but that its existence was necessarily entailed by the context of judgement: overt or covert, in-group favouritism was the only way for subjects to view themselves under a positive light, because the experimental setting did not provide them with any other alternative to self-superiority.

The second difference is that, whereas self-categorization theory would suggest that our findings are due to the perceptual–cognitive opportunities provided for our subjects in each condition – namely, clues to an intergroup dimension – we propose that they are due to the goals induced in our subjects by the manipulation of experimenter's provenance. These goals were social coordination of beliefs about in-group superiority with a potential source of social validation in the outsider condition. Whereas the standpoint of self-categorization theory has more of a cognitive flavour, stating that subjects cognitively construct the situation, ours has more of a social constructionist one, stating that subjects actually construct situations. To change slightly Tajfel's (1982*a*) argument, previously quoted, we may say that the functionality of social categorization lies in the relevance of overt responses subsequent to it, and that this is due to the particular context in which intergroup comparisons occur. The importance of social validation of beliefs about in-group superiority thus comes as no surprise when the process components, both cognitive and social, of the minimal group situation are taken into account.

Acknowledgements

This paper was partially supported by Junta Nacional de Investigação Científica e Tecnológica, Portugal, Proc. 435.40.50/988.2.75 to the first author.

References

Ajzen, I. & Fishbein, M. (1980). *Understanding Attitudes and Predicting Social Behavior*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Benzécri, J. P. (1973). *L'Analyse des Données: L'Analyse des Correspondances*. Paris: Dunod.

Berger, P. & Luckman, T. (1966). *The Social Construction of Reality*. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.

Billig, M. (1973). Normative communication in a minimal group situation. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 3, 339–344.

Billig, M. (1976). *Social Psychology and Intergroup Relations*. London: Academic Press.

Billig, M. & Tajfel, H. (1973). Social categorization and similarity in intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 3, 27–52.

Branthwaite, A., Doyle, S. & Lightbown, R. (1979). The balance between fairness and discrimination. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 9, 149–163.

Brewer, M. B. (1979). Ingroup bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive–motivational analysis. *Psychological Bulletin*, 86, 307–324.

Brewer, M. B. & Kramer, R. (1985). The psychology of intergroup attitudes. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 36, 219–243.

Cibois, Ph. (1987). *L'Analyse Factorielle*. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.

Doise, W. & Mugny, G. (1981). *Le Développement Social de l'Intelligence*. Paris: InterEditions.

Festinger, L. (1950). Informal social communication. *Psychological Review*, 57, 271–282.

Festinger, L. (1954). A theory of social comparison processes. *Human Relations*, 7, 117–140.

Gergen, K. (1982). *Toward Transformation in Social Knowledge*. New York: Springer-Verlag.

Greenacre, M. J. (1984). *Theory and Applications in Correspondence Analysis*. New York: Academic Press.

Harré, R. (1982). *On Social Being*. Totowa, NJ: Littlefield, Adams.

Lebart, L., Morineau, A. & Tabard, N. (1977). *Techniques de la Description Statistique*. Paris: Dunod.

Mead, G. H. (1934). *Mind, Self and Society from the Standpoint of a Social Behaviorist*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Moscovici, S. (1972). Society and theory in social psychology: A critical assessment. In J. Israel & H. Tajfel (Eds), *The Context of Social Psychology: A Critical Assessment*. London: Academic Press.

Nishisato, S. (1980). *Analysis of Categorical Data: Dual Scaling and its Applications*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.

Oakes, P. J. & Turner, J. C. (1980). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour: Does minimal intergroup discrimination make social identity more positive? *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 10, 295–301.

Rijsman, J. (1983). The dynamics of social comparison in personal and categorical comparison situations. In W. Doise & S. Moscovici (Eds), *Current Issues in European Social Psychology*, vol. 1. Cambridge/Paris: Cambridge University Press/Maison des Sciences de l'Homme.

Rijsman, J. (1987). Echange symbolique. In A.-N. Perret-Clermont (Ed.), *Interagir et Connaître* (in press).

Rosenthal, R. & Rosnow, R. L. (1984). *Essentials of Behavioral Research: Methods and Data Analysis*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

Sachdev, I. & Bourhis, R. (1984). Minimal majorities and minorities. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 14, 35–52.

Smith, N. (1982). *Mutual Knowledge*. London: Academic Press.

Sousa, E. S. & Leyens, J.-Ph. (1987). *A priori* vs. spontaneous models of causal attributions: The case of gender and achievement. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 26, 281–292.

Sperber, D. & Wilson, D. (1986). *Relevance: Communication and Cognition*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Tajfel, H. (1978). *Differentiation between Social Groups*. London: Academic Press.

Tajfel, H. (1982*a*). Experimental studies of intergroup behaviour. In J. P. Codol & J.-Ph. Leyens (Eds), *Cognitive Analysis of Social Behaviour*. The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff.

Tajfel, H. (1982*b*). Social psychology of intergroup relations. *Annual Review of Psychology*, 33, 1–30.

Tajfel, H., Billig, M., Bundy, R. & Flament, C.. (1971). Social categorization and intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 1, 149–178.

Tenenhaus, M. & Young, F. W. (1985). An analysis and synthesis of multiple correspondence analysis, optimal scaling, dual scaling, homogeneity analysis and other methods for quantifying categorical multivariate data. *Psychometrika*, 50, 91–119.

Turner, J. C. (1975). Social comparison and social identity: Some prospects for intergroup behaviour. *European Journal of Social Psychology*, 5, 5–34.

Turner, J. C. (1978). Social comparison, similarity and in-group favouritism. In H. Tajfel (Ed.), *Differentiation between Social Groups*. London: Academic Press.

Turner, J. C. (1981). The experimental social psychology of intergroup behaviour. In J. C. Turner & H. Giles (Eds), *Intergroup Behaviour*. Oxford: Blackwell.

Turner, J. C., Hogg, M., Oakes, P. J., Reicher, S. D. & Wetherell, M. S. (1987). *Rediscovering the Social Group: A Self-categorization Theory*. Oxford: Blackwell.
Turner, J. C., Sachdev, I. & Hogg, M. A. (1983). Social categorization, interpersonal attraction and group formation. *British Journal of Social Psychology*, 22, 227–239.
Vygotsky, L. S. (1962). *Thought and Language*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Received 20 October 1987; revised version received 20 April 1988

British Journal of Social Psychology (1988), 27, 319–332 *Printed in Great Britain*

Intergroup differentiation in a political context

Caroline Kelly *

Department of Psychology, North East London Polytechnic

A study is reported in which the relationships between in-group identification and intergroup differentiation and between intergroup differentiation and self-esteem were tested in the context of political affiliation. The prediction derived from social identity theory – that there should be a positive relationship between the strength of an individual's identification with a political party and the extent to which he or she differentiates between the in-group and various political out-groups – was compared with predictions derived from realistic conflict theory and the contact hypothesis. Intergroup differentiation was measured along dimensions of evaluation, affect and perceived intragroup homogeneity. The relationships between these ratings of intergroup differentiation and the individual's self-esteem were then tested. The study was based on a survey of 199 respondents supporting five political parties in Britian. Findings showed that in-group identification and perceived material conflict were consistent predictors of intergroup differentiation along evaluative and affective dimensions but not along the dimension of perceived intragroup homogeneity. The relationship between intergroup differentiation and self-esteem proved inconsistent suggesting that some modification may be required of the central role attributed to self-esteem in social identity theory.

The development of social identity theory (SIT) has led in recent years to renewed interest in the area of intergroup relations (e.g. Brown, 1984*a*; Tajfel, 1982, 1984). Despite detailed investigations of many of the theoretical principles derived from SIT, there have been relatively few attempts to provide empirical support for the fundamental tenets of the theory, namely the hypothesized relationships between in-group identification and intergroup differentiation and between intergroup differentiation and self-esteem. The aim of this paper is to describe the findings from a study which sought to test these relationships in the context of political affiliation.

According to SIT, there should be a positive relationship between an individual's level of identification with a social group and the level of intergroup differentation displayed. The hypothesized mechanism underlying this relationship is briefly as follows: an individual's membership of various social groups makes an important contribution to his or her self-concept by providing a source of social identity. An important feature of the notion of 'membership' is that it implies exclusivity, i.e. being a member distinguishes those who are inside the group from those who are outside the group – and in alternative groups. Since it is assumed that individuals seek a positive self-concept, it is argued that group members are engaged in a search for 'positive in-group distinctiveness'; in other words, they seek to differentiate the in-group from alternative groups along those

* Requests for reprints should be addressed to Caroline Kelly, Department of Psychology, Birkbeck College, Malet Street, London WC1E, UK.