

Research article

Playing with deviance: Typicality assessments of ingroup members as a strategy of outgroup approach

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Abstract

In two experiments, we analyzed the use of intra-group differentiation between normative and deviant members as an identity mobilization strategy in intergroup negotiations. Because ingroup members sometimes try to obtain the support of outgroup audiences to attain their goals, we propose that in intergroup negotiations, people attempt to minimize the distinction between the parties involved by changing the appraisal of deviance and including deviant members in the ingroup's prototype. In line with this hypothesis, differences in the assessment of typicality between normative and deviant targets were reduced in instrumental intergroup negotiation contexts. Furthermore, we explored a boundary condition for this effect and found that such outgroup approach is disrupted when threats taint the intergroup negotiation context. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

Perhaps the most Anglo-Saxon of Italian leaders, in the sense of his aplomb, his style and his composure.— La Repubblica, 10th November 2011

The aforementioned quotation refers to Mario Monti, nominated to replace Silvio Berlusconi as Italian Prime Minister after Berlusconi's resignation. The nomination of Monti to the detriment of other candidates was surely no accident. In times of disbelief from Northern European leaders and markets concerning Italy's ability to face the economic crisis, it was judged important for Italians to send a clear sign of adherence to the European vision. Who would be better suited to send such a message than Monti, a discrete, sober, and highly competent economist; a man who served as European commissioner for 10 years; and a leading member of several European think tanks?

As this example nicely illustrates, group members are sometimes motivated to present their ingroup as similar (rather than different) to an outgroup audience. Here, we propose that one way to do so is by minimizing the perceived differences between normative members and those deviant ingroup members who share several features with the outgroup. The resulting reduction in *intra*-group differentiation then leads to a reduction in *intergroup* differentiation. Because these strategies are likely to emerge when the ingroup needs the "collaboration or at least the lack of opposition" (Klein, Spears, & Reicher, 2007, p. 37) of the outgroup, that is, in situations of high interdependence, we tested our hypothesis in the context of intergroup negotiations.

Intra-group Differentiation Tuned to Mobilization Goals

Intra-group differentiation, that is, the extent to which people differentiate among normative and deviant ingroup members, has mainly been analyzed within the subjective group dynamics (SGD, e.g., Marques, Abrams, Paez, & Martinez-Taboada, 1998) framework. SGD has come to distinguish between two types of deviant members: pro-norm or pro-ingroup deviants on the one hand, and anti-norm or pro-outgroup deviants on the other hand (Abrams, Marques, Bown, & Henson, 2000; Teixeira, Demoulin, & Yzerbyt, 2011). Importantly, we use the term "deviant" here only to refer to atypical members who are close to the outgroup. This is a key point to bear in mind given that our predictions do not pertain to deviants who are more extreme than the norm and who, as a consequence, reinforce intergroup differences.

Subjective group dynamics build upon the earlier work on the so-called Black sheep effect (Marques & Yzerbyt, 1988; Marques, Yzerbyt, & Leyens, 1988), which focuses on the derogation of deviant group members as an identity-serving strategy. According to the SGD model, intra-group differentiation enhances the distinction between the ingroup and the outgroup by simultaneously emphasizing who the perfect ingroup member is and making clear that bad weeds are not really allowed within the group (Marques, Abrams, Páez, & Hogg, 2001). Doing so, people preserve ingroup purity and ensure a positive and distinct social identity (Tajfel & Turner, 1986).

Interestingly, research on deviance has implicitly assumed (i) that "ingroups are the most relevant audience for deviant

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behaviour" (Morton, 2011, p.100) and (ii) that when an outgroup audience is present, it is normally a hostile one. Still, real-life situations often imply the presence of non-violent outgroups that have a say about the ingroup's standing and resources. In such interdependence settings, intra-group differentiation in favor of normative members may be neither group members' best strategic choice nor their preferred modus operandi (Morton, 2011).

The latter proposition does well with the social identity model of deindividuation (SIDE; Reicher, Spears, & Postmes, 1995). The strategic component of the SIDE model suggests that audiences shape individuals' normative behavior. In line with this idea, research has shown that the identifiability to a powerful outgroup audience decreased support for ingroup norms susceptible to trigger outgroup sanctions (e.g., students' support for cheating on reports; Reicher & Levine, 1994). In contrast, identifiability to an ingroup audience increased endorsement of these "punishable" norms (Reicher, Levine, & Gordijn, 1998). In addition, in intergroup interdependence situations, that is, when the audience consists of an outgroup that has the power to constrain the ingroup's outcomes, group members often behave in ways designed to elicit the "collaboration or at least the lack of opposition" of the outgroup as a means to achieve its goals (Klein et al., 2007, p. 37). This motivation has been referred to as the mobilization function of identity performance (Klein et al., 2007, Verkuyten & Yildiz, 2010) and is close to the concept of instrumental goals as defined by Scheepers and colleagues (e.g., Scheepers, Spears, Doosje, & Manstead, 2003, 2006a). In intergroup contexts, mobilization is aimed at building trust and reassuring the outgroup of the ingroup's good intentions (Klein & Licata, 2003) or at least at not provoking the outgroup to avoid hostile reactions (Scheepers et al., 2006b).

Building upon these efforts, we decided to explore whether one strategy for pursuing mobilization goals in intergroup interdependence contexts is to act upon perceptions of intra-group differentiation. In our view, intra-group differentiation can be used as an indicator of the ingroup's position vis-à-vis the outgroup. As a matter of fact, the SGD model (Marques et al., 1998) states that the derogation of deviant ingroup members relative to normative ones serves an intergroup differentiation strategy. Excluding from the ingroup those (deviant) individuals who symbolize a dangerous rapprochement between ingroup and outgroup allows people to maintain their group's borders intact and therefore to preserve positive distinctiveness. Clearly, the stronger the differentiation between normative and deviant members, the further away from the outgroup the ingroup is perceived to be. In contrast, when the ingroup's motivation is to approach the outgroup, we should observe a reduction in intra-group differentiation. This argument is in line with the SIDE model research showing that people downplay specific aspects of their identity when their expression is perceived to be potentially harmful (Reicher & Levine, 1994) as well as with work showing that leaders shape the ingroup representations depicted in their speeches as a means to secure support from the audience they are addressing (Klein & Licata, 2003).

Recent work on political and negotiation contexts supports the same conjecture when dealing with deviance. For instance, Morton, Postmes, and Jetten (2007) examined how members

of political parties supported normative and deviant politicians as a function of public opinion. When public opinion was not in line with the party's ideology, highly identified individuals preferred a deviant candidate who was closer to the public opinion over a more normative member who, despite better symbolizing the party's identity, decreased the party's chances of winning the elections. Importantly, and supporting the idea of a strategic accommodation of responses to the audience of voters, the effect of support from the public opinion on choice of candidate was mediated by the extent to which the candidate was perceived as likely to win the election.

Similarly, Teixeira et al. (2011) found that when negotiations are framed in instrumental terms and thus when outgroup approach may serve group members' goals of resource increase, individuals display a preference for deviant representatives over normative ones. Interestingly, negotiations seem to be by default strategic contexts. Indeed, Teixeira and colleagues (Experiment 1) found stronger preferences for deviant representatives who are close to the outgroup audience *both* when participants were primed with an "instrumental" motive (e.g., asked to think about the target who would be more able to exert influence over the outgroup) and in a (no prime) *control* condition in which no strategic motive was made salient. Taken together, these results support not only the idea that ingroup members upgrade deviant members when they themselves aim at influencing outgroups but also the idea that intergroup negotiations "naturally" elicit such a strategic approach of the outgroup.

Typicality Assessments at the Service of Intra-group Differentiation

The research reviewed earlier has largely focused on evaluative assessments of ingroup targets, that is, positivity or preferences. The implicit assumption is that "evaluative" assessments of ingroup targets convey the view on the *whole* group. However, we see two reasons for which the upgrading of deviant targets on evaluative assessments, although necessary, is perhaps not sufficient.

First, concerning the outgroup audience, it would not serve an approach strategy to decrease intra-group differentiation on evaluative measures while stating that the *deviant* target is in fact someone who is *not* representative of the group. Such a claim would likely undermine the ingroup's attempt at approaching the outgroup. If the *deviant* representative would still be perceived as an exception to the rule (Kunda & Oleson, 1995), someone who does not embody the ingroup's position, there is a possibility that this could provoke a feeling of suspicion as to whether the use of the deviant is not just a manipulative attempt.

Second, turning to the ingroup itself, stating that one likes a deviant member (even as a strategy aimed at improving the ingroup's standing), could potentially cause ingroup members to feel psychological discomfort. This is because it seems difficult to succeed in pulling together ingroup members and standing by one's representative when there remains an acute sense of the gap between the deviant and the ingroup's prototypical behavior. By subjectively altering the notion of *deviance*, group members are in a position to reduce the dissonance that they might experience otherwise.

In sum, we propose that a decrease in intra-group differentiation should be observed not only at the evaluative level but also in typicality ratings.

PRESENT EXPERIMENTS

We conducted two experiments to examine our hypothesis that interdependence settings such as intergroup negotiations would lead to strategic changes in intra-group differentiation among normative and deviant members. We tested this hypothesis in two ways. First, we predicted that initial differences in typicality between normative and deviant targets would decrease or even disappear in intergroup negotiation contexts as compared with assessments made in the absence of intergroup interdependence.

Second, we analyzed threat as a boundary condition of this effect. We hypothesized that threats to the ingroup's identity (Experiment 1) or to its resources (Experiment 2) should disrupt this process of strategic outgroup approach. As a matter of fact, in the intergroup literature, threats have been shown to fuel prejudice and discrimination, and, importantly for the present paper, to enhance people's motivation for intergroup differentiation (e.g., Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Rothgerber, 1997; Stephan & Stephan, 2000). We thus predicted that instrumental concerns should be overridden by the increased need for intergroup differentiation when the intergroup negotiation context is tainted by threats.

EXPERIMENT 1

In Experiment 1, participants were invited to assess normative and deviant potential representatives in instrumental intergroup negotiations both in evaluative and typicality terms. Half the participants were confronted with a threatening context related to their group's identity but unrelated to the negotiation context. The other half was only presented with the intergroup negotiation context.

Method

Participants and Design

Thirty-four French-speaking Belgian students (28 women), aged 18 to 27 years ($M = 19.65$, $SD = 1.18$), volunteered to participate in exchange for course credit. The design consisted in a 2 (context: negotiation only versus negotiation *and* threat) \times 2 (target: normative versus deviant representative) mixed design with the second factor varying within participants.

Procedure and Material

Upon their arrival to the laboratory and after having completed a series of questionnaires unrelated to the present topic, French-speaking Belgian participants were presented with a fictitious first page of a popular Belgian newspaper. The experimenter informed participants that they could start taking a glance at the newspaper's page while she allegedly finished

preparing the rest of the materials for the experiment and that she would be right back with more instructions. Our experimental manipulation was embedded in the newspaper's first page headline. This headline was presented in such a way that it could hardly be missed (central, large font). In the *negotiation only* condition, the headline ("Ecology triumphs at Tweewaters") was totally unrelated to the intergroup context. In the *negotiation and threat* condition, the headline read, "European survey: French-speaking Belgians less appreciated than Dutch-speaking ones." In the context of the present experiment, French-speaking Belgians represented participants' ingroup, and Dutch-speaking Belgians, the outgroup.

After one minute, the experimenter returned and informed participants that their task was to read carefully a small section of text at the bottom of the newspaper's first page. This section was entitled "Negotiation for mixed education" and described a governmental project for the creation of a bilingual university in the country's bilingual capital (Brussels) as well as the fact that negotiations concerning the role of each community (French and Dutch speaking) in this project were soon to take place. It was further mentioned that, among the French-speaking community, one of two politicians was likely to be designated as potential representative. The descriptions of these two politicians constituted our target manipulation. The normative target was 43, had a French name, was married with someone from the French community, and had always lived in the French part of the country. The deviant target was 40, had a Flemish name and Flemish parents but had been living in the French-speaking community for 30 years.¹ Finally, both targets were presented as members of the French-speaking parliament. A pre-test conducted outside of any negotiation context in a sample taken from the same population as participants in the main experiment confirmed that the normative ingroup member ($M = 6.97$, $SD = 1.72$) was perceived as more typical of the ingroup than the deviant one ($M = 5.31$, $SD = 1.59$), $t(17) = 3.07$, $p < .008$ (ratings on 9-point scales). After having read the negotiation scenario, participants answered the dependent measures, were thanked, debriefed, and dismissed.

Dependent Measures

Typicality perceptions were assessed for each target by means of a 4-item 9-point scale (1 = *not at all*; 9 = *very much*; see Teixeira et al., 2011). Participants had to indicate to what extent each target was representative of French-speaking Belgians, typical of French-speaking Belgians, displayed characteristics that are typical of French-speaking Belgians, and had much in common with French-speaking Belgians ($\alpha = .94$ and $\alpha = .88$, for the normative and the deviant targets, respectively).

In addition, participants were asked to indicate their preference for each target as ingroup representative for the upcoming negotiation. For each candidate, participants indicated on 9-point

¹It is important to understand that in Belgium, it is quite common to come across self-categorized French (Dutch)-speaking citizens who have Dutch (French)-speaking parents or who were born within the recently defined Dutch (French)-speaking territory. One such example is the former prime minister, Yves Leterme, who has both a French name and a French background but who clearly identifies himself and is clearly identified by others as a member of the Dutch-speaking community. The same can happen for the opposite transition. An example is Laurette Onkelinx, a prominent French-speaking female politician whose father is Dutch speaking.

scales: (i) support for the candidate, (ii) perceived effectiveness as a representative, (iii) target's ability to negotiate in the ingroup's interest, and (iv) interest in choosing the candidate as an ingroup representative ($\alpha = .88$ and $\alpha = .94$, for the normative and the deviant targets, respectively).²

Results

Typicality Perceptions

Typicality assessments of normative and deviant targets were submitted to a Condition \times Target ANOVA with the second variable varying within participants. This analysis revealed a main effect of target, $F(1, 32) = 13.89$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .30$, as well as the predicted interaction, $F(1, 32) = 5.99$, $p < .020$, $\eta_p^2 = .16$. As shown in Figure 1, when negotiations were devoid of any threat, normative ($M = 6.15$, $SD = 1.54$) and deviant ($M = 5.70$, $SD = 1.78$) targets were judged equally typical, $F < 1$. In sharp contrast, the presence of threat increased the distinction among ingroup representatives, with the normative target ($M = 6.70$, $SD = 1.44$) being perceived as more typical than the deviant one ($M = 4.53$, $SD = 1.29$), $F(1, 32) = 21.78$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .40$. In addition, whereas there was no difference in the ratings of the normative target across conditions, $F(1, 32) = 1.14$, $p = .295$, deviant targets were perceived as more typical in the *negotiation only* condition than in the *negotiation and threat* one, $F(1, 32) = 4.99$, $p = .033$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$.

Preference for Representative

Scores of preference for each target as ingroup representative were submitted to the same ANOVA as that mentioned earlier. Results revealed a main effect of target, $F(1, 32) = 21.56$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .40$, as well as the predicted interaction, $F(1, 32) = 4.69$, $p = .038$, $\eta_p^2 = .13$. For participants in the *negotiation only* condition, both targets were equally preferred as ingroup representatives ($M_{\text{normative}} = 6.68$, $SD = 1.11$ and $M_{\text{deviant}} = 5.92$, $SD = 1.84$), $F(1, 32) = 1.56$, $p = .22$. In contrast, when there was an external threat, participants preferred the normative ($M = 6.92$, $SD = 1.01$) over the deviant target ($M = 4.82$, $SD = 1.71$), $F(1, 32) = 24.94$, $p < .001$, $\eta_p^2 = .43$. Whereas no differences emerged between conditions concerning the normative target ($F < 1$), the deviant target was marginally preferred in the *negotiation only* relative to the *negotiation and threat* condition, $F(1, 32) = 3.26$, $p = .08$, $\eta_p^2 = .43$.

Discussion

Consistent with our main hypothesis, Experiment 1 shows that in intergroup negotiation contexts, baseline differences in typicality between normative and deviant targets cease to exist. These findings are consistent with the hypothesis that

²We conducted two-factor analyses with oblimin rotation in which we introduced typicality and preference items for normative and deviant targets. Both analyses resulted in two-factor solutions (eigenvalues higher than 1; 79% and 82% of explained variance, factor loadings ranging from .790 to .945 and from .758 to .948, for normative and deviant targets, respectively, with low relevance cross-loadings). These results, together with moderate inter-measure correlations ($r_{\text{normative}} = .37$ and $r_{\text{deviant}} = .58$, both $p < .05$), confirm that the two measures are tapping different concepts.




Figure 1. Typicality assessments of normative and deviant ingroup targets as a function of the negotiation context

mobilization goals present in interdependence settings involve the tailoring of ingroup representations in the direction of the outgroup counterpart (Klein & Licata, 2003). Importantly, our manipulation of threat to ingroup identity revealed one boundary condition to this outgroup approach tendency. When a threat was made salient in the negotiation context, ingroup members differentiated between targets in both typicality and evaluative measures.

In spite of the encouraging nature of these findings, we see two limitations in this first experiment. First, we did not measure preferences in the pre-test. This makes it impossible to know whether differences in preferences are due to the upgrading of the deviant in the *negotiation only* condition or to the downgrading of this target in the *negotiation and threat* condition. Even if our argument mainly focuses on intra-group differentiation processes, this is an interesting point to examine. Second, the pre-test was conducted on a different sample and in the absence of a clear intergroup context. This precludes any straightforward comparison between means relative to typicality ratings.

EXPERIMENT 2

Experiment 1 showed that negotiation contexts lead to the reduction of intra-group differentiation in typicality ratings as compared with pre-tested levels. The pre-test, however, was devoid of references to any intergroup context (and did not include any preference measure for each target). One could thus argue that it is the introduction of an intergroup context *per se* that produced the effect and not mobilization goals inherent to the negotiation setting. Accordingly, the first aim of Experiment 2 was to replicate our effects by comparing an intergroup *negotiation* context with an intergroup control condition in which *no negotiation* took place.

In addition, whereas Experiment 1 focused on the impact of an identity threat admittedly external to the negotiation, Experiment 2 aimed at replicating our findings in the context of a threat that was more closely linked to the negotiation context (i.e., threat to the resources being negotiated). By presenting two situations that were equally focused on resources, we hoped to gain further insight on the conditions that elicit mobilization strategies. Indeed, we expected that mobilization concerns (even if probably always present to a certain extent)

would be overridden by the prospect of losing valuable resources to the outgroup. This threat should create a fairly antagonistic context that should incite group members to seek more differentiation from the outgroup. As a consequence, we should observe an increase in intra-group differentiation in the threat condition compared with a situation in which the ingroup hopes to increase its resources. This prediction is in line with research showing that realistic threats increase intergroup hostility (Brown, Maras, Masser, Vivian, & Hewstone, 2001; Esses, Dovidio, Jackson, & Armstrong, 2001; Riek et al., 2006). Finally, to increase the generalizability of our results, we decided to use a different negotiation scenario and different groups.

Method

Participants and Design

Sixty-four students ($M_{\text{age}} = 20.23$, $SD = 2.34$; 57 women) from a large Belgian university took part in the experiment. The design consisted in a 3 (context: negotiation only versus negotiation and threat versus no negotiation) \times 2 (target: normative versus deviant representative) mixed design with the second factor varying within participants.

Procedure and Materials

Participants read that in the context of a merger that had recently taken place between two universities (among which the participants' own university), the students' unions of both universities were getting to know each other. This was because both groups would soon need to coordinate as part of the same university. Participants in the *no negotiation* condition received this information and were immediately presented with our target manipulation. Participants in the two *negotiation* conditions were further informed that the two students' unions would have to negotiate to determine a common budget distribution method. In the *negotiation only* condition, it was mentioned that after a careful analysis of the different formulas, this negotiation represented an "opportunity of budget increase" for the ingroup and that their goal would be "to try to increase the money received relatively to past years' budgets." In the *negotiation and threat* condition, it was stated that the analysis of the situation ended up concluding that the negotiation would probably involve a "true risk of budget loss" for the ingroup and that the goal of the ingroup would be "to try not to lose money relatively to past years' budgets."

After having read the scenario, participants were presented with two targets, members of the ingroup's students' union. In the two negotiation conditions, it was further mentioned that these targets volunteered to represent the ingroup at the negotiation table. Both targets were described as students of participants' university who had been members of the students' union for 2 years, had the same age, studied very similar subjects (economics versus management), and were in the last year of their master's degree. The target manipulation consisted in varying the time these two students were studying at the participants' university as well as the place where they lived. The normative ingroup target was a student who had been studying at the participants' university since his first year

of college and lived on campus. The deviant target was someone who had done his first 2 years of college at the outgroup university and who currently lived near the university campus. After getting familiar with the information concerning both targets, participants answered the dependent variables. The measures of perceived typicality ($\alpha_{\text{normative}} = .90$ and $\alpha_{\text{deviant}} = .90$) and of preference for a representative ($\alpha_{\text{normative}} = .84$ and $\alpha_{\text{deviant}} = .91$) were similar to those used in Experiment 1. Importantly, participants in the *no negotiation* condition were asked to evaluate the extent to which each target would be a good ingroup representative without any mention to a negotiation context.

Results

Typicality Perceptions

Typicality assessments were submitted to a mixed-model ANOVA with target as within-subjects and context as between-subjects factors. This analysis revealed a main effect of target, $F(2, 61) = 98.55$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .62$, as well as a significant interaction, $F(2, 61) = 6.16$, $p = .004$, $\eta^2_p = .17$ (Figure 2). In the *no negotiation* condition, the normative target ($M = 7.00$; $SD = 0.99$) was perceived as more typical than the deviant one ($M = 5.14$; $SD = 1.40$), $F(1, 63) = 22.39$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .26$. A similar pattern emerged in the *negotiation and threat* condition ($M_{\text{normative}} = 7.10$; $SD = 1.24$, $M_{\text{deviant}} = 4.98$; $SD = 1.45$), $F(1, 63) = 33.20$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .35$. As predicted, the difference between the two targets became marginal when the negotiation context was devoid of any threat ($M_{\text{normative}} = 6.95$; $SD = 1.53$, $M_{\text{deviant}} = 6.15$; $SD = 1.22$), $F(1, 63) = 2.93$, $p = .092$, $\eta^2_p = .05$. If we look at the data by target, no differences emerged for the normative target, $F < 1$. In contrast, the typicality of the deviant target varied between conditions, $F(1, 63) = 4.46$, $p = .016$, $\eta^2_p = .13$. In line with our predictions, the deviant target was perceived as more typical in the *negotiation only* condition compared with the *no negotiation* ($p < .02$) and the *negotiation and threat* conditions ($p < .007$). The latter two conditions did not differ from each other ($p > .68$).




Figure 2. Typicality assessments of normative and deviant ingroup targets as a function of the intergroup context

Preference for Representative

The same mixed-model ANOVA on preference scores revealed a main effect of target, $F(2, 61) = 26.93$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .31$, which was qualified by the predicted two-way interaction, $F(2, 61) = 4.11$, $p = .021$, $\eta^2_p = .12$. Simple effects revealed that the normative target was preferred to the deviant one in both the *no negotiation* ($M_{\text{normative}} = 7.21$; $SD = 1.05$, $M_{\text{deviant}} = 6.49$; $SD = 1.46$), $F(1, 63) = 5.33$, $p = .024$, $\eta^2_p = .08$, and *negotiation and threat* conditions ($M_{\text{normative}} = 7.00$; $SD = .94$, $M_{\text{deviant}} = 5.64$; $SD = 1.52$), $F(1, 63) = 27.65$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2_p = .31$. As predicted, participants displayed equal preferences for both targets in the *negotiation only* condition ($M_{\text{normative}} = 6.88$; $SD = .91$, $M_{\text{deviant}} = 6.59$; $SD = 1.02$), $F < 1$. Additionally, only preferences for the deviant target varied between conditions, $F_{\text{normative}} < 1$ and $F_{\text{deviant}}(1, 63) = 3.19$, $p = .048$, $\eta^2_p = .03$. Specifically, the deviant target was the least preferred in the *negotiation and threat* condition relative to both the *no negotiation* and *negotiation* conditions, $p < .042$ and $p < .027$, respectively. Finally, no differences emerged among the two latter conditions, $p = .82$.

Discussion

In Experiment 2, we added a *no negotiation* condition with a salient intergroup context but without any reference to an intergroup negotiation. In addition, we manipulated threat to the ingroup's resources. Consistent with our hypothesis, when the intergroup negotiation was likely to bring about additional resources, we observed a reduction in intra-group differentiation, with the deviant target being rated as similarly typical and equally positive as the normative member. In contrast, in intergroup situations in which no negotiation was presented or when the negotiation represented a threat to the ingroup's resources, participants judged the normative target as being more typical and preferred this target as group representative compared to the deviant one.

These data further support the idea that mobilization strategies of approach are specific to intergroup interdependence contexts. Moreover, the reduction in intra-group differentiation only occurred when participants believed that the negotiation was likely to increase their resources. This pattern is consistent with the SIDE model's assumption that outgroup approach will be displayed when people believe that cooperation from the outgroup is desirable for the ingroup to achieve its goals (Klein et al., 2007).

It should be noted, however, that even if intra-group differentiation scores on both typicality and preference measures are in line with our predictions, the patterns obtained on each one of these measures stress somewhat different aspects. As one would expect, the presence of threat makes group members highly critical of the deviant member. This reaction emerges in the expression of rather negative evaluations and accounts for the difference between the evaluations of the deviant in the *negotiation and threat* condition compared with the two other conditions. As for the typicality ratings, the high stakes of the *negotiation only* condition seem to make group members particularly inclined to emphasize the typicality of the deviant member. Together, these responses constitute an interesting constellation that highlights the sensitivity of group members to the specificities of the intergroup interdependence situation.

GENERAL DISCUSSION

In two experiments, we examined intra-group differentiation in intergroup negotiations. Building on the basic assumption of the SIDE model (Klein et al., 2007; Reicher et al., 1995) that normative behavior is highly dependent on the situation (Postmes & Spears, 1998), we predicted and showed that ingroup members adapt perceptions of deviance to the goals that they pursue in the intergroup context. Specifically, in purely instrumental negotiations, differentiation between normative and deviant ingroup members was reduced both on typicality and evaluative measures compared with situations in which intergroup interdependence was not salient.

Besides finding support for identity mobilization strategies via the shaping of representations of deviance, the second goal of the present paper was to explore one boundary condition of such an approach tendency. We predicted and found that identity threats external to the negotiation context (Experiment 1) or realistic threats inherent to the negotiation context (Experiment 2) disrupt the tendency to minimize intra-group differentiation at the service of an approach strategy. These findings highlight the importance that both *external* perceptions of the intergroup context and *internal* perceptions of the negotiation may have in determining the use of these strategies. Our predictions were based both on previous research showing that threat increases intergroup differentiation (Riek et al., 2006) and on the SGD model's assumption that differentiation between normative and deviant ingroup members constitutes one way to achieve positive intergroup differentiation (Marques et al., 1998). One could, however, argue that in intergroup negotiations, threat might lead to increased mobilization attempts (and this would be especially true for threat to resources). Reality seems to provide more support for the former hypothesis, though. Indeed, identity threats often present in long-lasting intergroup conflicts (Coleman, 2000), and perceptions of inevitable losses (Rouhana & Bar-Tal, 1998; e.g., Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Northern Ireland, Basque country) are usually associated with the use of outgroup distancing and intergroup differentiation strategies (Coleman, 2003). Future research should look at the mechanisms underlying these effects. In the presence of symbolic threat (as in Experiment 1), higher levels of intra-group differentiation likely serve a positive distinctiveness motivation. Threats to resources, in contrast, may be influenced by a different mechanism. It is possible that resource threats increase the salience of the intergroup conflict situation and therefore of the perceived incompatibility of positions. Furthermore, the possibility of losing resources may create a power differential in the negotiation that reduces ingroup members' hope for outgroup cooperation. Finally, these phenomena might also be accompanied by an increased need for ingroup cohesion (to mobilize ingroup members' support for the group; Klein et al., 2007) and stronger levels of conformity to ingroup norms (Jetten, Postmes, & McAuliffe, 2002).

One limitation of our studies is the absence of manipulation checks for perceived threat. It should be said, however, that participants tend to be reactive to this type of manipulation checks and often have difficulty in admitting the existence of anxiety and stress in threatening situations (Bettencourt, Miller, & Hume, 1999; Turner, Pratkanis, Probasco, & Leve, 1992). Given

that both attacks to the ingroup's image (e.g., Branscombe, Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Branscombe, Spears, Ellemers, & Doosje, 2002; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997) and (the prospect of) ingroup losses (e.g., Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Scheepers et al., 2003) have been extensively considered as threatening situations, we are very confident that our manipulations have been effective.

The present results provide strong support for a motivated approach of intra-group perception and, as such, contribute to the literature on intergroup relations and self-categorization. Previous research in these domains has exemplified typicality changes as a function of the degree of ingroup identification (Castano, Paladino, Coull, & Yzerbyt, 2002), the salience of the intergroup context (Haslam, Oakes, McGarty, & Turner, 1995), the centrality of the traits to the group's prototype (Simon, 1992), the direction of deviance (Abrams et al., 2000; Hichy, Mari, & Capozza, 2008), or group variability (Hutchison, Jetten, & Gutierrez, 2011). Adding to this literature, we show that typicality assessments also vary according to the ingroup's motivations and goals.

Our work also speaks to negotiation research as it focuses on intra-group dynamics in the context of intergroup negotiations. To date, this question has largely been neglected (Demoulin & de Dreu, 2010), and further investigations on intra-group dynamics should contribute to deepen our understanding of intergroup negotiations. For instance, one could explore whether the perception of a given representative's typicality in an intergroup negotiation would impact the delegation of power and autonomy by its constituency. These variables are tremendously important in negotiations as they are tightly linked to the representative's margin to make concessions (Hermann & Kogan, 1968; Kogan, Lamm, & Trommsdorff, 1972). Knowing that normative and deviant representatives behave differently in intergroup negotiations (Steinel, van Kleef, van Knippenberg, Hogg, Homan, & Moffitt, 2010; van Kleef, Steinel, van Knippenberg, Hogg, & Svensson, 2007), it stands to reason that the decision to send a normative or deviant representative to the negotiation table should constrain the ingroup's negotiation outcome.

Finally, it is worth noting that the mechanisms explored here are not necessarily specific to intergroup negotiations. The introductory section often referred to *intergroup interdependence*. As a matter of fact, mobilization processes designed to approach the outgroup are theoretically relevant in all contexts where the chances of the ingroup to improve its standing and/or its resources are partially or totally dependent on the collaboration of an outgroup audience. Future work should shed additional light on these important issues.

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