8   Group-based emotions

The social heart in the individual head

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In a classic study, Minard (1952) examined racial interactions between white and black coal miners inside and outside the Pocahontas Coal Field of McDowell, West Virginia, USA. Although this research was conducted when segregation was still legal in many states, its message directly relates to a number of recent research efforts in the realm of group-based emotions. Minard found that whereas white coal miners treated black co-workers as equals in the context of the mine, they also dealt with them as social inferiors in the outside world. These data are often presented as evidence that the situational and normative pressures constrain the manifestation of people's behavior, especially in the realm of intergroup relations, and obscure the impact of more enduring aspects of people such as attitudes. In short, one should not expect people's prejudice to materialize in discrimination in any straightforward way. Only by taking some distance from any particular context and by averaging over many behaviors should researchers expect to observe a decent level of correspondence between attitude and behavior.

In this chapter, we take issue with a popular interpretation of such a discrepancy. For many observers, the particular settings people find themselves in entail a series of obstacles that simply stand in the way of the actualization of their dispositional penchant. Our understanding of this mismatch between otherwise chronic attitudes and behaviors in specific situations is very different. We take issue with the view that people somehow remain the same but negotiate with the context. In fact, we argue that people change in radical and indeed essential ways from one situation to another! Similarly, attitudes are not stable representations stored somewhere in our head. Rather, they are created again every time an evaluation is considered necessary. We argue that attitudes are inherently flexible and that this explains why they can be so context-sensitive (Smith & Conrey, 2007). Therefore we should not expect intergroup attitudes to be directly related to discriminatory behavior unless both are measured in the same context and with the same object (outgroup) in mind (for a discussion on this topic, see Mackie & Smith, 1998).

Building on social identity theory (SIT, Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorization theory (SCT, Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987), but also on research in social cognition, we argue that specific features of the

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context alter who people are in very fundamental ways. Temporary and short-lived as they may be, the viewpoints adopted by individuals are nonetheless experienced as authentic and permanent. Such modifications are responsible for a drastic alteration in individuals' appraisal of the situation, in their emotional reaction to it, and, eventually, in their behavioral response. Crucially, this means that what individuals think, feel, and do when confronted with people and events around them can be much more flexible than is generally thought.

Building on this general argument, this chapter focuses on group-based emotions. Specifically, we examine how emotional reactions are sensitive to the social landscape with which people are confronted. In the first section, we provide a quick overview of "intergroup emotion theory" (IET, Smith, 1993) as well as a series of other theoretical approaches pertaining to emotions in the intergroup domain. We also present early empirical work showing that people can and do experience emotions not on a strict individual basis but on behalf of the group to which they belong. In the second section, we detail our own strategy to study what we call group-based emotions. We then dwell on a series of illustrative empirical findings. Our third and final section presents some intriguing consequences of social identity changes on the perception of group threats. We conclude by delineating a number of open questions and we propose new directions for future research. The key idea, and indeed the backbone of this chapter, is that people experience different emotions as a function of their salient social identity. This is what makes these emotional episodes group-based.

From generalized prejudice to intergroup emotions

In the field of intergroup relations, no concept has been more central than the concept of prejudice (Allport, 1954). Prejudice can be simply defined as the affective reaction that people experience when they are confronted with another group or one of its members. Obviously, prejudice would hardly preoccupy the scientific community if it were always or even mostly positive. Unfortunately, the gut reaction that people feel when they meet with members of another group is more often than not of a definite negative nature. Over the years, researchers have come to use the concept of prejudice to refer to a host of unflattering emotional responses such as anxiety, disgust, fear, envy, contempt, and so on (Stephan & Stephan, 2000). Not surprisingly, these various negative reactions are thought to be linked to the opinions people hold about groups and to translate into behavioral reactions. This trinity of prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination lies at the heart of the vast majority of research efforts on intergroup attitudes (Fiske, 1998; Schneider, 2004).

The way prejudice is being conceptualized in the domain of intergroup relations has been considerably modified since Smith (1993), in an insightful contribution, proposed combining self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) and appraisal theories of emotion (Frijda, Kuipers, & ter Schure, 1989;

Lazarus, 1991; Scherer, 1988). Doing so allowed Smith (1993) to address several limitations of the traditional approaches to prejudice. Specifically, the dominant perspectives have a hard time accounting for some discrepancies between people's beliefs about other groups (i.e., their stereotypes), and their affective reactions (i.e., their prejudice). One example is that some groups seem to possess positive qualities but do not seem to be liked much. Moreover, although prejudice has traditionally been posited to be the key factor shaping stereotypes and discrimination, many observations suggest that it is the information one has about groups that feeds into emotional reactions and these affective responses, in turn, shape people's behaviors. Appraisal theories of emotion (e.g., Lazarus, 1991) are particularly well equipped to account for these phenomena. Although the specifics of the different theories vary, the underlying rationale is constant. A stimulus, be it an object, a situation, a person, or, of course, a group, is evaluated along a number of meaningful dimensions. This triggers a specific pattern of emotional reactions. Eventually, behavioral tendencies and specific actions ensue.

One limitation of appraisal theories is that emotional phenomena are conceptualized at the individual level. Building on self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987) and his own work on the overlap between the definition of the self and the ingroup (Smith, Coats, & Walling, 1999; Smith & Henry, 1996), Smith (1993, 1999) proposed that people were also likely to appraise situations, experience emotions, and express behaviors as members of social groups rather than as individuals. In other words, people's cognitive evaluation is conducted from the perspective of the group member. Situations are appraised, not for their relevance to the individual, but for their relevance to the group to which the individual belongs. This depersonalization process is crucial in order to understand what the appropriate stakes are vis-à-vis the stimulus: People do not function anymore as unique individuals but as interchangeable exemplars of their relevant ingroup in the comparative context. Just like people turn to their ingroup in order to settle on what their beliefs and behaviors should be, a phenomenon at the heart of referent informational theory (Turner, 1991), they can be seen as relying on their group identity to work out the fundamental characteristics of the situation, react emotionally to them, and take appropriate action.

In an early test of Smith's (1993) intergroup emotion theory (IET), Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000) reasoned that the strength of the ingroup position should influence group members' emotions and action tendencies. Appraisal theories of emotion hold that anger (fear) emerges when people face a negative event, such as a conflict, and realize that they do (do not) have the necessary means to withstand a fight and, eventually, prevail. Anger (fear) will then translate into action tendencies aimed at confronting (avoiding) the source of conflict. In the scenario used by Mackie et al. (2000), participants are asked to specify whether they are members of a group that supports or opposes some controversial issue. They are then presented with information suggesting that their own group enjoys substantial (versus little) collective

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support, whereas the other group can count on little (versus substantial) support. The key dependent measures concern emotional reactions and action tendencies.

In one of their studies, Mackie et al. (2000, Experiment 2) had participants read and evaluate a list of 19 headlines supposedly taken from newspapers and related to the issue of whether homosexual couples in long-term relationships should benefit from the same legal rights as married heterosexuals. Whereas the vast majority of headlines (16 out of 19) supported the ingroup in the "strong ingroup" condition, only a minority of headlines (3 out of 19) supported the ingroup in the "weak ingroup" condition. There was also a control condition in which participants were not presented any headlines. In line with IET, participants made to believe that the ingroup was in a strong (weak) position felt more (less) angry and wanted to oppose the outgroup more (less). As expected, anger proved to be a mediator of the impact of collective support on the tendency to confront the outgroup. Unfortunately, and replicating earlier findings (Mackie et al., 2000, Experiment 1), feelings of fear and defensive action tendencies remained impervious to the manipulation.

Interesting as they may be, empirical demonstrations such as these suffer from a number of limitations (for a detailed discussion, see Yzerbyt, Dumont, Mathieu, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2006). One is that IET is mainly, if not solely, concerned with people's emotional reactions as group members *toward groups*, be it the ingroup or outgroups. That is, the ambition is to understand and predict how people may react emotionally and, as a consequence, initiate certain behaviors, based on a particular appraisal of the groups that are salient in the intergroup situation (for a similar analysis, see Parkinson, Fischer, & Manstead, 2005, and Iyer & Leach, 2008, as well as the contributions of Brown and Otten, chapters 10 and 9 in this volume), when we would argue that the targets of so-called intergroup emotions can be much more diverse and do not need to be groups per se. In its emphasis on group and group members as the target of emotions, IET is highly similar to a number of other perspectives that have been proposed in recent years.

For instance, the *stereotype content model* (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2007; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002; Fiske, Xu, Cuddy, & Glick, 1999) proposes that the nature of the intergroup relations determines the stereotypes of the outgroup. Two dimensions of the intergroup relations are considered essential: perceived status and competition. Perceived status predicts competence stereotypes: high (low) status groups are considered competent (incompetent). Perceived competition predicts warmth stereotypes (warmth stereotypes being associated with an absence of competition). Warmth and competence are seen as core dimensions of group perception and are hypothesized to lead to specific emotions (Cuddy et al., 2007; Judd, James-Hawkins, Yzerbyt, & Kashima, 2005; Phalet & Poppe, 1997; Yzerbyt, Provost, & Corneille, 2005). Similarly, Neuberg and Cottrell's (2002) *biocultural or socio-functional model* sees cognitive appraisals of intergroup relations as the first

step in a causal chain that ultimately leads to behavior. These authors argue that important threats from an outgroup to ingroup resources or group functioning elicit specific intergroup emotions. We examine the sociofunctional model in more detail later.

Having said this, the idea that perceivers undertake a cognitive evaluation of the various groups that they are confronted with constitutes a most valuable development in research on intergroup relations. Indeed, the link between this work and the stereotyping literature is obvious and promises to improve our understanding of the factors that play a role in intergroup contact. Moreover, providing evidence for the social nature of these evaluations is a real benefit. Recent empirical evidence suggests that the appraisal of specific groups is indeed likely to be shared with other members of the same group (Smith, Seger, & Mackie, 2007), confirming the impact of group membership on people's assessment of the relationships (Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003).

If one examines the research conducted under the IET umbrella, it is interesting to note that Smith and colleagues adopted only one of two possible strategies aimed at providing evidence for the existence of emotions that rest on group membership. As a matter of fact, their approach consists in changing the (alleged) objective conditions faced by the group to which people belong in the hope that this will change their subjective evaluation of the outgroup, and directly influence their feelings and action tendencies as group members. Rather than concentrating on the appraisal side of the coin, the alternative strategy, and the one we decided to implement in our research, directly addresses the social identity aspect of the phenomenon. What we have been doing is to modulate the specific social identity that is made salient. Because this strategy capitalizes on the earliest stage of the process, it tends to facilitate the examination of a wider variety of stimulus objects (not only groups) while retaining the essential feature that the emotional experience is grounded in the group. This is why we much prefer the label *group-based emotions* (GBE). The key idea is that when people are confronted with specific events, how they appraise the situation will be crucially influenced by the salient social identity, which provides the lens through which the situation is being seen.

A distinct advantage of focusing on social identity in order to elicit group-based emotions is that it clarifies the distinction between the individual and the group level. Changing the objective conditions faced by the group may also change the conditions of the individual, possibly leading to a change in individual appraisals and emotions. Therefore, it is not always certain that a manipulation of group conditions affects only group-based emotions and not individual emotions. Manipulating the social identity avoids this interpretational problem because it unambiguously moves the identity from the personal to the group level. The next section is devoted to the underlying rationale of our GBE approach.

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The impact of social context on group-based emotions

A basic assumption underlying self-categorization theory (SCT) is that people can function at different levels of identity (Turner et al., 1987). SCT makes a distinction between personal and social identity. Still, both of these levels of self-categorization are seen as valid and authentic definitions of the self. That is, people are both individual persons and members of various groups, and operating at the personal or group level is, psychologically speaking, equally real. However, it remains that the forces guiding people's behavior at one or the other level may not be the same. At the personal level, behavior is shaped by individual differences. Unique characteristics such as traits, attitudes, and the like are at the forefront and combine with situational constraints to shape people's responses. In contrast, when working at the group level, people come to perceive themselves as interchangeable exemplars of their group, and their beliefs and actions should be aligned on their under-standing of those features that define their group as opposed to a salient outgroup in the comparative context.

One illustration of the power of this mechanism can be found in a study by Verkuyten and Hagendoorn (1998). These authors reasoned that prejudice (measured by the social distance of their Dutch participants towards Turks living in The Netherlands) should be influenced by individual-level versus group-level factors as a function of whether the context emphasizes personal versus national identity. As predicted, authoritarianism, an individual differ-ence variable, influenced prejudice when personal identity was made salient. In sharp contrast, the ingroup stereotypes of Dutch about Turkish people were related to prejudice when national identity was activated.

Research outside the SCT tradition similarly illustrates the sensitivity of people's behavior to the identity under which they operate. Over the last decade, an impressive number of studies have documented the fact that per-formance in a domain is hindered when individuals feel that a group to which they belong is negatively stereotyped in that domain, a phenomenon called "stereotype threat" (Steele & Aronson, 1995). In an intriguing study, Shih, Pittinsky, and Ambady (1999) capitalized on the cultural stereotypes that quantitative skills are superior among Asians than among other ethnic groups, but are inferior among women than among men. Indeed, participants, all Asian females, performed better than a control condition when their ethnic identity had been made salient, but their performance was depressed when their gender identity was activated. In these studies, people's behavior changes in significant ways simply because one social identity among many possible others has taken precedence as a result of subtle contextual changes. Our initial studies similarly rest on this idea that social identities can be somehow "selected" so as to influence people's reactions and emotions.

In one of our early demonstrations of the role of social categorization on group-based emotions (Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001), we con-fronted students from the University of Amsterdam with a newspaper article.

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The story reported a conflict involving students from Leiden University and the professors and Board at that same university. The latter wanted to implement new policies restricting access to the university. Leiden students had not been consulted and strongly opposed the decisions. Mobilization was on its way. Our University of Amsterdam students could receive the story in a number of ways, namely as students, as people enrolled in Amsterdam, or even as individual observers. We decided to channel the way to approach this conflict by warning experimental (but not control) participants that we were interested in comparing either the reactions of people belonging to different universities or the reactions of students and professors. Crucially, this manipulation took place *before* participants were presented with the newspaper article.

To the extent that participants see themselves as belonging to the same group as the students of Leiden, a reaction we hoped would be set off in the condition comparing "students versus professors", they should adopt a perspective similar to the one found among the Leiden students and feel the emotions presumably experienced by these students. In contrast, we expected participants in the condition comparing "different universities" to see themselves and the Leiden students as members of different groups. As a consequence, the emotions felt would be less akin to those presumably experienced by the victims. Our dependent variables comprised measures of anger, happiness, anxiety, and also a measure of similarity to the Leiden students.

As predicted, participants felt angrier and less happy when the study allegedly was aimed at comparing reactions of students to those of professors as against what was observed in the other experimental condition. There was no impact of our manipulation on anxiety, another negative emotion. Interestingly, participants in the control condition spontaneously tended to distance themselves. In spite of the fact that control participants had reasons to embrace the student identity, similarity ratings showed that they contrasted away from the victims. Clearly, thus, we were able to generate divergent patterns of emotional reactions by encouraging observers of some event to draw particular contours in their social landscape.

This initial success allowed us turn to our attention to a number of additional issues. Because group-based emotion theory holds that people's emotional reactions should mediate the impact of our manipulation on action tendencies, a *first question* was whether we could extend our argument about the impact of the categorization to include the issue of action tendencies and actual behavior. A *second issue* concerns the role of identification. Although we observed that the temporary salience of one identity over another affects the chain of reactions, we wanted evidence that the impact of the contextually salient category would be moderated by the degree of chronic identification with the salient category, further establishing the group-based nature of emotions. A *third question* is whether we could find cases in which an emotion other than anger, say fear, would show the predicted pattern. *Fourth*, and finally, a convincing demonstration of the influence

of social as opposed to personal identity on cognitive appraisals, emotions, and action tendencies would be provided if one could encourage observers to embrace either the perspective of the victims or the perspective of the perpetrators. The remainder of this section deals with these four issues.

In order to address the mediating role of emotions on action tendencies and the moderating role of identification, we (Yzerbyt et al., 2003) conducted a study in which French-speaking students at the University of Louvain in Louvain-la-Neuve, Belgium, learned about a conflict between Dutch-speaking students of the University of Ghent and their university authorities. The alleged clash revolved around the unexpected decision to impose English as the language for all Master-level classes. Again, we activated one of several social identities in our participants *before* they were confronted with the critical event. Also, before we presented them with the newspaper article, we measured participants' level of chronic identification with the group they were associated with in their specific condition, namely students in general (as compared to professors) or students from Louvain-la-Neuve (as compared to students from other universities). After they had read the article, participants reported their emotional reactions (anger, sadness, fear, and happiness) as well as the related action tendencies (offensive tendencies, absence of reaction, avoidance tendencies, mocking tendencies).

As hypothesized, people's emotional reactions were not only higher on anger than on any other emotion, but anger was also the only emotion that proved sensitive to our independent variables. Moreover, as predicted, the simultaneous presence of high identification and a group membership emphasizing the similarity with the victims was conducive to higher levels of anger than any of the three other combinations. Turning to action tendencies, the specific categorization imposed on participants through the comparison context combined with their chronic identification led to the production of a pattern that was consistent with expectations. That is, participants manifested the strongest offensive action tendencies when they had been thrown in the same category as the victims and had initially expressed strong levels of identification with this category. No differences emerged among the three other combinations. Importantly, our mediational hypothesis was confirmed: The stronger offensive action tendencies of the participants who were led to see themselves as belonging to the same category as the victims (i.e., students in general) and identified highly with this category, were fully mediated by the participants' emotional reactions of anger. In sum, this study strongly supports our approach to studying GBE.

It should be noted that the categorization manipulation used here relied on sub-categorization rather than cross-categorization. Participants were either put in the shoes of students in general or in the shoes of only a subset of students, namely students from their university. In line with other work showing the impact of broadening group boundaries on social behavior and inter-group relations (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, & Rust, 1993), our findings underscore the importance of making

salient a common ingroup for the emergence of GBE and action tendencies similar to those of the victims.

The above empirical demonstrations all focused on anger as the key emotion. Moreover, no evidence was provided for the impact of context on actual behaviors. These two issues were addressed in a series of studies that took advantage of the infamous terrorist attacks against the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001 (Dumont, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2003). One of these studies (Dumont et al., Experiment 2) was conducted just 1 week after the events. After having received a full-page picture of the burning Twin Towers, participants were given one of two rationales for the study. Half of the participants were informed that the study aimed at comparing European and Arab respondents. The remaining participants learned that their responses as Europeans would be compared with those of American respondents. The identity manipulation was thus quite subtle: Whereas the first condition presented Europeans and Americans as belonging to the same group of non-Arabs, the second put forth a distinction between Europeans and Americans. Interestingly, we observed no impact of our manipulation on the identification with Europeans. As well as a series of questions aimed at tapping participants' emotional reactions and action tendencies, we also measured several behaviors.

Results confirmed that sadness and anger were strongly reported by participants, but that these emotions remained unaffected by our subtle identity manipulation. In contrast, and as predicted, making salient a context that linked participants with victims of the harmful behavior in a common ingroup led them to report more fear than when the context had participants categorize the victims as outgroup members. Moreover, we obtained clear evidence that the manipulation influenced behavioral tendencies. Informing participants that their answers would be compared to Arab respondents elicited stronger tendencies to seek information about the events and its developments, stronger tendencies to provide support and help to the victims, and stronger tendencies to talk about the events with other persons than when they thought they would be compared to American respondents. Finally, our manipulation also affected significant behaviors such as communicating personal data in order to later receive information about terrorist networks, about how to support and help the victims, or about demonstrating for NATO's intervention. These behaviors would be most relevant if one wished to reduce one's level of uncertainty, regain some subjective control over the situation, and improve self-protection, which are all possible behavioral reactions to fear.

In addition to showing that emotions other than anger prove sensitive to categorization and identity changes elicited by the context, these findings also indicate that the impact of the context extends to behavioral intentions and actual behaviors. In this respect, we can mention another interesting study that used a method very similar to ours. Levine, Prosser, Evans, and Reicher (2005) set out to explore the impact of social categorization on

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real-life helping behavior. In their first study, they recruited male Manchester United soccer club fans as participants and confronted them with an emergency incident. During the first part of the experiment, participants' identity as Manchester United fans was made salient. While walking to another building for the second part of the experiment, a confederate jogged in front of the participants and ostensibly twisted his ankle while shouting out in pain. The victim's group membership was manipulated by means of his clothing: He was either wearing a Manchester United shirt, a Liverpool FC shirt, or an unbranded sports shirt. As predicted, participants were much more likely to offer help when the victim was wearing a Manchester United shirt.

In a clever follow-up study, Levine and colleagues (2005) used the same procedure, but made a more inclusive social category salient to the participants, the superordinate category of football fans in general. This means that both Liverpool FC and Manchester United fans could now be seen as belonging to the participants' ingroup. Indeed, participants were now much more inclined to offer help when the jogger was wearing a football shirt (either Manchester United or Liverpool FC), as compared to a neutral sports shirt. The large effect of social categorization in these studies is remarkable given the history of intense rivalry between the two teams. Even though no information was collected regarding participants' appraisals and emotional reactions, these results bear striking similarity to our own work.

The fourth and final issue of this section discusses another attempt to emphasize the role of social categorization in the emergence of emotions. We wanted to show that the same observers could be led to see themselves as victims or perpetrators of a particular event, and to feel angry or content as a function of the particular "social" shoes they were led to walk in. Of course, we also intended to trigger systematic differences in people's appraisal of the very same situation as well as in their behavioral intentions.

Addressing this question allowed us to establish a direct link with fascinating research conducted over recent years on collective guilt. Specifically, this work examined the conditions under which people experience guilt and shame with respect to harmful behavior perpetrated by members of the ingroup on members of other groups. In one telling study (Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, & Manstead, 1998, Experiment 2), Dutch participants first completed an identification questionnaire pertaining to their identity as Dutch people. They were then confronted with one of three sets of information about the conduct of Dutch people in one of their former colonies. Depending on conditions, the information was either consistently negative, both negative and positive, or consistently positive.

Not surprisingly, whereas participants in the negative conduct condition felt guilty and very much wanted to compensate for their ancestors' misbehavior, the reverse pattern emerged in the positive conduct condition. The most interesting data however concern the ambiguous condition. When the behaviors of the Dutch colonial forces turned out to be both positive and negative, only those participants who were not strongly identified expressed

guilt and agreed to compensate. In contrast, high identifiers expressed significantly less guilt and were not ready to offer compensation for the way their ancestors acted. These findings suggest that identification very much orients people's interpretation of events, even distant ones, thereby shaping their emotional reactions and willingness to engage in specific actions.

In one of our studies (Gordijn, Yzerbyt, Wigboldus, & Dumont, 2006), the goal was to show that the *very same* people could be led into reacting either like victims or like perpetrators simply by taking advantage of the existence of social identities linking people to either one of these two kinds of protagonists in some conflict. This time, we took advantage of the particular situation with which US universities are confronted, whereby out-of-state students pay more than their in-state colleagues to attend classes. We informed in-state students from the University of Colorado at Boulder that their State House Representatives had decided to raise the tuition by 35% for out-of-state students. This information was conveyed *right after* we had indicated to our participants that we wanted their opinion and reactions on a series of newspaper articles either *as students* (allegedly in order to compare them with non-students) or *as Colorado residents* (allegedly in order to compare them with people from other states), and had asked them to complete a scale tapping their identification with the relevant category. We then measured participants' appraisals of the policy adopted by Colorado State House Representatives as well as their emotional reactions and action tendencies. Note here that we had never directly examined appraisals before. We were thus very interested to look at the perception of legitimacy and justice associated with the policy as a function of the particular social identity we imposed on participants.

Replicating our previous findings, we confirmed that participants thinking of themselves as connected to the victims through the salient identity (students) reported more anger when they had initially indicated that they were strongly rather than weakly identified with the category of students. Importantly, a mirror pattern emerged for participants in the condition where their identity associated them to the perpetrators (Colorado residents). The more these participants identified with their state, the less angry they felt about the policy adopted by their State House Representatives. As far as appraisals and action tendencies are concerned, there were interesting effects of identification within each social identity condition. Participants induced to think of themselves as linked to the victims saw the decision as less acceptable and reported a stronger willingness to take action against the proposal as a function of their identification with the group of victims. In contrast, in the condition where similarities with the perpetrators were made salient, participants now saw the situation as less wrong and expressed more support for the decision when they identified more with the perpetrators.

Finally, a most compelling piece of evidence regarding the viability of the proposed links between categorization, appraisals, GBE, and action tendencies comes from evidence that the interactive impact of categorization and

identification on participants' action tendencies was mediated by how illegitimate they perceived the situation, which was itself mediated by how angry they felt. These data provide very strong support for the validity of our approach to GBE. They nicely complement the findings reported by Doosje and colleagues (1998) in showing that people can be manipulated into approaching a situation from very different perspectives. Depending on the specific social landscape that was activated in their particular case, observers understood the same events, reacted emotionally to them, and intended to do something about them in ways that varied dramatically. A recent study by Pennekamp, Doosje, Zebel, and Fischer (2007) further suggests that different perspectives associated with different social identities also seem to be able to exert their influence within one person. For Surinamese who have migrated to the Netherlands, Surinamese identification had a positive relation with the perceived relevance of the past slavery, which led to more group-based anger, whereas identification with the Netherlands was related to putting the slavery in a historical perspective and was associated with less group-based anger.

Drawing on our argument regarding the impact of categorization on group-based emotions (Yzerbyt, Dumont, Gordijn, & Wigboldus, 2002), Wohl and Branscombe (2004) conducted an internet study in which Jewish participants assigned more or less collective guilt for the Holocaust to Germans, expressed more or less willingness to forgive Germans, and judged genocide as being more or less pervasive as a function of the specific identities that were activated at the outset of the questionnaire, either Jews (versus Germans) or human beings. Again, the message here is that there is definitely more than one identity that observers can embrace when they approach a situation.

Clearly, our efforts, and now other people's work, show that, rather than leaving it all up to the observers, one can channel the social identity they adopt so as to orient their subsequent appraisals, emotions, action tendencies, and indeed behaviors. In the next section, we turn to our latest empirical work, illustrating once more how changes in social identity have non-trivial consequences in the kinds of appraisals and emotions experienced by people.

The power of group-based emotions

The studies presented in the previous section emphasize the fact that emotions such as anger or even fear can be modulated by the specific social landscape that is being promoted in the situation and the particular social identity endorsed by the perceivers. We thought it useful to provide even more unambiguous evidence to this effect. Therefore we decided to show that people's salient social identity can change the entire profile of appraisals and emotions that people experience. To test this hypothesis, we decided to draw on the work by Neuberg and Cottrell (2002) and once again show the versatility of people's group-based emotions.

In their biocultural (or sociofunctional) theoretical model of group-based emotions, Neuberg and Cottrell (2002; Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005) argue that

certain specific intergroup threats are related to the experience of specific intergroup emotions and specific behavioral tendencies toward the outgroup. According to the authors, our dependence on the group during our evolutionary history has made us sensitive to threats to group-level resources and obstructions to efficient group functioning. Intergroup emotions are a response to those group-level threats, and they help us to effectively deal with them by bringing about adaptive behavioral intentions (although the reported data are limited to threats and emotions while behavioral tendencies are not discussed). Interestingly enough, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) have not at all incorporated the theories of social identity and self-categorization into their model. In other words, they fail to take into account the flexibility of people's identity that is emphasized in these approaches. In our view, however, the same intergroup situation can be interpreted differently depending on the contextually salient social identity. If one social identity is more salient than another, this should have an impact on relevant emotions and behavioral tendencies.

We investigated this idea using Muslims as the target outgroup and young female students as participants. In general and across studies, all participants completed the same questionnaire, but we manipulated the salient social identity as in previous studies. The first study (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2008) had three social identity conditions. In one condition, respondents were asked for their opinion as *women*. They were told their responses would be compared to those of men, and were asked to answer some questions about identification with other women. In a second condition, respondents were asked for their opinion as *young persons*, and the salience of that identity was manipulated in the same way as in the woman condition. There was also a control condition in which respondents were asked for their opinion with no further instruction.

From Neuberg and Cottrell's (2002) sociofunctional model, we selected seven intergroup threats to be included in our study. Some of these were deemed especially relevant to the woman social identity. Indeed, the public discourse about Muslims often emphasizes their supposedly very different cultural background. One of the differences that is most discussed is the allegedly subordinate position of women in the Muslim community. We therefore considered "threat to personal freedoms and rights" and "threat to group values" to be particularly relevant for women. Furthermore, Muslims are associated with street violence and harassment. Women are physically weaker than men so we considered "threat to physical safety" to be particularly relevant for women as well. As irrelevant threats, we chose "threat to trust relations", "threat to reciprocity relations", "threat to the perception of the ingroup's morality", and "threat to health via contagion". We do not claim that women do not experience these threats, but that they are not *especially* relevant to women (i.e., more relevant to women than to men). We predicted that female students in the woman condition would report higher threat appraisals for the relevant threats but not for the irrelevant threats.

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Furthermore, using the theoretical connections between threats and emotions put forward in the sociofunctional model, fear and disgust should be linked to the relevant threats and thus should also be higher in the woman condition. Pity and guilt are not linked to any of the relevant threats, so no differences were expected for these two emotions. The results of this first study largely confirmed our expectations: The differences between the woman condition and the control condition were significantly larger for relevant threats and emotions than for irrelevant threats and emotions. Respondents in the "young person" condition generally did not differ much from the control condition. Interestingly, and confirming the general idea of the sociofunctional model, the impact of the social identity manipulation on fear and disgust was fully mediated by the relevant threat appraisals.

In a follow-up study (Kuppens & Yzerbyt, 2008), we dropped the young person condition and thus only had a control condition and a woman condition. In the control condition, we told participants that we were interested in individual differences regarding the attitude toward Muslims and we explicitly asked them for their personal opinion. In addition to the relevant (fear, disgust) and irrelevant (guilt, pity) emotions from the first study, we now also included measures of envy and admiration as additional irrelevant emotions. Results replicated our first study. As predicted, the differences between the woman condition and the control condition were significantly larger for relevant threats and emotions than for irrelevant ones.

The sociofunctional model also addresses behavioral tendencies. Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) proposed behavioral tendencies that are directly aimed at removing the relevant group-based threat. For instance, the proposed behavioral reaction to a threat to group values is to "maintain and confirm the value system", and the proposed reaction to endangered physical safety is to "protect self and valued others". However, these authors report no data that support their contention. We included measures of the behavioral tendencies proposed by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) in both our studies. Moreover, as the relevant emotions in our studies (fear and disgust) could theoretically lead to a more general avoidance behavioral intention, we also included items that tap the general intention to avoid Muslims. None of the behavioral intentions proposed by Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) proved sensitive to our social identity manipulation. In contrast, participants in the women condition in the second study reported a stronger intention to avoid Muslims, compared to the control condition (in the first study there was a nonsignificant trend in the same direction).

Taken together, these two studies provide most encouraging support for the idea that the sociofunctional model of intergroup emotions can be fruitfully integrated with the self-categorization approach to produce findings that are fully in line with our group-based emotion model. The contextually relevant social identity clearly has an impact on perceived threats and reported emotions and behavioral tendencies. These results strengthen the support for a flexible view on group-based emotions, even when applying a model based

on evolved reactions to intergroup threats. Furthermore, although previous studies had already shown the influence of social identity manipulation on group-based anger and fear, these studies add to earlier findings by showing an effect for disgust.

Conclusion

We started this chapter with a reminder about the attitude–behavior discrepancy, a well-known concern among social psychologists. It is our view that this issue is generally presented in a problematic way. The traditional view is that people have a certain personality and hold attitudes that persist across time, but that they are confronted with a number of obstacles and constraints in various situations that lead them to behave in "discrepant" ways. We propose an alternative view based on self-categorization theory, namely that people are more often than not changed in essential ways because of the situations that they find themselves in. To the extent that social perceivers endorse different identities, whether at a personal or social level, or one social identity versus another, they are likely to appraise the world around them in radically different ways. These divergent but nevertheless authentic experiences of the environment trigger different emotional experiences and materialize in different behaviors.

After presenting the theoretical arsenal and empirical strategy underlying most contemporary perspectives that deal with so-called intergroup emotions, we detailed our own strategy for establishing the significance of group-based emotions. The innovative character of our approach resides in our directly manipulating the salient social identity of participants. As a set, our research findings offer a most convincing demonstration that emotional reactions and their associated behaviors are indeed grounded in the social identity of perceivers. By promoting a particular approach to the social landscape, social perceivers can be shown to manifest radically different emotions and behaviors. The bottom-line message of our work is thus that in order to change people's emotions, it may be worth trying to change who people are and to do so by engineering the way they define their social environment in the salient comparative context. Such a modification may be greatly facilitated to the extent that one fully understands how people change as a function of whom they associate with at a psychological level.

In our view, a series of fascinating questions emerge from our research on group-based emotions and definitely deserve to be investigated. First and foremost, we would like to suggest that people remain generally blind to the fact that they would be likely to react differently, sometimes in dramatic ways, if they had been led to approach the environment with a different social identity. This is most intriguing because it means that people remain generally unable to appreciate the importance and consequences of the construal of a situation. If people were able to do this better, they may find themselves in a better position to appreciate the perspective of another person and avoid

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misunderstandings (Demoulin, Leyens, & Dovidio, 2008). This relative inability to embrace a different perspective for oneself would seem to be related to the difficulty of showing consideration for the views of others. We are currently interested in the relation that may or may not exist between these two skills.

To date, our work on group-based emotions has always examined the impact of identity on the emotional experience (for a review, see Yzerbyt et al., 2006). Another issue that deserves closer attention concerns the reverse causal link (see also Kessler & Hollbach, 2005). Is it the case that emotions may guide the adoption of specific identities? In other words, is it possible that people end up endorsing one social identity more easily than another as a function of the specific emotion that they feel on being confronted with some new event involving different people belonging to various groups?

It is important to emphasize that our research program takes a decidedly unusual perspective regarding the variability of human behavior, in particular when it comes to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. As a matter of fact, we argue that it is much easier to provide an account for the stability by of human behavior capitalizing on flexibility than to explain flexibility from stability. This viewpoint leads us to propose that people who want to modify intergroup behavior could do so by trying to see how it is possible to vary the specific vantage point that individual perceivers adopt rather than trying to change social groups in their entirety (Yzerbyt, 2006). Although we quite realize that this angle has seldom attracted the attention of policy makers, it would nevertheless seem to be a most promising avenue.

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