The dimensional compensation model:

Reality and strategic constraints on warmth and competence in intergroup perceptions

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Social perceivers rely on two fundamental content dimensions to describe themselves and others, i.e., warmth/communion and competence/agency (Fiske, 2015). These two dimensions reflect core challenges of human life, namely ‘getting along’ and ‘getting ahead’, and epistemic motives, that is, understanding intentions and assessing resources. If people navigate the world as individuals and rely on interpersonal social cognition to orient interpersonal behavior, they also belong to larger social entities. As members of groups, people build upon intergroup perception to shape their intergroup behavior (Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). The present chapter brings together the work on fundamental dimensions and the research on intergroup relations and shows that intergroup perception often leads to compensation between both dimensions (Yzerbyt, 2016). The first part of the chapter explains how the Stereotype Content Model has proposed that two dimensions apply to the perception of groups in general and stereotypes in particular. A closer examination of the model and the empirical work it generated reveals that stereotypes are most often ‘mixed’ in terms of the two fundamental dimensions. The second part combines the insights of social perception work and the intergroup relations literature and presents the dimensional compensation model and its various empirical tests. The following three parts examine the consequences of this dimensional compensation effect, detail some boundary conditions, and present new evidence regarding its underlying mechanisms. The final part concludes with a series of directions for future research.
The dimensional compensation model

The two fundamental dimensions of stereotyping and intergroup stereotypes

Within the field of social perception, the Stereotype Content Model (SCM) (Fiske et al., 2002; for a review, see Fiske 2015; see also Fiske, in this volume) builds upon a long tradition of research (e.g., Katz & Braly, 1935) as well as more recent contributions (Phalet & Poppe, 1997) on the issue of attitudes and stereotypes. This model offers a rich account of the antecedents and consequences of the specific views that social perceivers form about the people and groups that comprise their social world. Indeed, a central tenet is that people and groups differ in the extent to which they possess status, power, and resources and that they cooperate or compete with each other. As such, these two unmistakable features of social interactions constrain the way perceivers form their impressions of groups and group members. In turn, the latter shape people’s affective reactions and orient their behaviors (Cuddy et al., 2008).

Clearly, the two structural aspects of competition/cooperation and resources orchestrate people’s views at the psychological level. On the one hand, the assumed intentions of the target (do the members of this group mean well, does this social target harbor positive goals?) translate into judgments of warmth/communion. On the other, the power and resources believed to characterize the target (is this group is a position to make their intentions come true, given the goals of this social target, are the necessary means available) convert into judgments of competence/agency.

Importantly, whereas earlier work on social perception stressed the importance of evaluative consistency, with judgments falling by and large on a single dimension ranging from bad to good, SCM researchers expected and repeatedly found that these two dimensions are orthogonal and form a bidimensional space crossing low to high competence and low to high warmth.

In spite of the wide acclaim of the SCM and the impressive amount of supportive evidence (Fiske, 2015; Fiske, this volume), even SCM researchers note that a substantial number of the groups tend to fall in the ambivalent quadrants, i.e., the high-competence-low-warmth quadrant and the low-competence-high-warmth one (Durante et al., 2013; Durante et al., 2017). Moreover,
experimental work by SCM scholars on such specific groups as career women (Cuddy et al., 2004) and old people (Cuddy et al., 2005) suggest that ambivalence is often the pair of glasses through which perceivers appraise particular group members. Finally, the related work on ambivalent sexism conducted by Glick and Fiske (1996) reveals that hostile and benevolent sexism largely portray women in terms that correspond to these two quadrants. Hostile sexism has it that women are skilled, yet sly and ill-intentioned creatures, and globally tempting and using men to take advantage of them. In contrast, benevolent sexism conceives of women as adorable yet fragile people, worthy of love but not quite able to navigate the social world. In sum, the orthogonality of the fundamental dimensions of warmth and competence may well apply as a rule but a negative relation tends to emerge between the two fundamental dimensions whenever one focuses on perceptions of particular pairs of groups in the context of actual social interactions.

Turning to the intergroup literature, a seemingly different account emerges with respect to the origins and functions of stereotypes. According to Social Identity Theory (SIT; Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), stereotypes serve to explain, rationalize, and justify the social world as well as intergroup behavior. That is, stereotypes not only account for the nature of people and their relations but they also serve a series of motives (Yzerbyt & Corneille, 2005). This is because people derive their sense of worth from their membership into social groups. In other words, social perceivers’ needs in terms of self-regard are satisfied to the extent that they belong to groups that come across as valuable, preferably better than other groups. This search for positive distinctiveness is believed to account for many of the biases that materialize in stereotypes, prejudice, and discriminatory behaviors in the real world (for a review, see Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010).

To be sure, people’s love for their group does not necessarily mean that they will consider their ingroup superior to other groups on all counts. Doing so would not only be delusional but probably counterproductive as well. In fact, reflecting on the specific measurement tools mobilized by the Social Identity researchers, Mummendey & Schreiber (1983) conjectured that ingroup bias may seem to emerge inevitably because group members face only one judgment dimension on which
they can differentiate between the ingroup and the outgroup. After all, this methodological option mimics the realistic conflict theory setting imagined by Sherif (1966) and it is thus hardly surprising that groups are bound to compete, if only symbolically, in order to secure a dominant position in such a situation. Interestingly, these authors show that, when a more varied set of dimensions is available for evaluation purposes, group members mobilize only a subset of characteristics to affirm their superiority. Establishing ingroup bias on some selected dimension would seem to give the possibility to bear with outgroup bias on other, less crucial, dimensions. Upon scrutiny, the criteria chosen to materialize the dominant position of one’s group are far from being indifferent. To be sure, reality constraints are entering the picture and group members on both sides of the fence are likely to consider them but the real question is how these checks translate into judgments. Are there lawful connections between ‘objective’ aspects of the intergroup situation and the more subjective understanding of the groups and people in presence? And what are the factors that modulate the resulting picture? SIT remains mostly silent about these questions. As the next section shows, this is where the work on the Stereotyping Content Model (SCM: Fiske et al., 2002) comes in handy.

**The compensation in intergroup stereotypes: Initial demonstrations**

In most situations of real life, multiple dimensions are available for group evaluation. It thus seems possible to combine insights from SIT in the intergroup relations domain whereby group members search for positive distinctiveness with the SCM findings regarding the role and importance of the two fundamental dimensions of social perception. One important lesson from the SIT tradition is that the comparative context imposes itself in any situation involving two groups. So, if it is indeed the case that perceivers appraise social targets in terms of competence and warmth, group members would compare groups in terms of aspects that boil down to these two trait domains. On the one hand, people would evaluate groups on a global dimension of competence that would readily translate the concrete relative positions of the groups with respect to status, power, and resources. On the other, group members could rate groups in terms of social features that conveys the nature
of their collaboration. In light of the long tradition in intergroup contact and conflict, we focused on situations in which perceivers rarely take more than two groups into consideration, most often the ingroup and the outgroup but also sometimes two target groups that are evaluated from an observer’s perspective. Drawing on Mummendey & Schreiber (1983), we reasoned that one group is likely to end up higher on competence than the other but that, at the same time, the other group should be rated more favorably on warmth. As such, this negative relation between judgments on the two dimensions in social situations, which we called compensation (Yzerbyt, Provost & Corneille, 2005), should provide group members with a means to secure positive distinctiveness while avoiding the unrealistic and indeed socially sanctioned move of affirming superiority on every aspect. This prediction of compensation is fully in line with the notion of social creativity (Lemaine, 1974): each group finds a way to shine on some dimension of comparison.

In the first empirical test of compensation (Yzerbyt et al., 2005), we relied on a full-crossed design. French-speaking Belgian and French participants evaluated both French-speaking Belgians and French on traits related to warmth and competence. France enjoys higher cultural prestige and is politically and economically more important than Belgium. Given these structural differences, we hypothesized that citizens of these two countries would rate French higher than Belgians in terms of competence. We also expected participants to see Belgians as warmer than French. Crucially, we hoped participants from both groups to agree on the relative standing of the groups on these two dimensions. The data fully corroborated our predictions (see Figure 1). Interestingly, both groups also seemed keen to exacerbate (minimize) the difference between the two groups on their preferred (less preferred) dimension.
Although such data illustrate the real-life relevance of the compensatory relation between these two dimensions in intergroup evaluations, one limitation is that the observed compensation rests on existing knowledge. In a more stringent test of compensation using an experimental approach (Judd et al., 2005, Expt. 1a and 1b), we manipulated the information given to participants on one of the two dimensions and examined their judgments on both dimensions. Any difference on the non-manipulated dimension would show that perceivers make inferences beyond the information given. A pattern known as halo would result if this difference parallels the one on the manipulated dimension. Compensation would materialize instead if the difference goes in the opposite direction. We predicted the latter.

Concretely, participants learned that they were to form an impression of two social groups. First, they read a series of 32 behaviors, half allegedly performed by a member of one group (Blue) and half by a member of the other group (Green). For each group, half of the behaviors (8)
concerned one dimension, e.g., competence. Whereas the majority of these (6) were positive for one of the two groups, they were negative for the other. As for the remaining behaviors, they were either neutral on both dimensions (4) or pertained to the other dimension, half of them (2) being positive and half (2) negative. Next, participants sorted the cards according to groups, read all sorted behaviors again and, to encourage impression formation, wrote a short text about each group. Finally, they rated both groups on four scales which measured competence (capable, skilled, lazy, disorganized) and four which tapped warmth (sociable, caring, insensitive, unfriendly).

![Figure 2. Competence and Warmth rating of High and Low targets for High and Low judges](image)

As expected, participants noticed the built-in difference between the two groups, whether we manipulated competence or warmth. More crucially, they compensated on the other dimension. Thus, even when perceivers contemplate unknown groups, their judgments reveal a negative relation between competence and warmth. Compensation even showed up in negative correlations between the group differences on the two dimensions, that is, the larger the perceived difference between the groups on the manipulated dimension, the larger the perceived difference between them on the other dimension in the opposite direction. Along with several others (Judd, et al., 2005; Kervyn et al.,
2009; Yzerbyt et al., 2008), this experiment clearly demonstrates perceivers’ propensity to imbue a group that is more competent (warm) than another with comparatively less warmth (competence).

Contrary to Yzerbyt et al.’s (2005) initial study, the above participants did not belong to either the Blue or the Green group. A follow-up experiment (Judd et al., 2005, Expt 5) examined this issue using a minimal group paradigm. Participants learned that their profile on an initial perceptual task made them members of the high or the low competence group before receiving the group information. Compensation emerged and, replicating Yzerbyt et al.’s earlier findings, members of each group enhanced the positive regard in which they held their ingroup relative to their regard for the outgroup (see Figure 2). That is, compared to the members of the low-competence group, the members of the high-competence group saw more of a difference in competence between the two groups and less of a difference in warmth. Still, even they were unable to deny the compensation as they acknowledged that their own group might be less warm than the other group. These judgments emerge despite the fact that the objective information provided to participants indicates that both groups are comparable on the second dimension.

Consequences of compensation

Compensation emerges in surprisingly diverse settings, sometimes with non-trivial and even counterintuitive consequences (for reviews, see Kervyn et al., 2010; Yzerbyt, 2016). One illustration of the startling impact of compensatory judgments is how they guide information-gathering strategies (Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Judd & Nunes, 2009). Indeed, a most striking phenomenon in social perception concerns perceptual and behavioral confirmation (Snyder, 1984): Perceivers are particularly adept at verifying their prior views of others. In particular, they shape other people’s behavior and have them support their favored conclusions, a phenomenon known as self-fulfilling prophecy. Interestingly, research has always stressed that perceivers notice information and generate hypotheses of a similar valence, leading to a halo confirmation effect (Snyder, Tanke & Berscheid, 1977).
We wanted to see whether compensation instead could materialize in the judgments and behaviors of the target people. In a first experiment (Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Judd & Nunes, 2009, Expt. 1), participants underwent the Judd et al. (2005) manipulation with one additional twist. Specifically, participants received a list of questions and had to select those they found most useful in gaining further information. For the questions pertaining to the manipulated dimension, participants selected the ones implying the high (low) end of the dimension to be asked to the high (low) group. More interestingly, they also selected questions manifesting a compensatory pattern on the unmanipulated dimension. A second experiment (Kervyn et al., 2009, Expt. 2) looked at the bias in the answers made available as a result. Pretest participants answered the questions selected in Experiment 1 and experimental participants received their answers. Some read the answers to 10 questions most often selected for the high competence group and the answers to the 10 questions most often selected for the low competence group. Others read the answers to the questions posed to the high and the low warmth groups. In both cases, the group impressions formed by experimental participants revealed compensation on the other dimension.

In a final experiment (Kervyn et al., 2009, Expt 3), we examined actual interactions by inviting three participants at a time to the lab for an interview scenario. Two of the participants, the interviewees, were made to believe that they were each member of one of two groups while the third, the interviewer, asked a series of 20 questions. The 10 questions selected most often for the high competence (warmth) group were posed to the corresponding group member and the 10 questions selected most often for the low competence (warmth) group were asked to the other interviewee. All three participants then rated the two interviewees and their groups. For interviewers, compensation emerged whether the judgments concerned the interviewees or their groups. For the interviewees, compensation materialized in the ratings of the groups and of the other interviewee (only when the manipulation concerned competence). Only self-ratings failed to show compensation. In sum, compensation not only shapes social perception but it also constrains
behaviors, even shaping the views of the group members about the groups in presence. Clearly, thus, compensation affects people’s judgments in a variety of ways (for a review, see Kervyn et al., 2010).

Compensation in an intergroup context: Boundary conditions

The initial studies that investigated compensation all involved some form of comparison between a few targets, ideally two. This may suggest that the compensatory logic may be less likely to apply whenever a social target is appraised in isolation or when more than two targets are considered. We tested this idea by having participants evaluate only one group, either the high competence or the low competence group, and rate the group on both competence and warmth (Judd et al., 2005, Expt. 4). Interestingly, the high competence group ended up being judged slightly warmer than the low competence group. There was thus no evidence of compensation and even a tendency for a halo effect. These data notwithstanding, it is often difficult to avoid comparison in the social domain. The above pattern emerged in a study where respondents learned about a new group in a rather decontextualized setting. As the abundant literature on social comparison stresses, social perceivers are prone to compare any social target with others, in particular when they are themselves members of one of the groups. In short, halo is hard to obtain when comparison concerns intrude the situation.

Another remarkable feature of the situations examined in early compensation work has to do with the gap between the groups on one of the two dimensions as well as the absence of conflict. We decided to investigate the impact of these two factors more systematically in a series of studies (Cambon, Yzerbyt & Yakimova, 2015; Cambon & Yzerbyt, 2016). Using a minimal group paradigm (Cambon et al., 2015, Expt 1), we had groups of 4 to 6 participants fill in a bogus personality test measuring either their competence or their warmth. In the asymmetrical conditions, one half of the group members received high scores and the remaining ones low scores on the manipulated dimension and were then assigned to two different subgroups on the basis of this score. In the symmetrical conditions, all participants received either a high or a low score on the manipulated dimension and joined the two groups on a random basis. Subgroups then went to separate rooms.
and filled in some questionnaire. The topic of this questionnaire allowed manipulating the level of symbolic conflict by telling the subgroup members that the other subgroup in the session had either the same or a different view on the topic. Participants then rated their subgroup and the other subgroup on both dimensions. Depending on conditions, the manipulated dimension was thus the ingroup’s preferred dimension, i.e., the ingroup allegedly scoring high on this dimension, or the outgroup’s preferred dimension, i.e., the ingroup allegedly scoring low on this dimension. As predicted, compensation emerged only when there was a clear difference on the manipulated dimension between the two groups and conflict was absent (see Figure 3, top panel). At the other extreme, the lack of initial difference and the presence of conflict led participants to express strong ingroup bias on both dimensions (see Figure 3; bottom panel).

Figure 3. Ratings of ingroup and outgroup on ingroup and outgroup preferred dimension as a function of conflict and intergroup difference.

A second experiment (Cambon et al., 2015, Expt 1) turned to existing groups and had psychology students evaluate their ingroup as well as a very superior (medical students), a superior (economy students), an equal (sociology students), an inferior (special education students), or a very
inferior (auxiliary nurses) outgroup. We also manipulated the level of conflict. Rather than a symbolic conflict, we relied on realistic threat. The outgroup department was versus was not likely to move and occupy the psychology building, one of the nicest buildings on campus. In line with predictions (see Figure 4), compensation emerged more strongly in low-conflict situations that involved a different status between the groups. Whereas the initial status difference readily translated into competence and led to clear compensation on warmth with a low level of conflict, ingroup bias emerged on both fundamental dimensions when the participants thought the outgroup posed a threat. Interestingly, conflict led participants to exacerbate the difference on the ingroup’s preferred dimension, i.e., competence and warmth for the (very) inferior outgroup and the (very) superior outgroup conditions, respectively.

Figure 4. Compensation (computed as ingroup bias on competence minus ingroup bias on warmth) as a function of status of the outgroup and level of conflict

These results not only show that conflict disrupts compensation but they also underscore the importance of existing group differences for compensatory judgments to emerge. When groups enjoy a comparable status, participants acknowledge the similarity in competence and prove reluctant to make a distinction on warmth, again as long as there is no conflict. This impact of group
The dimensional compensation model also showed in a study with natural groups judging each other, using a variety of hierarchical levels within two organizations (Cambon & Yzerbyt, 2016). Here too, in the absence of conflict, compensation emerged more strongly when the groups were further apart in terms of status. In fact, Cambon et al. (2015, Expt. 2) found that status difference materialized in a preference for compensation over ingroup bias only to the extent that group members see the intergroup gap as legitimate and stable.

A most intriguing lesson from the above studies is also that group stereotypes are fluid and context-based (Leyens, Yzerbyt, & Schadron, 1994; Turner, Oakes, & Haslam, 1994; Yzerbyt & Demoulin, 2010). That is, groups may be seen as more competent than warm in a given comparison context and warmer than competent in another. A series of studies using countries as the target groups (Kervyn, Yzerbyt, Judd & Demoulin, 2010) illustrates this point. In a first experiment (Kervyn et al., 2010; Expt. 1), participants rated Canada on competence and warmth in one of three different conditions. In the control condition, Canada came out as moderately competent and warm. When participants evaluated Brazil before Canada, the latter country came across as more competent than warm. In contrast, when they first evaluated Japan, Canada was now less competent than warm. A second experiment (Kervyn et al., 2010, Expt. 2) showed that this fluidity also affected participants’ own group. Compared to a control condition in which Belgian participants evaluated their country, Belgium appeared less competent and warmer when participants first contemplated Germany and the other way around when they initially rated Italy. In sum, even though compensatory judgments are lawful, they are not necessarily referring to inherent properties of the social targets. Rather, they constitute evaluations that are highly responsive to the salient structural aspects of the social setting.

**The routes to intergroup compensation**

Although our research program stresses the robustness of the compensation in social perception and accumulated impressive evidence that compensation matters in social interactions, the reasons underlying its emergence remain largely unknown. As mentioned above the prime concern is likely to
be the group’s relative standing in the comparative context. At a very basic level, if group members were unable to assert their superiority on one of the two fundamental dimensions would they grant the outgroup superiority on the other dimension? And does this depend on being able to shine on the one dimension that they deem important for themselves in the situation? In all likelihood, the search for positive distinctiveness surely remains a key factor in the emergence of compensation.

We tested this idea in two experiments using a deceptively simple stratagem to confront people with the possibility of conceding superiority to the outgroup (Yzerbyt & Cambon, 2017). We started from the realization that research on compensation always presented participants with an opportunity to rate each one of the two groups on both dimensions. We decided to prevent this and instead to present group members with only one dimension (at least initially). We were especially interested in those cases where the dimension was not the one that group members would spontaneously associate with their group. When group members appraise groups in terms of the dimensions that are spontaneously associated with their group, i.e., competence for the high-status groups and warmth for the low-status groups, things should be easy. We therefore predicted compensation in all these ‘comfortable’ situations. A much more challenging situation arises when people fail to meet initially with their preferred dimension and instead have to consider the other dimension. In these ‘uncomfortable’ situations, we expected no compensation. The findings fully confirmed our predictions (Yzerbyt & Cambon, 2017).

As it turns out, the data also revealed a somewhat different pattern depending on the status of the groups. High-status group members did not hesitate to indicate their superiority on warmth, a judgment we had never observed when both dimensions were available. In contrast, low-status group members were less willing to assert superiority on competence and indeed failed to do so when the status difference was greatest. We would argue that these different reactions emphasize the reality constraints attached to the two fundamental dimensions in that self-ascription of warmth seems more subjective, more ‘negotiable’, than claims of competence (Tausch, Kenworthy, & Hewstone, 2007). In our opinion, if a ‘the winner takes it all’ posture fails to emerge in most real life
situations it is because of the possible social sanctions attached to it (Plant & Devine, 2001). Normative pressures are likely to play a role in the judgments of high-status groups about low-status groups (Owuamalam, Wong, & Rubin, 2016). In line with this reasoning, we also measured the perceived norms on non-discrimination and, as predicted, the more high-status group members proved sensitive to such norms, the more they compensated (Yzerbyt & Cambon, 2017, Expt. 2).

In a recent study (Cambon & Yzerbyt, 2017), we tested this ‘normative’ account using a ‘testing-process-by-interaction’ strategy (Jacoby & Sassenberg, 2011). Specifically, we manipulated the pressures towards non-discrimination by activating either a non-discrimination or a non-censorship norm. We hypothesized that the activation of the non-discrimination norm would make high-status participants aware of the pressures toward non-discrimination and lead to compensation. In contrast, activating a norm that questioned political correctness and censorship and promoted ‘honesty’ should attenuate the awareness of non-discrimination pressures and make high-status groups less reluctant to express their “unrestrained” views of the groups on both fundamental dimensions. As predicted, these effects only occurred for high-status group members because their advantageous position in the experimental setting (they received positive feedback regarding their status) makes them more sensitive to the norms toward (non-)discrimination. Such data go a long way to confirm that sensitivity to ambient norms may come as a viable reason for high-status group members to compensate, a pattern known as ‘noblesse oblige’ (Vanbeselaere, Boen, Van Avermaet, & Buelens, 2006).

What about the low-status group members? In all likelihood, the key here is again the search for positive distinctiveness. However, their outgroup bias on competence can hardly rests on magnanimity. In contrast, it is their ingroup bias on warmth that ought to be seen as a direct response to their predicament. Given the social hierarchy in terms of prestige, status, and resources, promoting one’s group on warmth is the safest way to ensure a comparative edge to the members of the low-status group. Building upon several lines of research (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Lemyre & Smith, 1985), we would argue that self-esteem is at the heart of the process for low-status groups.
Interestingly, if the dividends of compensation reside in the ability to secure positive self-esteem, then it should be possible to reassure people via alternative means. This rationale is consistent with several strands of work (Becker, 2012; Derks, van Laar, & Ellemers, 2007; Fein & Spencer, 1997) and holds that compensation serves an affirmation function. In our experiment, we did or did not give participants the possibility to self-affirm before describing both groups (Cambon & Yzerbyt, 2017). We predicted that only participants given the opportunity to self-affirm would not need to compensate because the affirmation manipulation would have boosted their self-esteem. We predicted that these effects would take place only among low-status group members for two reasons. First, the status feedback should not threaten high-status group members’ self-esteem so the latter should not experience any need to restore it. Second, high-status group members’ self-esteem is likely to be high and there is evidence that self-affirmation fails to affect high self-esteem participants. Our data fully confirmed these predictions.

To sum up, the search for positive distinctiveness is a key aspect underlying compensation in group members’ judgments. However, this search materializes in very different ways for members of the high-status and of the low-status groups essentially because of higher reality constraints for competence than for warmth. Although high-status groups are tempted to favor the ingroup on all counts, they are at least sensitive to social norms of non-discrimination. The story for low-status group members is entirely different as they depend on favorable warmth ratings to restore their threatened self-esteem.

**Conclusions**

When people evaluate their ingroup and some outgroup, they often avoid favoring their ingroup on all counts. Instead of derogating the outgroup across the board, group members are keen to select only selected aspects to secure their positive distinctiveness while conceding some value to the outgroup on other aspects. In the present chapter, we relied on these two dimensions of warmth and competence evidence by the SCM (Fiske et al., 2002) to examine the way group members
appraise intergroup comparisons (Yzerbyt, 2016). Our research shows that the two fundamental dimensions offer the perfect ground for this compromising posture as members of real but also of minimal groups manifest a so-called compensation pattern along competence and warmth. In other words, when a group is judged to be better on the competence dimension than the other group, it also tends to be rated as less warm. This robust pattern shapes group members’ judgments as well as their behaviors (for a review, Kervyn et al., 2010).

A very important message of our research is that the standing of the groups cannot be interpreted as pointing to some kind of inherent characteristics. Rather, group members modulate their stereotypes as a function of the specific comparison context, i.e., the status/power and the cooperation/competition relations characterizing the groups in presence. Even more striking, our data show that the presence of intergroup conflict and the illegitimacy of the relative status difference both disrupt compensation (Cambon & Yzerbyt, 2016). In line with the justification role of stereotypes stressed by Tajfel (1981), this finding dovetails nicely with the idea that compensation is a form of intergroup perception that signals and contributes to the status quo of the social hierarchy. Several recent efforts suggest that ambivalence on the two dimensions emerges in the context of unequal social systems (for a review, see Durante & Fiske, 2017) and is observed more in countries characterized by moderate levels of conflict than in countries with very high or very low levels of conflict (Durante et al., 2017). By directly manipulating conflict levels and status differentials, our own work thus contributes to this literature by offering unique insights with respect to causality.

Importantly, while group members’ goal in ingroup and outgroup seems to be one of securing positive distinctiveness, the specific compensation pattern typically results from additional and indeed different concerns depending on whether people belong to the high-status or the low-status group in the given context. At the very least, normative pressures condemning discrimination are one set of considerations leading the dominant groups to give up superiority on warmth. In contrast, given the reality constraints of the status difference and the resulting differentiation on
competence, dominated groups find themselves tempted to claim greater warmth in an attempt to enhance their self-esteem.

As it turns out, the dynamics of intergroup comparison whereby group members may feel more or less constrained by their relative position on competence or warmth is reminiscent of social comparison work in the interpersonal domain. In line with the logic underlying our dimensional compensation model in intergroup contexts, a compensation pattern would also be expected to emerge when individuals compare themselves with each other. The confrontation with another person who is decidedly more competent or warmer is likely to have non-trivial consequences on how people want to see themselves on the other dimension (see chapter x).

Although the dynamics of intergroup stereotyping are a complex matter, this chapter shows that substantial progress is possible by bringing together such various research traditions as social perception on the one hand and intergroup relations on the other. At the same time, several questions remain unanswered. For instance, and in light of contemporary efforts stressing a series of nuances within each of the fundamental dimensions (Abele, Cuddy, Judd & Yzerbyt, 2008; Abele, Hauke et al., 2016), future research may want to consider whether compensation equally applies to the sub-dimensions of competence/agency, i.e., skills and assertiveness, and the sub-dimensions of warmth/communion, i.e., sociability and morality. Also, the specific role of compensation in ongoing interactions between groups and group members and its underlying mechanisms remain important topics for future endeavors. Indeed, giving up warmth on the part of high-status groups does not seem to derive solely from compliance with anti-discrimination norms but may likely serve other purposes, in relation to the justification function of stereotypes. In our view, a thorough understanding of the motives and contexts that prevail in the formation of intergroup stereotypes constitutes a captivating item on the research agenda.
References


