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# 5

## Intergroup Emotions and Self-Categorization

### The Impact of Perspective-Taking on Reactions to Victims of Harmful Behavior

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**D**uring the Kosovo war, thousands of civilians were thrown on the roads of their province in the middle of the winter in an attempt to escape the troops of Serbian ultra-nationalists. Most ended up as refugees in Albania. Many were reported to have died on their way to Albania or Montenegro. To be sure, the rest of the world did not remain insensitive, and international reactions took many forms. In Belgium, the dreadful situation of the Kosovars encouraged the Dutch- and French-speaking communities to unite their efforts to collect money. In a telethon that made history, some 1.3 billion Belgian francs were gathered—an impressive average of three U.S. dollars per capita. In other words, had the equivalent program and public reaction taken place in the United States, some 750 million dollars would have been raised!

In sharp contrast to what happened during the Bosnian war, the Belgian media never referred to religious issues. In the telethon program itself, journalists and entertainers alike did not make the slightest reference to religion. For political observers, this omission came as somewhat of a puzzle. For social psychologists interested in intergroup relations, the suspicion was even stronger. Would the benefit of the telethon have reached such remarkable figures had

the Belgian population, the vast majority of which is of Christian background, been explicitly reminded that most Kosovars are Muslims and that Serbs are Christians? The research presented in this chapter indicates that the answer to this question is a definite no. Indeed, we suggest that the generosity of the Belgian viewers may have been far less spectacular had the perpetrators and the victims in the Kosovo war been presented under a different light. The key factor, we argue, is that the potential donors, although not directly affected by the perpetrators' negative behavior, likely saw the victims as belonging to the same category as themselves. As a result they tended to appraise the situation in very much the same way as if they themselves had been involved in the situation. As it happens, various strands of research produced results compatible with our intuition that inclusion of ourselves and others in the same category or, for that matter, that a strong overlap between the self and other people will be of critical importance in shaping our emotions and our actions.

In a first section, we evaluate a number of research efforts that looked at the impact of merging other people and the self in the same unit (Heider, 1958). Starting with the work on self-expansion and on helping, we then examine related findings within the intergroup relations literature. We review evidence that people tend to equate self and others as long as they belong to the same category and explore recent empirical efforts showing the benefits of perspective-taking on stereotype control and ingroup bias. In the second section, we turn to the consequences of self-other overlap on the emergence of intergroup emotions and action tendencies. We quickly present Smith's (1993, 1999) appraisal model of intergroup emotions and concentrate on recent work devoted to the extended contact hypothesis and to the issue of collective guilt. In our third section, we provide an overview of our own research program on social emotions and behaviors. In several studies, we accumulated a very consistent set of findings showing the relevance of a self-categorization approach of emotional reactions and action tendencies. We conclude by stressing the relevance of self-other overlap and depersonalization in any attempt to understand and orient intergroup relations.

### PERSPECTIVE-TAKING AND SELF-CATEGORIZATION: WALKING THROUGH THE WORLD IN OTHER PEOPLE'S SHOES

As our introductory example suggests, the connection between the victims of dramatic events and distant observers is likely to be of crucial importance in shaping the observers' reactions. This very question has been at the heart of several lines of research. Indeed, the work on self-expansion, empathy and altruism, self-categorization, and perspective-taking all convey the message that

the degree of overlap between the others and the self has important affective, cognitive, and behavioral consequences.

In a most innovative research program, Aron and colleagues (for a recent review, see Aron, Aron, & Norman, 2000) proposed that human beings have a core motivation to expand the self. People are striving to acquire social and material resources, perspectives, and identities that enhance their ability to accomplish goals. By entering new relationships, the self presumably increases in diversity and in perceived self-efficacy. Aron and collaborators mounted an impressive set of data confirming that (rapid) expansion of the self indeed produces (strong) positive affective reactions (Aron, Norman, Aron, McKenna, & Heyman, 2000). These authors also report on experiments demonstrating that, in the context of close relationships, the other is literally included in the cognitive representation of the self (see also, Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996). For example, Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson (1991) found that, although participants were most likely to attribute both poles of pairs of opposite traits to self (for instance, they would indicate that the self is both extroverted and introverted), they also tended to choose both traits more often for a best friend than for a friendly acquaintance (Sande, Goethals, & Radloff, 1988). This pattern suggests that the knowledge structure representing the best friend resembles that of the self more than the knowledge structure of the friendly acquaintance.

Addressing the issue of cognitive representations more directly, Aron et al. (1991) asked married participants to rate 90 trait adjectives for their descriptiveness of themselves and their spouse. After a filler task, they then made a "me-not me" reaction time choice for each one of these traits. To the extent that the spouse is part of the self, any trait on which the two people differ should render the self-description decision more difficult to make, thereby increasing the reaction time. The data confirmed that there is indeed an overlap in the cognitive structures representing the self and close others.

Another domain obviously related to the issue of self-other overlap is prosocial behavior (for a review, see Dovidio & Penner, 2000). Within the context of the research on helping, the idea of seeing the other as part of the self is directly reminiscent of the notion of empathy. To the extent that empathy can be seen as some sort of confusion between the self and the other, we would expect self-other overlap to play a key role in the provision of help upon encountering a person in need. A number of studies support the idea that self-other overlap increases the likelihood that an observer will intervene and provide help. For instance, Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, Luce, and Neuberg (1997) found that participants' intention to help another person was mediated by both empathic feeling and inclusion of the other in the self. Interestingly, when both variables were entered in the equation, the impact of empathy was no longer significant and self-other overlap came out as the key mediator. Although Batson, Sager, Garst, Kang, Rubchinsky, & Dawson (1997; Batson, 1997, 1998) disputed

the strong conclusion that empathy is nothing but self–other merging, it seems clear that including the other in the self is a most efficient strategy to increase empathy among observers (Neuberg, Cialdini, Brown, Luce, Sagarin, & Lewis, 1997).

The impact of self–other overlap has also been shown in the context of intergroup relations. In an intriguing set of studies, Cadinu and Rothbart (1996) relied on minimal group settings (i.e., a context in which information about the other members of the group is virtually absent) to provide evidence that ingroup favoritism is essentially a self-anchoring effect. Participants in their study displayed a greater correlation between the self and ingroup ratings when the self-ratings were made before the ingroup ratings. Also, participants were more likely to generalize from the self to the ingroup than from the ingroup to the self. To be sure, we would argue that knowledge about the other(s) needs not be extensive for the self to start incorporating other people's characteristics. Moreover, people's familiarity with a great many groups in their social environment offers room for much flexibility in the merging process.

Stressing the changing nature of self–other overlap like no other approach, self-categorization theory (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987) suggests that the contextual salience of a given social identity leads group members to perceive themselves as interchangeable exemplars of the group rather than as unique individuals (Haslam, Turner, Oakes, McGarty, & Reynolds, 1998; Oakes, Haslam, & Turner, 1994; Turner & Onorato, 1999). This focus on the similarities between people and other members of the group has come to be known as the depersonalization process. The internalization of the same group concept and categorical attributes by all group members typically gives way to uniform behavior and has been used to account for such diverse phenomena as stereotyping, group polarization, social influence, and leadership (for a review, see Turner & Reynolds, 2000).

Although the depersonalization process is a key assumption of self-categorization theory, the empirical evidence demonstrating the confusion between the characteristics typical of the self and those typical of the ingroup long remained mostly indirect (but see Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996). In a study borrowing the paradigm used by Aron et al. (1991), Smith and Henry (1996) provided direct proof that the representations of the self and the ingroup overlapped and that ingroup members and ingroup features become part of the self. Indeed, these authors found that ingroup traits that matched the self gave rise to faster self-descriptive responses than ingroup traits that mismatched the self. Consistent with a large body of findings showing that the action generally takes place for the ingroup rather than for the outgroup (Brewer, 1999; Otten & Wentura, 1999; Yzerbyt, Castano, Leyens, & Paladino, 2000), no such difference was observed for the traits describing the outgroup. In a follow-up study, Smith, Coats, and Walling (1999) further showed that participants' perception of their standing on a given trait influenced their response time on the ingroup description

task. People were slower to indicate that a self-descriptive versus non-self-descriptive trait described the ingroup. Such an inhibition pattern is precisely what would be expected if the ingroup is defined in terms that match the ones used to describe the self. As a set, these studies provide strong evidence that the mental representations of the self and the ingroup indeed overlap.

Although the above data indicate that people see themselves as possessing characteristics that are similar to the ones possessed by their fellow group members, they hardly provide any hint that such overlap influences the way people interact with others, especially when these targets are members of negatively stereotyped social groups. A series of experiments by Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) on perspective-taking does just that.

In one study, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000, Exp. 1) borrowed a paradigm used by Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, and Jetten (1994) to explore the consequences of stereotype suppression (for a review, see Wenzlaff & Wegner, 2000). Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) gave participants a photograph of an elderly man and asked them to write an essay describing a typical day of the man either with suppression instructions ("previous research has demonstrated that thoughts and impressions are consistently influenced by stereotypic preconceptions, and therefore you should actively try to avoid thinking about the photographed target in such a manner"), perspective-taking instructions ("imagine a day in the life of this individual as if you were that person, looking at the world through his eyes and walking through the world in his shoes"), or no specific instructions. Participants then performed a lexical decision task before they wrote a second essay about a different elderly man.

As expected, both suppression and perspective-taking instructions reduced the stereotypicality of the first description compared to the control condition. Also, perspective-taking participants wrote a more positive essay than participants in the two other conditions. The key prediction concerned participants' performance on the lexical decision task. In line with earlier work showing rebound effects (i.e., the hyperaccessibility of the stereotype after a suppression episode), suppression participants were quicker to make a decision for stereotype-consistent traits than stereotype-inconsistent traits. In line with predictions, no such effect was obtained for perspective-taking and control participants. Clearly, thus, perspective-taking restricted the expression of stereotypical beliefs without provoking the usual facilitation for stereotype-consistent traits on the lexical decision task. In a follow-up study, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000, Exp. 2) adapted the paradigm used by Smith and Henry (1996) and further showed that the degree to which people see the self and the target of judgment as sharing a high number of characteristics is a direct predictor of the propensity to neglect stereotypic expectations.

In a final study, Galinsky and Moskowitz (2000) reasoned that, to the extent that ingroup favoritism can be seen as a direct consequence of the association between the ingroup and the self (Cadinu & Rothbart, 1996; Otten &

Moskowitz, 2000; Smith & Henry, 1996), any increase of the overlap between the self and the outgroup, by way of taking the perspective of an outgroup member, would reduce the strength and ubiquity of the bias. This is exactly what the data revealed. As it happens, the evaluation of the outgroup was raised to a level equivalent to that of the ingroup, thereby showing that it was not so much the ingroup that was seen as distinct from the self than the outgroup that was now merging with the self (Galinsky, in press). In our view, these data stress in a most unambiguous way the role of the links between the self and the target group in the emergence of intergroup phenomena.

In summary, the tendency to merge the self with the other, either by applying the characteristics of the self to the other or the characteristics of the other to the self, has been found to exert a profound influence on the way people take pleasure and satisfaction from a relationship or even provide help. At the intergroup level, there is also strong evidence that such phenomena as stereotyping or ingroup favoritism are shaped by a tendency to see overlap between the others and the self. In the next section, we turn to the effect of self-group overlap on emotional experiences.

### FROM SELF-OTHER OVERLAP TO INTERGROUP EMOTIONS

Remember the emerging impact of the telethon program designed to aid the refugees in Kosovo—with its emphasis on a somewhat indirect path to the emotional experience, this example stands in sharp contrast to what can generally be found in current work on emotion. Indeed, contemporary appraisal theories mainly address the issue of individual emotional experiences (Frijda, Kuipers & ter Schure, 1989; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1988; Smith & Ellsworth, 1985). They stage personal emotions as complex reactions to specific situations or events that include differentiated cognitions, feelings, and action tendencies. That is, an individual is believed to interpret a specific event mainly in terms of whether the event harms or favors the individual's goals and desires and whether the individual possesses or lacks the resources to cope with the event. This cognitive appraisal then triggers a specific emotional experience which, in turn, promotes particular behavioral reactions. Clearly, thus, little is said about the experience of emotions on behalf of other people, not to mention entire social groups.

In an attempt to move beyond such a highly individualized context, and building upon self-categorization theory (Turner et al., 1987), Smith (1993, 1999) proposed an extension of the appraisal models in which people were thought to be able to experience emotions on behalf of their group. In that model, individuals are not necessarily personally concerned with the event but they experience emotions because their group may be helped or hurt by it. The critical

factor here is the focus on individuals' identity. Importantly, Smith's (1993) model of social emotions insists on the idea that people may experience specific intergroup emotions instead of just a global and undifferentiated (and generally negative) affective reaction (Dijker, 1987). In turn, each specific emotion is thought to lead to a unique pattern of intergroup behaviors.

Several lines of research are consistent with the idea that people's situation as group members would lead them to experience emotions that would otherwise be absent if they persisted in seeing themselves as individuals. As a case in point, the work on fraternal relative deprivation (for recent examples, see Smith, Spears, & Hamstra, 1999; Tropp & Wright, 1999) holds that only when people embrace the social identity of a deprived group will they be in a position to experience a negative affective reaction to its full extent and engage in collective action in an attempt to set the record straight. There is also ample work to indicate that people feel happy or sad depending on the success or failure of their group even if they did not personally contribute to the outcome. Indeed, in a series of field studies, Cialdini, Borden, Thorne, Walker, Freeman, and Sloan (1976) observed that students wore more apparel displaying the logo of their university on Mondays following a victory of the local football team than on Mondays following a defeat or a draw. Moreover, students used the pronoun "we" significantly more to designate their team when they were asked to describe a victory of the university team than when they were asked to describe a defeat or a draw. This tendency was more pronounced when the student's public self had been threatened, for example, when they had personally failed a knowledge test.

In order to account for this so-called BIRG (Basking in Reflected Glory) effect, Cialdini and colleagues (1976) relied on Heider's (1958) balance concept. According to Heider, cognitive unit relations ("I am associated with the team") are accompanied by affective relations ("I have the same evaluative meaning as the team"). Framing the explanation as a self-presentation device, Cialdini et al. (1976) suggested that students are aware that this strive for consistency comes into play in other people's eyes. They thus very much want to underscore their association with the winning team. We doubt somewhat the sufficiency of the self-presentation account. Instead, we would claim that the association between the self and the ingroup is a consequence of a wholly intrapersonal process (i.e., an authentic emotional reaction to the success of their group).

A recent study by Boen, Vanbeselae, and Feys (2000) conducted on the Internet lends some credence to our intuition. These authors monitored the number of unique visitors on the most popular website attached to each one of the teams participating in the Belgian and Dutch soccer championships. They did this on the first working day after each game for half of the 1999–2000 soccer season. Boen et al. (2000) found that the number of visitors was significantly higher after a win than after a loss. Clearly, the largely private nature of

the behavior observed by Boen and colleagues militates against a pure self-presentational account and sits comfortably within our social emotional framework.

As it turns out, the behavior of even a single ingroup member may also have a dramatic impact on the way people react. Imagine that you are informed that one of your friends entertains a pleasant relationship with an outgroup member. Assuming that this ingroup member is seen as part of your self and that the outgroup member is part of that ingroup member's self, it is reasonable to expect that the outgroup member will be seen as part of your self. Because the outgroup is part of that outgroup member, one would anticipate some increase in the overlap between your self and the outgroup as a whole. This idea of transitivity in the self—other merging was tested in what has come to be known as the extended contact hypothesis (Wright, Aron, McLaughlin-Volpe, & Ropp, 1997). In one intriguing experiment, Wright et al. (1997, Exp. 4) used a modified minimal group paradigm and had participants believe that they were into one of two groups on the basis of their performance on an object estimation task. Participants then observed an ingroup and an outgroup member (both confederates) interacting. By way of verbal and nonverbal cues, the two confederates represented their relationship as that of close friends, unacquainted strangers, or disliked acquaintances. As expected, observation of an interaction between cross-group friends produced more positive evaluations of the outgroup than did observation of an interaction between an ingroup and an outgroup member who were either strangers or disliked acquaintances. Last but not least, Wright and colleagues (1997) found no evidence for an ingroup bias among those participants who had witnessed a cross-group friendship, whereas a clear ingroup bias emerged in the two other conditions. The message here can be seen as one more illustration of Heider's (1958) balance theory. Instead of the usual "my friend's friend is my friend," Wright et al.'s (1997) work illustrates the fact that "my group member's friend's group is my group."

From the perspective of the social emotions model, a major limitation of the above empirical efforts is that the emphasis remains on very broad evaluative reactions regarding the ingroup or the outgroup with limited attention devoted to specific emotional reactions. A notable exception is the work on collective guilt conducted by Doosje, Branscombe, Spears, and Manstead (1998). Using a minimal group paradigm study, Doosje et al. (1998, Exp. 1) informed participants about their alleged group membership (inductive thinkers) and asked them to evaluate ingroup and outgroup products. Depending on conditions, participants then learned that their fellow ingroup members had displayed a high versus low level of bias in their evaluations. Also, they were told about their high or low level of personal bias. Participants' reactions indicated that they felt more collective guilt when their group had been biased, especially when they themselves believed that they had not systematically undervalued the outgroup. Moreover, these feelings were linked to participants' compensa-

tory behavior. In a follow-up study focusing on the Dutch as a group, Doosje et al. (1998, Exp. 2) not only measured participants' identification with their national group but they also manipulated the historical treatment of Indonesia, a former Dutch colony, by the Dutch. Participants learned that their ancestors had done a lot of good things, a lot of negative things, or both good and bad things for Indonesia during the colonial period. As expected, compared to low identifiers, high identifiers felt much less guilty and were less willing to compensate for behaviors, but only when the past treatment of the outgroup was open to some interpretation. The data also confirmed that the feeling of guilt mediated participants' compensatory behavior. As can be seen, the nice twist about these studies is that they minimized as much as possible participants' personal responsibility for the actions of their group.

To sum up, several lines of research—like the work on fraternal relative deprivation, basking in reflected glory, and extended intergroup contact—are all congruent with the idea that people may experience emotions as a result of their taking into consideration their association with a particular group. Perhaps closest to our present argument, however, the work on collective guilt offers suggestive evidence that people may be sensitive to information regarding their fellow group members. As a result, they manifest specific emotional reactions and engage in significant behaviors. Despite this, there is a shortage of research that meets with the ambition of the appraisal model of social emotions. The next section deals with a research program specifically aimed at showing the importance of group membership, whether contextually salient or chronically accessible, in the emergence of specific social emotions and their associated action tendencies.

## SELF-CATEGORIZATION, ANGER, AND OFFENSIVE TENDENCIES

According to appraisal theories, anger at another person is likely to result when the individual believes that the other has harmed the self and the self has the proper resources to react. Applying this idea to the group situation, Mackie, Devos, and Smith (2000; Devos, Silver, Mackie, & Smith, this volume) predicted and, indeed, found that group members experience anger and report offensive tendencies if they had the impression that their ingroup benefited from greater collective support than the outgroup.

Although we have also been interested in anger as a critical intergroup emotion, our research agenda took a somewhat different path and aimed at addressing the following related questions: Are people capable of experiencing anger when other individuals are harmed by unfair and intentional outgroup behavior, and is the role of categorization of those victims as ingroup or as outgroup at all relevant? A quick look at the literature on emotions indicates

that people seem to experience some difficulty in feeling angry on behalf of somebody else. In fact, previous research has shown that observers prefer to believe that other people get what they deserve, especially when they do not have the possibility to compensate the victims (Lerner, 1980). Consequently, observers are not very likely to empathize with victims. One way of inducing more empathy with victims is by telling observers to imagine themselves in the negative circumstances of the victims (Aderman, Brehm, & Katz, 1974). All in all, however, previous research did not pay much attention to the experience of anger on behalf of other people. This is hardly surprising if one looks closely at the specific characteristics of anger. Indeed, emotion theories generally assume that anger is only experienced when one perceives a situation that concerns oneself (Frijda et al., 1989).

Building upon Smith's (1993) model, we hypothesized that observers may also be likely to experience anger toward the perpetrator, especially if the victims can be seen as part of the ingroup and the perpetrator can be seen as part of an outgroup. One obvious approach to test our model would be to rely on individual differences in group identification. Our analysis suggests that, compared to low identifiers, high identifiers would be more likely to feel angry when confronted with victims who are members of their ingroup. There is one difficulty with this strategy, as people's group identification may be related to their aptitude to empathize with others in general. Therefore, we initially wanted to take a more radical approach by trying to alter in a straightforward manner the way people construct their surrounding environment. By manipulating the social context, we hoped to show that the appraisal of the social situation significantly influences people's reactions to intergroup events over and above the impact of existing differences in people's personality.

In a first study (Gordijn, Wigboldus, Hermesen, & Yzerbyt, 1999), we used the crosscutting categorization paradigm to categorize the victims as part of the same group as the participants or as part of an outgroup (for a meta-analysis, see Urban & Miller, 1998). In the crosscutting categorization paradigm, the target is part of the outgroup on one dimension and part of the ingroup on another dimension. In order to manipulate the categorization of the victims, psychology students from the University of Amsterdam were told that the researchers were interested in differences in impression formation between students of different majors (for example, math students versus psychology students), or that the researchers were interested in differences in impression formation between students of different universities (for example, University of Amsterdam versus Free University).

Participants in both conditions were then asked to read an article reporting on a math student of the Free University who had used the Internet facilities of the psychology department to illegally enter the Pentagon computer. The student had been caught, and the Free University had decided to close the computer room at the psychology department for some period of time. In sum,

the psychology students of the Free University were the people harmed by the behavior of a math student of the Free University. A focus on differences between students of different majors should make the target appear to belong to the same group as the participants (psychology students). In contrast, a focus on differences between students of different universities should make the target appear to belong to a different group than the participants (students of the Free University).

Participants then rated their feelings on a series of 7-point scales, three related to anger (outraged, aggressive, and angry) and three to happiness (happy, related, and cheerful). Globally, participants reported feeling more happy than




FIGURE 5.1. Intensity of happiness and anger as a function of the categorization of the participants and the victims.

anger upon reading the newspaper article (see Figure 5.1). More importantly, and in line with predictions, results showed that the same negative behavior of an outgroup member that harms others led to more anger among participants when their perception was focused on similarities rather than on differences between the harmed group and themselves. This pattern implies that an emotion such as anger can be influenced by the way one perceives the people being harmed but only when similarities rather than differences between oneself and the victims are salient, implying that they belong to one's ingroup.

Although this experiment offers initial support for our analysis, it also has some limitations. First of all, the absence of a control group makes it difficult to see whether people feel *more angry* when similarities with the victims are made salient or whether they feel *less angry* when differences are made salient. Indeed, according to social identity theory (Tajfel, 1982), people are inclined to discriminate against groups they do not belong to in order to enhance their self-esteem. People could thus feel satisfied and not angry to see an outgroup being harmed. A second limitation is that we restricted ourselves to an evaluation of anger and happiness. It is not clear however whether negative affect in general is influenced or whether it is just anger-related feelings that are affected by our manipulation. A third limitation concerned the fact that it is not obvious whether the observers were angry as a result of the math student's behavior, or if they were angry with the university because it closed down the computer room. It is thus important to disambiguate the target of participants' emotional reaction.

To deal with these issues, we conducted another study (Gordijn, Wigboldus, & Yzerbyt, 2001). A control group in which the focus of attention of participants was not manipulated was added to the design. Further, a situation was chosen which was likely to cause anger rather than anxiety. As a matter of fact, although anger and anxiety share the same negative valence, they are based on very different appraisals of the situation. If the situation is appraised as if the perpetrator is behaving in an intentional and unfair way with respect to the victims and these victims have a sense that they have the power to do something about it, anger rather than anxiety should be experienced. Finally, a story was selected in which it was clear who was causing anger in the participants. We expected that anger rather than anxiety would be influenced as a function of categorization of the victims. In addition, the direction of influence was explored: that is, it was tested whether the perception of the victims as outgroup causes happiness or whether the perception of the victims as ingroup causes anger in comparison to the control group.

In order to manipulate the *categorization of the people who were harmed (target)*, one third of the participants, the different group condition, were told that the researchers were interested in differences in impression formation between students of different universities (for example, University of Amsterdam versus Leiden University). A second third, the same group condition, learned that the researchers were interested in differences in impression formation

between students and professors. Finally, the rest of the participants, the control condition, were just told that the study was about impression formation with no indication of a particular focus. Next, participants were asked to carefully read an article that allegedly had appeared in the Leiden University newspaper.

This time, a story was developed in which it was described that the board of Leiden University was thinking about various ways to help the University become a smaller and more exclusive university with only the best students of the Netherlands. Students at Leiden University were shocked by such possible decisions as introducing admission exams, increasing tuition for slow students, removing students who do not pass their exams, and the like. Because they had not been informed about the decision, and especially because they were not allowed to participate in the decision-making process, students were planning various forms of protest. Thus, the negatively behaving source was described as a committee of professors of Leiden University, and the Leiden students were the victims. Various pieces of information collected in a pilot study confirmed that the story was inducing anger as intended.

After reading the information, participants were asked to rate their feelings on 7-point scales, three related to anger (angry, outraged, and aggressive), three to happiness (happy, elated, and cheerful), and three to anxiety (anxious, powerless, and helpless). In order to check our manipulation, we asked participants in the different and in the similar target conditions among which groups the study was carried out. Clearly, our manipulations were found to be highly successful. We also asked participants to what extent they felt similar to students of Leiden University, and to what extent they saw students of Leiden University and of the University of Amsterdam as similar. Interestingly, participants indicated that they felt more similar to the Leiden students in the similar target condition than in the different target and control conditions, these two conditions showing no differences in the perception of similarity.

Results strongly supported our hypotheses: Participants felt more angry than happy. Anxiety was intermediate (see Figure 5.2). The critical interaction effect between feelings and categorization of the target also emerged. Additional analyses confirmed that anger was differentially influenced by the manipulation of similarity. Participants felt more angry when their attention was focused on the fact that they belonged to the same category as the target than when their attention was focused on differences or when their focus of attention on category was not manipulated, the latter conditions not being different from each other. Happiness was also differentially influenced by the manipulation of similarity. Indeed, participants felt less happy when their attention was focused on the fact that they themselves and the target belonged to the same category than when their attention was focused on differences or when their focus of attention on category was not manipulated. Again, the latter two conditions were not different from each other. Finally, the data revealed no significant differences for anxiety as a function of the manipulation of target category.




FIGURE 5.2. Intensity of anxiety, happiness, and anger as a function of the categorization of the participants and the victims.

Clearly, these findings show that the unfair and intentional behavior of the perpetrator influenced anger rather than anxiety as a function of categorization. Interestingly, the data obtained for the control group suggest that a focus on differences is the default option and that observers are more likely to spontaneously categorize victims as different rather than as similar, a pattern reminiscent of the classic just world findings (Lerner, 1980).

The first couple of studies provides unambiguous evidence of the dramatic consequences of a subtle change in the way people are led to categorize themselves with respect to victims of the harmful behavior of an outgroup. The merits of these experiments notwithstanding, a series of interesting questions remained unanswered. First, we included a limited set of negative emotions

and did not put anger in competition with a closely related emotion—namely fear. Second, we had no evidence regarding the impact of the categorization context on factors other than emotions. Still, in line with appraisal theories of emotion, it would be most important to see whether the emotional experience would also translate into a specific action tendency. A related objective is to examine whether the emotional experience indeed mediates the impact of self-categorization factors on some specific action tendency. Finally, according to self-categorization theory, people are likely to self-stereotype as a function of their level of identification with the group. High identifiers are expected to adopt the prototypical behavior of the ingroup to a larger extent than low identifiers. Clearly, thus, it would be important to examine the moderating role of group identification in the emergence of the emotional experience and, ultimately, in the occurrence of the behavioral reactions toward the outgroup (Branscombe & Wann, 1992; Doosje et al., 1998).

To address these various issues, we designed a new study (Yzerbyt, Dumont, Wigboldus, & Gordijn, 2000). Concretely, participants were contacted in university libraries and invited to take part in a study that allegedly aimed at surveying people's opinions about a series of events that had recently appeared in national newspapers. For half of the participants, the written instructions presented on the first page of the booklet made the aims of the study (i.e., comparing the opinions of students and those of professors) very explicit. On the bottom of the page, these same participants were asked to indicate whether they were a student, a professor, or something else. For the remaining participants, the instructions unambiguously indicated that the study aimed at comparing the opinions of the students at University of Louvain at Louvain-la-Neuve (UCL) and those at the University of Gent. On the bottom of the page, participants were asked to report whether they were a student at UCL, at the Free University of Brussels, at the University of Gent, or elsewhere.

Next, participants filled in a group identification scale. Depending on the experimental condition, the items were written with respect to the group of students or to the group of students at the UCL. On the next page, participants then read a photocopy of a text allegedly taken from a national newspaper. The story was that the Board of the University of Gent had decided to start using English as the sole language in the third, fourth, and fifth year of University. The same general components as before had been used as means to ensure that anger was the most likely reaction to the text. After they had read the text, participants were asked to indicate their feelings on a series of 12 rating scales. Three items concerned anger, three were related to depression, three had to do with fear, and three were associated with happiness. Finally, participants used rating scales to indicate to what extent they endorsed each one of 12 action tendencies. As for the emotions, three of the action tendencies concerned anger, three were related to depression, three had to do with fear, and three were associated with happiness. Finally, a series of filler questions were included in order to ascertain the success of the manipulation.



Our results fully corroborated our hypotheses. Looking at participants facing a context in which the distinct memberships of themselves and the victims were emphasized, we only found a significant main effect of emotion. Not surprisingly, participants reported feeling more anger than any other emotion. Also, they seemed somewhat less depressed and happy than fearful. Turning to those participants confronted with a context stressing their common group membership with the victims, the main effect of emotion was significant (see Figure 5.3). Once again, participants reported feeling more anger than any other emotion. Interestingly, they also reported feeling less happiness than any other




FIGURE 5.3. Intensity of emotion as a function of the participants' identification with the group (when the context stresses the common group membership with the victims).

emotion. Fear and depression fell in between these two extremes. More importantly, the data also reveal the presence of a significant emotion by identification interaction, thereby confirming the fact that the impact of the story was more pronounced among high identifiers than among low identifiers. In complete agreement with our predictions, significant comparisons for anger and happiness indicated that the story made high identifiers more angry and less happy than their less identified colleagues.

A distinct goal of this study was to examine the joint impact of category salience and group identification on action tendencies. Paralleling the data for




FIGURE 5.4. Action tendency as a function of the participants' identification with the group (when the context stresses the common group membership of the victims).

emotions, the answers given to the action tendency questions revealed the presence of a significant interaction between emotion and identification for those participants who were confronted with a common group membership (see Figure 5.4) but not for those who were led to think about a distinct group membership. Additional analyses confirmed that high identifiers who were reminded of a common group membership stated that they wanted to "move against" the perpetrator more than low identifiers.

The next step in our analysis sought to test the highly specific prediction that anger, along with its associated action tendencies, would be more extreme when both the contextual forces and the personal characteristics combine to exacerbate the inclusion of the victims in the self. An a priori contrast opposing the common group membership/high identification condition to the three others confirmed the validity of this prediction both for the emotion and for the offensive action tendency. Finally, we wanted to test the hypothesis that emotions would mediate their respective action tendency. Indeed, a mediational analysis confirmed that the offensive action tendencies were entirely mediated by the emotional reactions of anger.

In sum, this third study not only replicates our earlier studies, but it also extends our findings in several important ways. First, we were again able to establish the distinctive impact of the observed event on the emotional experience of our participants. In contrast to what was observed for anger, two other negative emotions, namely fear and depression, proved to be largely unaffected by our manipulation of category salience and by participants' level of identification with the salient category. Second, and more importantly, we found supportive evidence for the combined impact of category salience and identification on the emotional experience. Specifically, the salience of similarity was found to generate angry feelings among participants only to the extent that they strongly identified with the relevant category. Third, we were able to show that the impact of the independent variables was not limited to emotional consequences but had an influence at the conative level as well. Finally, we also showed that the tendency to oppose the perpetrator and react to the event was largely mediated by the degree to which angry feelings had been triggered in the first place.

To sum up, we accumulated an impressive amount of evidence showing that the extent to which people perceive themselves to be similar to the victims of harmful behavior influences both their emotions and their action tendencies. In complete agreement with Smith's (1993, 1999) model of social emotions, we found the emotional experiences to be extremely specific and to play a mediational role in the emergence of behaviors.

## CONCLUSIONS

One of the key messages of the present chapter is that people experience emotions on behalf of others as long as they see others as fellow ingroup members.

Because human beings are fundamentally inclined to merge the characteristics of their self with those of the members of their group, they appraise the situations confronted by those people, experience feelings on their behalf, and manifest behavioral tendencies just as if they themselves were going through the episode. Over the course of several studies, our findings deliver a highly consistent message. Our initial demonstration ascertained the impact of the contextual salience of social categories in the emergence of negative emotions (Gordijn et al., 1999). In a subsequent experiment, we also established the importance to discriminate between several negative emotions (Gordijn et al., 2001). Finally, we extended our analysis to show the joint impact of contextual salience and chronic social identification in the emergence of specific affective and conative reactions (Yzerbyt et al., 2000). As a set, these studies offer strong evidence that appraisal theories of emotion, when applied to the intergroup level, offer much promise not only to further our understanding of the phenomenology of group membership but also to improve the quality of our prediction with respect to intergroup behavior. As a matter of fact, people's reactions in an intergroup context can only rarely be traced back to events that they experienced for themselves. The extent to which people see others as belonging to the same category as themselves will be of utmost importance for such critical things as collective action, improvement of the intergroup relations, and the like.

We started this chapter with anecdotal evidence from a TV show. Clearly, Belgian viewers were induced to see civilians undergoing dreadful events in their lives hundreds of miles away as people who were pretty much like them. Whether there was a conscious strategy on the part of the media people or on the part of some parties involved in the conflict remains of course an open question. As such, the factors promoting the specific demarcation of the social environment should be a most fascinating issue for future research. Once a particular social landscape was being adopted, however, there was a general momentum in the coverage of the events that tended to associate Western European citizens with the victims of the Serbian regime. Despite this, the research reviewed in the present chapter suggests that a systematic reference to the fact that these people may be in some profound and significant way different from the observers would have tempered the generosity that manifested itself during that historic TV show. Such is the power of social emotions!

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