When votes depend on who’s listening: Voters’ intragroup status and voting procedure predict representative endorsement in intergroup contexts

Catia P. Teixeira¹,²*, Stephanie Demoulin¹ and Vincent Yzerbyt¹
¹Catholic University of Louvain, Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium
²Scientific Research Fund, Belgium

Three experiments investigated whether the selection of a representative in intergroup interdependence settings can reflect group members’ strategic behaviour. We tested the impact of an individual’s intragroup status (normative vs. pro-out-group deviant, Experiments 1–3) and of voting procedure (Experiments 2 and 3) on the choice of an in-group representative. Experiment 1 shows that normative members prefer normative representatives, whereas pro-out-group deviant members equally like normative and pro-out-group deviant representatives. Experiment 2 extends these results and shows that voting procedure (private vs. in-group audience) moderates this effect. Pro-out-group deviant members’ preferences and behaviours appear more strategic and context-sensitive than normative ones. Specifically, pro-out-group deviants vote more for normative representatives than for pro-out-group deviants when facing an in-group audience, whereas the reverse pattern emerges in private. Experiment 3 shows that this moderation effect is specific to in-group audiences compared to out-group ones, reinforcing the idea that normative members ‘stick to their guns’. Implications of these findings for leader endorsement and intergroup relations are discussed.

Although intergroup encounters are inevitable and groups often rely on single members to defend their interests in intergroup interdependence contexts, research addressing the determinants of representatives’ selection in intergroup contexts is almost entirely absent (Hogg, 2001). Exceptions are work conducted on representative endorsement in political contexts (Morton, Postmes, & Jetten, 2007) and on the impact of goals in representative selection for intergroup negotiations (Teixeira, Demoulin, & Yzerbyt, 2011, 2013). The present research adds to this literature by analysing the extent to which voters’ own intragroup status, that is voters’ normative versus deviant position within the group, and the context in which the vote takes place, for example public versus private nature of the vote, interact to influence people’s choice for normative or deviant representatives.

Addressing this question not only helps to increase our understanding of the interplay between intra- and intergroup processes (Dovidio, 2013), but it also sheds light on the role that the choice between a raising-hand or a ballot box voting procedure can have in the final results of representative elections for countries’ governments, political parties, unions, or companies, among others.

*Correspondence should be addressed to Catia P. Teixeira, Place Cardinal Mercier, 10, 1340 Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium (email: catia.teixeira@uclouvain.be).

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The (relative) advantage of being normative

According to social identity and self-categorization theories (Tajfel & Turner, 1986; Turner, 1987), one of the sources of positive evaluations of group members is their degree of typicality, that is the extent to which group members match the representation of the group. The more an in-group member minimizes intragroup differences while maximizing intergroup ones, the closer this member is to the in-group’s prototype (Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, & Turner, 1995) and the more positive her/his evaluation (Hogg, 2001). One usually distinguishes normative or typical group members from deviant or atypical ones. In intergroup contexts, atypical or deviant group members can be of two kinds. They can deviate from the group either in the direction of the out-group or in the opposite direction (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Dougill, 2002; Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000). Whereas the former are labelled pro-out-group deviants, the latter are known as pro-in-group deviants (Teixeira et al., 2011).

Because of their key role in intergroup differentiation, normative or typical in-group members are viewed in a positive light (Hogg & Hardie, 1991), are influential (van Knippenberg, Lossie, & Wilke, 1994), and are seen as having high levels of charisma (Platow, van Knippenberg, Haslam, van Knippenberg, & Spears, 2006). In contrast, deviant in-group members are usually evaluated negatively (Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988), especially when they deviate from the norm in the direction of the out-group (Abrams et al., 2002). As a matter of fact, pro-out-group deviant members endanger the in-group’s positive image to a greater extent than pro-in-group ones.

Importantly for the present research, besides bringing positive evaluations, a normative intragroup status also puts group members in a good position to claim or to be handed group leadership (Hogg, 2001). In other words, normative or typical members (who are by definition more identity-reinforcing) are systematically preferred as leaders over deviant or atypical ones (who potentially put the group’s identity into question, for a review see Hogg, 2001; van Knippenberg, 2011). Furthermore, once endorsed as a leader, the member’s level of prototypicality acts as a protective factor against her or his failure (Giessner & van Knippenberg, 2008) and against negative evaluations possibly triggered by out-group-favouring behaviour (Platow & van Knippenberg, 2001).

Still, there are situations in which normative members may face competition from deviant in-group members regarding the role of representative. Supporting this idea, work on leadership using the subjective group dynamics framework suggests that deviants presented as future leaders can be given innovation credit (at least) to the same extent as normative ones (Abrams, Randsley de Moura, Marques, & Hutchison, 2008). Moreover, in instrumental contexts such as political elections (Morton et al., 2007) and intergroup negotiations about interests (Teixeira et al., 2011, 2013), group members actually state to prefer pro-out-group deviant representatives over normative ones. This is supposedly due to perceptions of increased chances of success for the in-group (Morton et al., 2007).

Although leaders’ or representatives’ endorsement has been widely studied, this research remains largely focused on leaders’ evaluation from an intragroup perspective. When taken into account, the intergroup context is highly implicit, focusing on the leader’s ability to maximize intergroup differentiation (for exceptions see Teixeira et al.,

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1 Previous research employs the terms pro-out-group/pro-in-group deviants (Teixeira et al., 2011) atypical (Hutchison, Jetten, & Gutierrez, 2011), peripheral (Jetten, Branscombe, & Spears, 2002), or anti-norm/pro-norm (Abrams et al., 2000) individuals. Deviance in the present paper was operationalized by means of people’s general profile rather than specific pro-norm or anti-norm behaviours. The terms pro-in-group and pro-out-group deviance were thus particularly appropriate in the context of the present studies.
2011, 2013). It seems obvious, however, that a leader often acts as a group’s spoken person in intergroup contexts given that ‘groups often interact and communicate with one another’ (Hogg, 2001, p. 193).

The present research aims to contribute to fill this research gap by analysing leader endorsement in intergroup interdependence contexts. Importantly, we explore these behaviours in identity-related intergroup settings. These are contexts in which the issues at stake are crucial for the distinctiveness and positivity of the identity of the groups involved (Teixeira et al., 2011; see also, Ledgerwood, Liviatan, & Carnevale, 2007). In such contexts, it is plausible to assume that the dominant norm is to select normative representatives because these members are perceived as being better at securing positive distinctiveness for the in-group than deviant members (who, on the contrary, endanger it, Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada, 1998). As it turns out, previous findings do not lend support to this hypothesis. Rather, research on identity-based intergroup settings shows that group members tend to display equal preferences for normative and deviant representatives (Teixeira et al., 2011).

In our opinion, one possible explanation for this lack of differentiation found in intergroup contexts resides in the fact that previous studies (on the contrary to research on leadership endorsement) may have failed to take intragroup dynamics into account (Dovidio, 2013). In particular, we would like to suggest that the intragroup status of the voters explains the absence of differences in the choice of a representative: Divergent preferences expressed by normative and deviant voters may have led to an overall apparent indifference for the person who should represent the group in identity contexts. By directly manipulating individuals’ intragroup status, the present experiments should allow us to have a clearer sense of the determinants of group members’ preferences.

The experience of being deviant
A pro-out-group peripheral or deviant position is linked to identity insecurity and low personal and collective self-esteem (Jetten et al., 2002). Because of the usually strong negative evaluations that they receive, pro-out-group deviant group members aspire to improve their intragroup status and seem to be less affectively linked to their group. For example, these members display group loyalty only if they expect their in-group status to change in the future (Jetten, Branscombe, Spears, & McKimmie, 2003) and they do not react to distinctiveness threats by increasing in-group bias as much as their normative counterparts do (Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1997). In intergroup negotiations, when made accountable to an attractive in-group, pro-out-group deviant representatives exhibit more competitive behaviours towards the opposing party than normative members (Van Kleef, Steinel, van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007). This presumably happens because out-group hostility is perceived to be a sign of in-group loyalty and is considered to be the group’s norm in intergroup negotiations (Benton & Druckman, 1974). When cooperation (rather than competition) is clearly stated as the group’s norm, pro-out-group deviants shift to cooperative behaviours, but only if they have a high need to belong (Steinel et al., 2010).

In sum, deviant in-group members embody the group characteristics less than normative ones and react less in line with their group membership. Also, pro-out-group deviant members are less motivated to defend the in-group on purely ‘altruistic’ grounds (Jetten, 2006). As a consequence, deviant members strategically adapt their behaviour to contextual constraints.
Applying these findings to leader endorsement in identity-based intergroup contexts, we predict that whereas normative members should endorse normative representatives, pro-out-group deviants should support pro-out-group deviant leaders. As a matter of fact, one may assume that voting for a pro-out-group deviant representative represents a chance for pro-out-group deviants to voice their opinion and to promote their views about the group. In line with work on self-anchoring (Otten & Epstude, 2006), normative and pro-out-group deviant in-groupers should have different ideas about what the group should be (come). As a consequence, they should support different representatives. In short, normative in-group members should endorse normative representatives, whereas pro-out-group deviants should support pro-out-group deviant ones (Hypothesis 1). We tested this hypothesis in a first experiment.

EXPERIMENT 1

Method

Participants and design
Forty-eight students (29 female participants; \( M_{\text{age}} = 19.85, SD = 1.44 \)) at a large European university took part in the experiment and were randomly assigned to one of two experimental conditions. The design consisted in a 2 (participant’s intragroup status: Normative vs. pro-out-group deviant) by 2 (potential in-group representative: Normative vs. pro-out-group deviant) mixed design with the latter factor varying within participants.

Procedure
This experiment (as well as Experiments 2 and 3) involved minimal settings (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). This methodological option was taken in order to tap basic processes related to group membership without risking the interference of other intergroup variables (e.g., groups’ respective status).

Participants came to the laboratory in groups of 6–8, and each participant was randomly allocated to one of two experimental conditions. Upon their arrival, participants were asked to judge a series of paintings and, allegedly based on their preferences, received a bogus personality feedback placing them in the ‘Purple’ category rather than in the ‘Green’ one. We explained that the preference for certain chromatic waves was linked to neurological characteristics and that people could be divided into two large categories as a function of their preferences. They were then informed that the computer had computed not only their neurological category but also their score within their group.

Building on the procedure by Van Kleef et al. (2007), our manipulation of participants’ intragroup status consisted in presenting participants with a continuum between in-group and out-group in which their position relative to the out-group varied. Normative participants were placed in the middle of the in-group part of the continuum, whereas pro-out-group deviant participants fell in the third of the continuum closer to the out-group. Furthermore, participants read in the normative condition:

You are typically Purple. Not only do you have more in common with other members of the Purple group than with members of the Green group but you have the typical characteristics of your group,

and in the pro-out-group deviant condition:
You are slightly Purple. Even if you have more in common with members of the Purple group than with members of the Green group, you are not very characteristic of the Purple group. However, given that you are slightly Purple it is still better to categorize you in the Purple group.

Following the feedback about intragroup status, participants were informed that a negotiation involving the Purple and the Green groups would soon take place. The experiment was presented as a project conducted in cooperation with the National Film Academy whose goal was to create new cartoon characters for a movie. Participants read the following:

Because people’s preferences vary, debates among representatives of both groups will be conducted in order to better understand each group’s preferences. Specifically, we will organise negotiations between representatives of the two groups. They will have to elaborate a proposal for the National Film Academy on the type of cartoon characters to be kept for refinement by the animation staff. Representatives will have to make sure that their group’s preferences are taken into account.

Clearly, given that the group membership manipulation was based on preferences for colours and shapes, the negotiation issue was intrinsically related to the expression of the each group’s identity. Participants then received the profile of two potential representatives for their group: A normative member and a pro-out-group deviant one. Descriptions of the two targets were the same as the ones used in the intragroup status feedback reported above, and their order of presentation was counterbalanced between participants. Participants were informed that the representative was to be chosen among participants who had already taken part in a previous phase of the study and that consequently they themselves could not be elected.

They were asked to express their preferences for each representative on a two-item scale (do you think this person would make a good ingroup representative; do you think this person would defend your group as s/he should?; 1 = not at all; 9 = very much; $r_{\text{normative}} = .58$, $r_{\text{pro-out-group deviant}} = .76$, both $p < .001$). Given the ‘ballot order effect’ (e.g., Koppell & Steen, 2004), the order in which participants answered these questions was also counterbalanced. We also found important to measure perceptions of intergroup competition in the negotiation in order to exclude this variable as a possible explanation for our results. Indeed, it could be argued that normative participants perceive more intergroup competition than pro-out-group deviant ones and, as a consequence, prefer representatives who are further away from the out-group, reflecting a polarization tendency. As a means to compute an index of intergroup competition, we asked participants to indicate the extent to which they thought that the intergroup negotiation would be competitive, hostile, friendly, cooperative, honest, open, and respectful on a scale from 1 to 9 (last five items reverse-coded, $\alpha = .85$). Finally, participants completed manipulation checks, were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Results

All participants correctly identified their group as well as their intragroup status.

Perceptions of intergroup competition were neither affected by our manipulation nor did it affect preferences for representatives or change our results when entered as a
covariate in our main analyses. We therefore present results without taking this variable into account.

Measures concerning the preference for each target (normative and pro-out-group deviant) were submitted to a mixed-model ANOVA with participants’ intragroup status as a between-subject factor. Results showed a significant main effect of potential representative, $F(1, 46) = 15.84, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .26$, that was qualified by the predicted interaction between participants’ status and potential representative, $F(1, 46) = 7.08, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .13$ (see Figure 1). Whereas participants in the normative status condition reported preferring the normative target ($M = 7.56, SD = 1.28$) over the pro-out-group deviant one ($M = 4.83, SD = 1.40$), $F(1, 47) = 22.11, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .32$, no such effect emerged for participants in the pro-out-group deviant status condition ($F < 1, M_{\text{normative}} = 6.17, SD = 2.23, M_{\text{pro-out-group deviant}} = 5.63, SD = 2.03$). Participants also preferred the normative target more when they were themselves attributed a normative status than when they thought of themselves as pro-out-group deviant members, $F(1, 47) = 7.08, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .13$, whereas no such difference was found regarding preferences for the pro-out-group deviant target $F(1, 47) = 2.47, p > .10$.

**Discussion**

As predicted, ‘normative’ participants preferred normative over pro-out-group representatives. In contrast, ‘pro-out-group deviant’ participants did not prefer one type of representative over the other.

Our hypotheses were supported concerning normative voters. However, they were only partially supported for pro-out-group deviant ones given that these members failed to express a clear preference for pro-out-group deviant representatives. Two methodological limitations may account for this lack of difference. On the one hand, the scenario did not make explicit the private nature of one’s vote. In the presence of some uncertainty about the privacy of their responses, pro-out-group deviant members may have decided to ‘play it safe’ and to conceal their preference for the pro-out-group deviant target. On the other hand, the assessment of preferences with continuous measures makes it possible for pro-out-group deviant voters to answer in line with both their genuine preferences and group norms by providing similar evaluations of both targets. We address these limitations...
in Experiment 2. To this end, we manipulated the voting procedure (private vs. public) and relied on a categorical behavioural measure.

**EXPERIMENT 2**

In line with the argument developed in the introduction concerning higher instability of deviant members’ behaviours compared to normative ones, research has shown that the former are more sensitive than the latter to the public versus private nature of their behavioural displays. For instance, the display of out-group negativity is dependent on the private versus public context in which negativity is assessed. Deviants show more out-group negativity when they believe that their answers will be visible to other in-group members (Noel, Wann, & Branscombe, 1995). Furthermore, self-presentation of deviants also depends on the in-group versus out-group status of the audience. For instance, deviant members describe themselves as more conformist than normative members but only when addressing in-group audiences and only when they believe their responses will be public (Jetten, Hornsey, & Adarves-Yorno, 2006).

We argued that when deviant members have to select a group representative, they should show a preference for a member with the same deviant status as their own. The research reported above suggests that this should be the case only when deviants’ vote is private. This is because voting for a deviant leader is a counter-normative, potentially punishable behaviour. Our prediction is in line with the strategic component of the SIDE model that posits that visibility and identifiability of individuals’ behaviour decreases the likelihood of counter-normative behavioural displays because people try to get rewards or at least avoid punishments from their audiences (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). Following this reasoning, when representative preferences or votes remain private, deviant group members should support deviant representatives, whereas when they are public to other in-groupers, these members should shift their preferences and state their support for normative representatives.

The available literature suggests that this shifting effect is less likely to occur among normative members. Normative members can count on a secure position within the group and are less vulnerable to situational constraints (Hollander, 1958; Jetten et al., 2006). Therefore, normative group members should prefer normative representatives independently of whether their behaviour is to be kept private or to be revealed to in-group audiences. In sum, we predicted an interaction between intragroup status of participants (normative vs. pro-out-group deviant) and voting context (private or public) on representative endorsement (Hypothesis 2). We also improved the dependent measure by including an actual voting procedure. For exploratory purposes, we added a pro-in-group deviant member as a potential representative for the in-group.

**Method**

**Participants and design**

One hundred and forty psychology students (117 female, \( M_{\text{age}} = 19.43, SD = 1.45 \)) at a large European university took part in our experiment in exchange for course credit. Our design consisted of a 2 (intragroup status of participant: Normative vs. pro-out-group deviant) by 2 (vote procedure: Public vs. private) by 3 (intragroup status of potential representative: Pro-in-group deviant vs. normative vs. pro-out-group deviant) mixed
design. The first two factors were manipulated between participants, and the latter was manipulated within participants.

Procedure
The general procedure was similar to the one used in Experiment 1. We turned to more technical and scientific group labels in order to further enhance the credibility of the cover story. Participants' in-group was called the Magno-cellular group and the out-group the Parvo-cellular one. We also added a third potential representative designed to be a pro-in-group deviant. This target was presented as more extreme than the normative one, that is in the third of the continuum further away from the out-group and was described as someone possessing all ingroup characteristics and therefore very far away from the outgroup (in contrast to the normative member who was described as having all the typical in-group features). After being assigned to a group and having received bogus feedback about intragroup status, participants learned about the upcoming intergroup negotiation and the need to select a representative among the three targets. They were then informed about the voting procedure.

In the private condition, participants were told that their vote was completely anonymous, that it was not to be revealed to any of the potential representatives nor to other in-group members, and that it should be placed in a ballot box designed for this purpose. In the public condition, we informed participants that, after the vote, we would gather all the members of their group in a big room (some of them taking part in the experiment in other labs of the faculty building). Each participant was then going to be asked to read out their vote to the other members of the group. It is worth mentioning that it was made clear to participants that they would simply have to read out their vote. This is important in order to dismiss alternative explanations related to the fear of having to justify their choice.

After expressing their preference for each of the targets using the same two items as in Experiment 1 ($r_{pro-in-group\ deviant} = .60$, $r_{normative} = .47$, $r_{pro-out-group\ deviant} = .65$, all $p < .001$), participants were asked to fill in a ballot. This ballot consisted in completing the blank space in the sentence: ‘I wish to see representative number _____ representing my group at the negotiation table’. From the point of view of our hypothesis, participants were thus confronted with an ordinal scale ranging from the pro-out-group to the pro-in-group deviant, with the normative target falling in between. After expressing their vote, and answering to the same scale on perceptions of intergroup competition as in Experiment 1, they were debriefed, thanked, and dismissed.

Results
Four participants incorrectly identified their intragroup status. Given that the large majority of participants were able to successfully reproduce the exact label of both their group and their intragroup status and that results remained unchanged with the inclusion or exclusion of these participants, we decided to keep all participants in our sample. Again, we found no effects of any of our independent variables on intergroup competition perceptions. Furthermore, the inclusion of this variable in our analyses as a covariate (for both continuous and ordinal measures) did not change the pattern of results.
Preferences for potential representatives

We submitted participants’ preferences for each target to a mixed-model ANOVA with intragroup status and voting procedure varying between participants and potential representative varying within them. As in Experiment 1, results revealed the presence of a main effect of potential representative, $F(2, 130) = 36.26, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .22$, and a potential representative by intragroup status interaction, $F(2, 130) = 9.99, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .07$. Importantly, these effects were qualified by the predicted three-way interaction, $F(2, 130) = 3.24, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .02$, see Table 1.

Among normative participants, only the main effect of potential representative reached significance, $F(2, 133) = 35.88, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .25$. Irrespective of the procedure, normative participants showed a strong preference for the normative representative ($M = 6.02, SD = .80$) relative to the pro-out-group ($M = 4.17, SD = 1.36$), $F(1, 133) = 79.12, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .37$, and pro-in-group deviant ones ($M = 4.83, SD = 1.57$), $F(1, 133) = 35.40, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .21$. Moreover, normative participants also preferred pro-in-group over pro-out-group deviant targets, $F(1, 133) = 6.93, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .05$.

In contrast, pro-out-group deviant participants’ preferences were affected by the voting procedure, $F(2, 130) = 3.66, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .02$. In the public condition, pro-out-group deviant participants preferred the normative target ($M = 5.68, SD = 0.76$) over the pro-out-group ($M = 4.66, SD = 1.34$), $F(1, 66) = 13.36, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .17$, and the pro-in-group deviant ones ($M = 4.93, SD = 1.46$), $F(1, 66) = 8.65, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .12$. No differences were found between the latter two targets ($F < 1$). In other words, they reported the same preference pattern as their normative counterparts.

Pro-out-group participants’ preferences were radically different in the private condition. Specifically, replicating the findings of Experiment 1, pro-out-group deviant participants reported similar preferences for the normative ($M = 5.11, SD = 1.06$) and the pro-out-group deviant targets ($M = 5.03, SD = 1.25$), $F < 1$. In addition, these targets were preferred to the pro-in-group deviant member ($M = 4.15, SD = 1.64$), $F_{\text{normative}}(1, 66) = 14.71, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .18$, and $F_{\text{pro-out-group deviant}}(1, 66) = 7.21, p < .01, \eta^2_p = .10$.

Looking at the data differently, among deviant participants, preferences concerning the pro-in-group deviant representative were stronger in the public than in the private voting context, $F(1, 133) = 4.01, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .03$. A similar pattern emerged for normative potential representatives, $F(1, 133) = 6.30, p < .05, \eta^2_p = .05$. Concerning the pro-out-group deviant target, no differences were found between the two voting conditions, $F(1, 133) = 1.15, p > .10$.

Table 1. Means (and standard deviations) of preferences for potential representatives as a function of intragroup status of participants and voting context

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Potential representative</th>
<th>Normative voters</th>
<th>Pro-out-group deviant voters</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Private vote</td>
<td>Public vote</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-in-group deviant</td>
<td>4.93 (1.71)</td>
<td>4.73 (1.49)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Normative</td>
<td>6.10 (0.84)</td>
<td>5.94 (0.76)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pro-out-group deviant</td>
<td>4.11 (1.50)</td>
<td>4.22 (1.22)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

2 Three outliers were excluded from the analyses because they presented studentized residuals higher than 3 SD.
Voting behaviour

Participants’ votes on our ordinal scale were analysed by means of the SAS PROC CATMOD procedure using intragroup status of participant, voting procedure, and the interaction between these two variables as predictors. Results revealed the presence of main effects of intragroup status, \( \chi^2(N = 135) = 15.44, p < .001 \), and voting procedure, \( \chi^2(N = 135) = 4.14, p < .05 \), and, more importantly, the predicted interaction between the two independent variables, \( \chi^2(N = 135) = 4.07, p < .05 \) (see Figure 2). As was the case for preferences, follow-up analyses confirmed that the voting procedure affected pro-out-group deviant participants, \( \chi^2_{pro-out\text{-}group\ deviant}(N = 67) = 8.45, p < .002 \), but not normative ones, \( \chi^2_{normative}(N = 68) < 1, p > .99 \). Specifically, whereas pro-out-group deviant participants in the private condition were more likely to vote for pro-out-group deviant targets (23 votes) than for normative (10 votes) or pro-in-group deviants (one vote), the reverse pattern emerged for participants in the public condition (pro-out-group deviant = 10 votes; normative = 21 votes; pro-in-group deviant = two votes). In contrast, normative participants voted massively for normative targets whether the voting procedure was private or public (23 and 25, respectively).

Discussion

The present findings replicate and extend those of Experiment 1. Once again, normative members preferred normative representatives. This preference was not affected by the voting procedure. In sharp contrast, pro-out-group deviant members were strongly affected by the context in which the voting took place. Although they privately stated liking the pro-out-group deviant and the normative targets equally, they publicly manifested stronger preferences for the normative target over the pro-out-group one. Importantly, this apparent indifference in private settings towards normative and pro-out-group deviant representatives was only obtained on the continuous measure. When a behavioural measure forced participants to make a choice, pro-out-group deviant members voted more often for the pro-out-group deviant representative in private settings but did the opposite when this choice was to be made public to other in-group members.
EXPERIMENT 3

According to our hypothesis, the reversal of pro-out-group members’ vote in public settings is a way to try increasing (or at least not decreasing) their intragroup status. If this hypothesis is correct, then vote reversal should only occur in public settings involving in-group audiences. In Experiment 3, we varied the nature of the audience to which voters had to report their choice of representative. Based on the findings of Experiment 2, we predicted an interaction between intragroup status of the voter and the voting context (Hypothesis 3). Specifically, we expected both normative and pro-out-group participants to select a normative representative when having to report their vote to the in-group. In contrast, when facing an out-group audience, pro-out-group deviants should maintain their private preference and vote for a pro-out-group deviant representative. If, as previous research and results of Experiment 2 suggest, normative participants are less affected by external constraints, their votes should remain unaffected by the voting context.

Method
Participants and design
Ninety-two students from a large European University (61 female, $M_{age} = 20.72$, $SD = 1.31$) participated in our experiment. Participants received 10 Euros in exchange for their participation. The design consisted of a 2 (intragroup status of participant: Normative vs. pro-out-group deviant) by 2 (type of audience: In-group vs. out-group) by 3 (intragroup status of potential representative: Pro-in-group deviant vs. normative vs. pro-out-group deviant) mixed design. The first two factors were manipulated between participants, and the latter was manipulated within participants.

Procedure
The experimental procedure was similar to Experiment 2 with one exception. Participants were always told that they would have to reveal their vote to an audience but, depending on the condition, this audience was supposedly composed of either in-group or out-group members.

Results and discussion
All participants correctly identified their group or intragroup status. As in the first two experiments, we measured perceptions of intergroup competition. We found an interaction between intragroup status and type of audience, $F(2, 90) = 7.24, p < .01$, $\eta^2_p = .08$. The effect of audience was significant for normative participants, $F(1, 45) = 6.38, p = .015$, $\eta^2_p = .13$, revealing higher perceived levels of intergroup competition in the in-group audience condition ($M = 3.96$, $SD = 1.17$) than in the out-group audience one ($M = 3.08$, $SD = 1.20$). No effects were found for pro-out-group participants, $F(1, 45) = 1.72, p = .20$. Even if this pattern was unexpected, our results remain unchanged when we controlled for this variable in our main analyses.

With respect to our continuous preference measure, the only significant effect was an intragroup status by potential representative interaction, $F(2, 90) = 9.43, p < .01$, $\eta^2_p = .10$. Follow-up tests showed that ‘normative’ participants preferred normative
targets \((M = 5.63, SD = 1.17)\) over both pro-in-group deviants \((M = 4.62, SD = 1.61; F(1, 91) = 12.88, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .12)\) and pro-out-group ones \((M = 4.08, SD = 1.40; F(1, 91) = 42.79, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .32)\). Preferences concerning the two latter targets did not differ, \(F(1, 91) = 2.61, p = .110, \eta^2_p = .03\). Pro-out-group participants’ least preferred target was the pro-in-group deviant one \((M = 3.95, SD = 1.51)\), when compared to both normative, \(M = 5.03, SD = 1.19; F(1, 91) = 34.87, p < .001, \eta^2_p = .28\), and pro-out-group potential representatives, \(M = 5.54, SD = 1.12; F(1, 91) = 11.43, p = .001, \eta^2_p = .11\). No differences emerged between the two latter targets, \(F(1, 91) = 2.22, p = .14, \eta^2_p = .02\).

As before, we relied on the SAS PROC CATMOD to analyse participants’ votes using intragroup status of participant, type of audience, and their interaction as predictors. Results again revealed a main effect of intragroup status, \(\chi^2(N = 92.1) = 6.13, p < .02\), a marginal effect of type of audience, \(\chi^2(N = 92.1) = 2.66, p = .10\), and the predicted interaction between intragroup status and type of audience, \(\chi^2(N = 92.1) = 3.90, p < .05\) (see Figure 3). Normative participants were not affected by the voting context, \(\chi^2(N = 46) < 1\), massively choosing normative representatives (33 votes) relative to pro-in-group (five votes) or pro-out-group ones (eight votes). Consistent with our hypothesis, pro-out-group deviant participants adapted their vote to the audience, \(\chi^2(N = 46.1) = 6.07, p < .02\). When facing an in-group audience, participants clearly selected normative representatives (14 votes) relative to pro-in-group (two votes) or pro-out-group ones (five votes). This pattern reversed in front of an out-group audience (pro-out-group deviant = 15 votes; normative = 10 votes; pro-in-group deviant = 0.1 votes3).

Again, these results support a strategic account of voting behaviour for pro-out-group deviant members by showing that the findings observed in Experiment 2 are specific to in-group audiences. In addition, normative group members proved insensitive to variations in the voting context. The latter result is in line with the idea that normative group members benefit from a safe intragroup status and do not feel any pressure to modify their preferences as a function of the specific audience that they face. Furthermore, the fact that

![Figure 3](image-url)\(^3\) Because the pro-in-group deviant cell contained no observation, this cell was set to 0.1 in order to conduct the analysis.
we only obtained the expected interaction on voting behaviour and not in the continuous preference measure seems to indicate that, similarly to Experiment 2, pro-out-group deviants are somewhat reluctant to ‘take the risk’ of stating their ‘deviant’ preferences, only doing it when forced to choose (cf. analyses above on voting behaviour). This fact is methodologically interesting and, in our opinion, reinforces the need to have dependent variables that are as close as possible to the actual behaviour that one is analysing.

**GENERAL DISCUSSION**

In three experiments, we explored whether and when the choice of a group representative is a strategic behaviour. We analysed the impact of voters’ intragroup status on their choice of an in-group representative for intergroup negotiations and examined the extent to which voters’ choice is affected by the voting context. Making the intragroup status of voters salient resulted in choices correspondent to individuals’ own status: Normative members chose normative representatives, whereas pro-out-group deviant members chose pro-out-group deviant ones. This pattern remained unchanged when in-group members were to inform an out-group audience of their choice of representative. Importantly, when voters were informed that their choice would be revealed to other in-group members, pro-out-group deviant members no longer voted for pro-out-group deviant representatives but instead shifted their voting preferences towards normative representatives. No contextual variations were observed among normative members who consistently stated preferring normative representatives over deviant ones.

These results add to the literature on intergroup relations, negotiation, and conflict management research as well as on voting behaviour. First of all, our findings extend the aforementioned research that shows that, in identity-related negotiations, group members equally prefer normative and deviant representatives (Teixeira et al., 2011, 2013). Our research suggests that this does not mean that people are indifferent to who represents them but rather that this choice is dependent on who chooses the representative. Our findings are in line with and extend previous research showing stable norm-congruent behaviours on the part of normative members, and strategic behaviours on the part of deviant ones (e.g., Jetten et al., 2006).

One important question that remains to be answered concerns the process responsible for differences between normative and deviant members’ behaviour. One potential candidate is individuals’ need to belong. To the extent that being valued by other in-group members is a source of self-esteem (Smith, Tyler, Huo, Ortiz, & Lind, 1998) and that deviant members have a less secure position within their group, they may be more in need of inclusion than normative members. Another option is that deviants change their preferences because their ‘deviant’ choices are more likely to lead to punishment than normative members’ ones. This would mean, for instance, that if group members were to elect a representative in a context in which diversity or innovation were praised, deviant members should not need to change their public preferences (but perhaps normative members would). This last idea nicely resonates with recent work, suggesting that in certain situations, deviance may be valued because the group’s broad goals are aligned with a positive image of deviants (Ellemers & Jetten, 2013). This would be the case in situations in which the group is in clear need of a change or when diversity is part of the core values of the group’s identity (Jetten & Hornsey, 2011).
Our findings suggest that having an anonymous or a public voting procedure for the selection of representatives can impact the final results of intergroup encounters. Because deviant members vote in the same direction as normative members when the vote is public, representatives elected on the basis of such procedures may benefit from a larger margin of victory than when the vote is private. This (apparently) consensual support could lead groups to trust representatives more and give them more autonomy when dealing with the out-group (Steinel, De Dreu, Ouwehand, & Ramirez-Marin, 2009).

The present research focuses on differences between normative and pro-out-group deviant voters. In future studies, it would be important to investigate whether the findings obtained for pro-out-group deviant voters also generalize to pro-in-group ones. To the extent that the latter also constitute a deviant minority within the group, one could predict that they would exhibit the same contextual variations in behaviour as pro-out-group deviants do. However, contrary to pro-out-group deviants, pro-in-group members do not endanger the intergroup distinction, that is they deviate from the group's prototype in the direction opposite to the out-group. As a consequence, their particular position vis-à-vis the out-group could act as a buffer against the negative evaluation by their fellow in-group members. Therefore, pro-in-group deviants may have less internal mobility concerns than their pro-out-group counterparts and consequently may show less contextual variations in their behaviours.

In line with the idea that group norms can change as a function of the context, work on minority influence and meta-contrast suggests that one important factor to consider might be the out-group position. Indeed, David and Turner (1999) showed that extreme group members are more influential in intergroup compared to intragroup contexts and that out-group members influence the in-group position (in the sense of a polarization away from the out-group position) mainly in public contexts (David & Turner, 1996). This reasoning leads to an interesting future research direction: Analysing consequences of different conceptualisations of what it means to be prototypical. In the present studies, we focused on a central tendency conceptualisation of prototypicality. However, previous research on prototype negotiation suggests that there is a difference between what is acknowledged as the average group member and what the ideal group member (in our case, leader) might be (Bartel & Wiesenfeld, 2013). Taking these differences into account could explain, for instance, that when it comes to negotiations conducted in the context of escalating conflicts (e.g., Israel and Palestine) in which group positions are strongly polarized (Coleman, 2000), pro-in-group deviants may actually become the ‘ideal’ leader despite not being the ‘average’ member.

It is also worth elaborating on the generalization of the present results. In our studies, the goal of each group was to make sure that their group’s views would be taken into account. Interests and social identity content were therefore intrinsically related as both varied as a function of participants’ perceptual preferences. This type of situation is often encountered when we look at negotiations in which groups’ identity is linked to the group stances’ in negotiations, such as in negotiations between political parties or between unions and managers. However, one can also find situations in which group membership is to some extent independent of the group’s position as, for instance, in negotiations purely about interests or resources. In such situations, the impact of the intragroup status of group members on voting decisions might be less important because subgroup preferences are consensual and coincide with the in-group’s overarching goal of improving its position. This is certainly an intriguing topic for future research.
References


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